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ABSTRACT 
Struggle over space is at the core of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Different actors are 
involved in this struggle. The Israeli occupation with its planning system, and the Israeli settlers, 
since the beginning of the occupation, has been enforcing different policies of using space to 
achieve control over the Palestinians. The Palestinian authority with its planning system under 
the Israeli policies of control does not have enough power to deal with the different spatial 
problems that face planning endeavor. Palestinian planners find their autonomy challenged and 
abilities limited under Israeli policies of control. Among different actors in the spatial struggle in 
the Palestinian Territories (PT) are Palestinian people who despite their deep suffering from the 
Israeli policies of control continue making claim to their rights to use space through their spatial 
practices.  
Within this complexity of struggle over space in the context of occupation, between actors 
seeking control and those who resist that control and groups claiming their conflicting rights to 
the same space, I aim to understand whether and how spatial planning could play a role by 
understanding the relationship between space, power, and planning. Existing literature is limited 
in its ability to explain this role. For example, post colonial planning literature, theoretically, 
addresses the problem of planning as becoming a tool to achieve control. Additionally, radical 
planning and insurgent planning approaches discuss how in authoritarian political contexts, 
transformation can be achieved by the engagement of populace in a kind of covert radical or 
insurgent planning. However, existing literature is mostly focused on conflict between 
authoritarian state and its citizens, not a state of occupation that involves an occupation of 
indigenous state and citizens. 
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In order to achieve its goal, the research asks this main question: what is the role of spatial 
planning in the struggle over space (control and resistance) in the complex context of occupation, 
and what are the probabilities and the constraints of professional planners’ intervention in such 
complex context? Since Palestine has a long history of occupation and domination and the 
phenomenon of the use of planning in the struggle over space in the Palestinian areas is 
historically rooted, the research takes an historical approach and examines this relationship in 
two distinct historical colonial periods: the British Mandate in Palestine and the current Israeli 
occupation. The study hopes to result into conceptual contributions for spatial planning in the PT. 
The conceptualization of this research will provide an understanding for future studies about 
planning in cities under deep political conflict such as occupation. It will develop the idea of 
planning as a form of resistance. 
The significance of this research lies in its addressing lack of knowledge about planning 
within the complex context of colonial/occupational areas. It has practical and conceptual 
contributions. Practically, it documents processes and decisions of planning under occupation. 
Conceptually, the study contributes to scholarship in planning and political geography by 
illuminating the spatial practices of different actors in their spatial struggle. To planning 
scholarship it adds voice to those who have called for an expanded definition of planning. That is 
planning is not limited to practices of trained professionals. Rather it includes everyday spatial 
practices of people that are powerful in shaping the space and its territorial control.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, power and space have been in an intense and mutual 
relationship.  Space has been used in the exercise of power, and it also has been used to release 
and display power.   In this context, power does not only mean the power from above: the power 
to dominate, to control, to impose order from top downwards.   It is also the power from below: 
the bottom-up power, the power to resist.   That is, control is in a “dyadic” relationship with 
resistance, and space is the main arena of the practices of this dichotomy in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPT).    
In this struggle of control and resistance over space in the OPT, different actors are involved 
using both built and open spaces: the Israeli state with its planning system; the Palestinian 
Authority with its planning system; the Israeli settlers1; and the Palestinian people2.   Since the 
beginning of the Israeli occupation3, the Israeli system has been enforcing different policies of 
using space (built and open) to achieve control over the Palestinians.  The Palestinian authority 
with its planning system under the Israeli policies of control faces multiple constraints.  It does 
not have enough power to deal with the spatial problems that face planning endeavors, and it 
needs to operate under the Israeli policies of control.  The Palestinian planners, therefore, find 
themselves limited as their work is affected for the most part by their compromised position 
under the Israeli planning system, of which the main objective is to achieve control over the 
Palestinians.    
 
1 The Israelis who live in the Israeli settlements that have been built on the Palestinian land in the OPT. 
2 The Palestinians who live in the OPT. 
3 The Israeli authorities ruled historic Palestine in 1948 and established the Israeli state in the areas that are now 
known as the 1948 territories. In 1967, the Israelis took over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which are now the OPT. 
In this dissertation, whenever I use OPT, I refer to this definition of the Palestinian territories. 
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Among the different actors in the spatial struggle4 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are 
the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian people.   The Israeli settlers’ role in this struggle over space 
can be conceived as agents and tools for the Israeli occupational system of control.   They 
conduct different practices of occupying the Palestinian land and buildings.   At the same time, 
the Israeli state uses the Israeli settlers as tools to assist Israeli presence on the ground in the OPT, 
and thus as mechanisms for control.  The Palestinian people in this struggle over space, despite 
the different strategies to achieve control by the Israeli state and settlers, continue their claim to 
their rights to use space through their own spatial practices.   
As a result of this complex struggle over space, the Palestinian Territories contend with a 
variety of spatial problems in which Palestinian planning authorities can play a limited role to 
resolve.  This study aims to understand the role of planning in dealing with this complexity by 
understanding the relationship between space, power, and planning.   In other words, the study 
explores the role of spatial planning in the struggle over space in the complex context of 
occupation.   
Existing literature on the role of planning from the perspective of subordinates in the 
complex context of occupation is limited.  Colonial and post-colonial planning literature (King, 
1976; Yiftachel, 1995, 2009) greatly addresses the role of planning as a tool to achieve control, 
especially by colonizers seeking control in the colonies.  Post-colonial planning literature 
criticizes the application of western planning theories in non-western societies as an expression 
and means of domination through planning.  This perspective calls instead for local, domestic, 
and contextual planning.   Additionally, radical planning and insurgent planning literature 
 
4 Struggle over space in the OPT occurs both as a military actions and as everyday spatial practices. This dissertation 
focuses on the non-military everyday spatial practices.    
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discuss planning in the face of control, such as Beard (2003), Miraftab (2009), Holston (2009), 
and Perera (2009).  But their concerns are with political contexts where domination is achieved 
through direct authoritarian rule or indirect inclusion. They argue that transformation can be 
achieved by the engagement of the populace in forms of covert or radical and insurgent planning.   
For this literature, the engagement of the people is itself a kind of insurgent practice or action.   
The main characteristic of these practices to be considered insurgent is informality, and the main 
objective is to destabilize the hegemonic regime (Roy, 2009). This is through different practices 
according to different authors: through practices of “insurgent citizenship” in the face of 
“differentiated citizenship” (Holston, 2009), or through practices of disruption in neoliberal 
governance (Miraftab, 2009), or through practices of unorganized processes of space-making 
through ordinary people over any official plan (Perera, 2009), or by settling exclusively in the 
shadow of formal spaces, in “gray spaces” excluded for city membership (Yiftachel, 2009).  A 
detailed review of this literature is presented in Chapter Two.      
However, this literature is limited to conflicts between the authoritarian state and its citizens 
or minorities and social groups.   It is not dealing with the conflict between a state of occupation 
and a state of occupied citizens.   In an occupied or colonial area, there are two systems of 
planning: the local (indigenous) planning system and the planning system of the occupation.   In 
this context, the occupying planning system operates to achieve control of both the local state 
and local people, a mode of ruling that produces complex difficulties facing the local planning 
system.  There is a pre-assumption that planning authorities are taken for granted in the hands of 
sovereign state. However, in the context of occupation the local (indigenous) state is not a 
sovereign one; it does not have enough power; it is limited and occupied. Therefore, in the 
context where the sovereign (local) state does not exist, how can the local indigenous planning 
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system operate in the face of the occupying planning system? 
In this context, this dissertation contributes to literature on radical and insurgent planning by 
examining the role of indigenous planning in negotiations of power and control over space.   
Examining planning authorities and citizens whose decisions are constrained by the rule of the 
Israeli state, the study aims to unfold the multiple layers of complex politics involved in spatial 
planning as a means of social control.   It explores the role of indigenous planning and occupying 
planning in occupied areas.   It hopes to result in conceptual contributions for spatial planning in 
the OPT.   The conceptualization of this research provides an understanding for future studies 
about planning in cities under deep political conflict such as occupation.   It helps us to better see 
the limitations and possibilities of planning as a form of control and as a form of resistance.     
Since Palestine has a long history of occupation and domination5, this dissertation takes a 
historical approach to understand the role of spatial planning in the struggle (of control and 
resistance) over space in the complex conditions of occupation.   The phenomenon of the use of 
spatial planning in the struggle over space in the Palestinian areas is historically rooted.   Both 
open and built spaces have been the arena for the practices of the dyad control/resistance by the 
different actors across the long history of Palestine.  This dissertation concerns the role of open 
space in Palestinian/Israeli spatial struggle.  For that it examines afforestation planning practices 
during the British Mandate (1917-1948) and the Israeli domination (1948-present); and internal 
closure policies that impose movement restrictions in the OPT (see figure 1.1).  A detailed 
 
5 Historic Palestine had been for a long time under the rule of foreign invaders. It was ruled by the Romans from 
Early Roman Period 63 BCE until late Roman Period III 330 CE, and the Byzantines from 330-638 CE. Muslim 
Caliphate rule in Palestine was from 638-1099 CE. Then Palestine was invaded and ruled by the Western Crusaders 
from 1099-1244. The Muslim Mamluks ruled from 1244-1517. Followed by the Ottoman Turks, from 1517-1917. In 
the twentieth century (from 1917-1948) it was ruled by the British until the Israelis took rule over Palestine in 1948 
(Parkes, 1949). 
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discussion of the research methodology is included in Chapter Two.        
    
1.1 Background: The Complexity of the Struggle over Space in the OPT 
Struggle over space in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) is very complex due to the 
fact that different actors are involved in the struggle with their different spatial practices and 
aims.   Four main bodies of actors are involved in the struggle over space in the Palestinian 
territories: the Israeli state with its planning system; the Palestinian authority with its planning 
system; the Israeli settlers; and the Palestinian people.   Some of these actors, using their own 
spatial practices, seek control while others seek resistance, which in turns makes planning in the 
OPT a very complex task.   There is an intertwined pattern of control/resistance using both open 
and built spaces among the groups of actors.   This section discusses different spatial policies 
used by different actors in the spatial struggle in the OPT.   
The Israeli occupation authorities use both built and open spaces as an arena to achieve 
control over the Palestinians.   They impose different policies to achieve this control.   Policies 
that focus on built spaces to achieve control include building regulations and building demolition 
policies.   As a kind of punishment, the Israeli authorities used to employ the policy of 
demolition of the Palestinians’ houses and other buildings, which Graham (2003) has called a 
policy of “urbicide” or a “wholesale urbicide.”   The Israeli occupation has worked with the 
analysis and prescriptions of demographers, statisticians, geographers, architects and planners to 
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deepen its control over the three dimensional spaces of the Occupied Territories.   The Israeli 
occupation has used architecture and planning as the “continuation of war by other means” 
(Graham, 2003, p. 180).   Like the tank, gun and bulldozer, building matters and infrastructure 
have been used by the Israeli occupation to achieve tactical and strategic aims in controlling the 
Palestinian territories (ibid).    
In addition to destruction and demolition of the Palestinian built spaces, the Israeli 
occupation authorities require permission for new buildings.  For the Palestinians this means 
engaging in an endless bureaucratic process that usually ends with refusal. For example in 1986, 
the number of building permits issued by the Israelis in areas outside main municipalities in the 
West Bank was 381 out of 2,370 applications; and in 1989, although the number of building 
permits issued had increased, it was still about 22% (358 permits out of 1,586 applications) 
(Coon, 1992, p. 133). These restrictive policies imposed by the Israelis on Palestinian building 
and development had been sustained after the division of the Palestinian territories into A, B and 
C zones through the Oslo II agreement,6 (see map 1.1).  Through this agreement, the West Bank 
was divided into A, B and C zones, which are of different status regarding the nature of security 
control over them: area A, where most Palestinians live, has full Palestinian security and 
Palestinian civil control; area B has Israeli security and Palestinian civil control; and area C is 
under full Israeli control. By September 2000, area A totaled 18%, whereas area C was 60%.  
Within this context, new buildings in most of the Occupied Territories (areas within zone C) 
 
6 The Oslo II agreement was between the Palestinians and Israel. It was signed September 24, 1995, in Washington, 
D.C., by the chairman of the PLO, Yassir Arafat, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin and the US president Bill 
Clinton. This agreement was a follow up of the Oslo Agreement from two years earlier, the first peace agreement 
between Israel and Palestine and served as a continuation of the fragile peace process of the Middle East. The actual 
content of Oslo II concerned the West Bank, and covered security issues, Palestinian elections, transfer of land, 
transfer of civil power from Israel to Palestine, trade conditions between the two countries and the release of 
Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons.  
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required permission from the Israeli authorities. 
Policies of using built spaces to achieve control also include encroachment or ‘closure’ 
practices over specific buildings, and the policy of construction and destruction.  The 
Palestinians’ “bare life” has been the target of the Israeli authorities.  The Israeli authorities apply 
what has been called by Kearns (2007) “bio-politics” to achieve sovereignty in the OPT.  
Through long periods of curfews and siege, the Israeli occupation prohibits the Palestinian 
people from using commercial buildings and thus undermines the Palestinian economy and 
attacks the Palestinian people by erecting obstacles to their daily needs.  The Israeli occupation 
also imposes the policy of occupying specific buildings (public buildings or private houses) and 
transforming them to military points, and closing specific public buildings such as schools and 
universities.  The neighborhood of Jabal Johar in Al-Khalil (Hebron) is a good example where in 
2001 the Israelis took control of three schools with a combined enrolment of 1,835 pupils and 
established a military encampment on their premises (Lein, 2001, p. 41).  
Most importantly, the Israeli policies of using built-up spaces as an arena to control the OPT 
include construction as well as destruction.   Parallel with damaging, destroying, occupying and 
restricting different kinds of Palestinian buildings, the Israeli occupation builds Israeli 
settlements and a network of bypass roads to connect them over the Palestinian land (see map 
1.2).  The Palestinian built-up spaces, however, are not the only arena used to achieve control for 
the Israeli occupation.  Open spaces also form a vital arena for that control.   
Israeli policies that focus on open spaces to achieve control include the policy of anti-
afforestation towards the Palestinian farms and plantations, the repeated occupation of main 
squares and plazas in the Palestinian cities, and the internal closure policy.   The Israeli 
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authorities impose not only the policy of, using Graham’s (2003) term, “urbicide” on the 
Palestinian built spaces, but, I argue, they are also busy in enforcing the policy of ruralcide.  It is 
the policy of ‘anti-afforestation’ that includes attacking and damaging the Palestinian farmlands, 
and cutting and uprooting Palestinian trees and plantations.  Ruralcide or anti-afforestation (and 
afforestation) policies, and internal closure policy by the Israeli occupation are a principal topic 
in this dissertation.  
It is worth mentioning that the current Israeli polices using open spaces in order to impose 
control over the OPT have their origins in the Zionists’ planning ideas for Palestine.   From the 
beginning of their domination in Palestine, the Israeli authorities have attempted to consume 
open spaces of Palestine in order to prevent any Palestinian growth.   This is demonstrated in the 
first Israeli National Master Plan (the Sharon Plan) of 1949.   The main concept of this plan was 
to disperse the Israeli new towns within the Palestinian landscape (Efrat, 2004, p. 8).  The 
incoming Jewish immigrants of the time were dispersed within 30 new towns and about 400 new 
agrarian settlements that replaced about 400 erased Palestinian villages (p. 8).   This spatial plan 
helped (and is still helping) control the space of Palestine by connecting these dispersed nodes 
together with a huge spatial organization of road networks (the bypass roads).   Thus, the Israeli 
attempts at controlling the OPT are not only through regulations and restrictions of the use of 
land but also through consuming the existing available land to prevent any Palestinian growth 
and development.    
The Palestinian planning system represents the second group of actors in the struggle over 
space in the OPT.   The Palestinian planning apparatus was first established with the declaration 
of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1995 by the Oslo peace 
process. It consists of three levels: the Higher Planning Council (HPC), the Regional Planning 
10 
 
Committees (governorates level) and the Local Planning Committees (municipal and village 
councils).   Planning responsibilities are divided between the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the 
Ministry of Local Government (MoLG).   The MoP is responsible for the physical planning 
issues on regional (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and national levels, and the MoLG takes the 
responsibilities of planning at the local level (municipalities and village councils).  
The Palestinian planning system is working with great limitations and constraints.  The 
division of the Palestinian Territories into zones A, B and C under Oslo Agreement II, as 
mentioned earlier in this Chapter, greatly contributed to the various limitations and challenges 
that the Palestinian planning system faces.  These challenges are related to the limited areas that 
are under the PNA control according to Oslo Agreement II.  The Palestinian planning system is 
responsible for planning issues in areas within zones A and B, which form only 40% of the 
Palestinian Territories. The remaining areas (60% of the OPT) within zone C, in which most of 
the Palestinian localities lay, are the responsibility of the Israeli authorities—represented by the 
Civil Administration.  So, in areas of zone C the Palestinian village councils prepare the 
documents for needed development and through the MoLG submit them to the Israeli authorities, 
namely the planning department of the Civil Administration, for final decision.   
Areas in zone A, which are under full Palestinian control, are the centers of the main cities, 
already exhausted and dense, and are subject to Israeli intervention through military operations. 
Most of the needed development for the Palestinian Territories lay within zones B and C, which 
means facing the Israeli intensive regulations and restrictions for security reasons in zone B and 
for the full Israeli control in zone C, (see figure 1.2).  In addition to limited areas given to the 
Palestinians under this division of the territories, there is no physical boundary demarcation 
between the Palestinian authority and Israel, which is what gives the Israelis flexibility for any 
‘needed’ intervention, in their point of view. 
Figure (1.2) 
Planning responsibilities of the Palestinian professional planning system and the Israeli 
interventions in the three zones of the OPT according to Oslo agreement II: varied from 
weak responsibility indicated by            to high responsibility or high intervention indicated 
by  
Security 
M
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The Ministry of Planning The Ministry of Local Government 
The Israeli Civil Administration 
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Most importantly, the constraints and challenges facing the Palestinian planners increased 
with the Israeli re-occupation of the areas under the PNA in 2000. It paralyzed Palestinian 
planners because the Israeli intervention could occur at any time. Indeed, all Palestinian 
institutions, including the planning apparatus, have become subject to the Israeli attacks.  For 
example, in 2002 the offices of most Palestinian institutions were damaged or destroyed by the 
Israeli wide range attack on the Palestinian Territories; these included: the Ministry of Local 
Government, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Culture.             
Palestinian planners now are working within these limitations and constraints, affected by the 
Israeli planning system, not having enough power to deal with the different spatial problems 
facing them.   For example, this is seen in the unsuccessful attempts of the MoLG in its work of 
preparing the needed structural plans for Palestinian local communities. 
For example, the village council of Al-Aqaba village, in the northern section of the West 
Bank (see map 1.3) has been trying for a long time to get an approved structural plan and to get 
building permits for public buildings (schools and commercial buildings).  However, this work is 
denied by the Israelis for the reason that the village exists within the area of an Israeli military 
camp.  Most importantly, the area of the structural plan (were it ever approved) of each 
Palestinian village is identified by the Israeli authorities. This area is usually the built-up area of 
the village, which is very small, already exhausted and does not satisfy the demands of the 
increasing population. This forces the Palestinian people to expand into the areas within zone C, 
which poses the dilemma of either suffering with the occupation authorities, or solving their 
needs by building and development deemed illegal by the Israelis.  Thus, this validates another 
13 
 
policy of the Israeli interventions and challenges to the Palestinian planning system through the 
policy of stopping the construction and the demolition of the ‘illegal’ buildings.  
This policy of demolition has become a fact of Palestinian life in the OPT that profoundly 
affects both present and future.  Palestinians who live in these buildings live in fear of the Israeli 
authorities destroying their houses. For example, in 2009 the Israeli authorities demolished 2,450 
Palestinian buildings in areas of zone C under the pretext that they had not been granted building 
permits within the previous 12 years (Ma’an, 2009).  In addition to the fear of demolition, the 
‘illegal’ building means that the Palestinians have to live without the minimum level of basic 
services, such as those related to education and health care, as we will see in the remainder of 
this section.  
A notable tactic of the Israelis’ interventions and limitations of the Palestinian planning 
system is to delay the work under their responsibility by the demanding complex requirements.  
As-Sawiya village near Nablus city in the north section of the West Bank is a good example of 
this tactic.  The Palestinians have attempted several times through the village council to get 
building permits for a number of important needed buildings, but with each review the Israelis 
demand a new and different set of requirements to be met.  For example, the last time, they asked 
the Palestinian village council to provide a new aerial photograph of the village that is not older 
than six months.  When the aerial photo was prepared and delivered, the Israelis delayed the case 
for more than six months so that the aerial photo was invalid according to their own criteria.  
Until now the case is undecided.  Equally importantly, in most cases, such as what has happened 
in the Jordan Valley area, the Israeli authorities do not allow the Palestinian Authority to do the 
aerial photographing for security reasons.  
14 
 
Another significant example of the challenges and limitations imposed on the Palestinian 
planning system by the Israelis is that of Al-Jeftlik village.  This village is in the Jordan Valley 
section of the West Bank, with a population of 6000 (MoLG, 2009) and t does not have a 
structural plan.  The Israeli authorities considered the whole area of the village as lying within 
Zone C, a claim that denies the village all basic services and development such as water, 
electricity and education.  The village council through the MoLG has attempted several times to 
establish infrastructural projects such as electricity and water, and to obtain a permit to build a 
school in the village, only to be denied by the Israeli authorities.  The village school is thus made 
of tents because the village council could not get a permit even for a temporary structure.            
In the above examples the Palestinian planning system is affected by the conditions of lack of 
autonomy, limited power to make decisions, and working under the Israeli occupation 
restrictions and forces; specifically related to zoning the OPT into zones A, B and C, in which 
most of the Palestinian communities are within zone C.    
The third group of actors involved in the spatial struggle in the OPT are the Israeli settlers. 
They are agents for the occupational system to expand and strengthen control over the OPT, 
using both the Palestinian built and open spaces.   They attack Palestinian buildings and claim 
their rights to these buildings.   The historical struggle in Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) cities is a good example of these attacks.   In Hebron, hundreds of Palestinian 
families lost their homes (or sometimes their lives) because of the settlers’ attacks (see table 1.1 
and picture no. 1).   Palestinian lands are also subject to settlers’ attacks that consist of tree-
uprooting, cutting, and burning, or damaging and bulldozing the agricultural land, discussed later 
in this dissertation.   
  
 
Picture no. (1): a Palestinian house occupied by the Israeli settlers in Al-
Khaleel city. Notice the Israeli flag on the second floor. 
 
Source: Author, May 2009 
 
Palestinian people, while under different policies of occupation for control and domination, 
have continued claiming their rights to the use of space (built and open) through their own spatial 
practices.  They informally invent alternative spaces (built and open) for their use, to replace 
those whose uses are prohibited by the Israeli policies.   For example, when schools and 
universities are closed by the Israeli occupation, the Palestinians use alternative buildings for 
education such as the mosques, centers of private or semi-public organizations, clubs and even 
houses.  When main road-network that connects Palestinian cities and towns are blocked by the 
Israelis, the Palestinians use alternative road network.  Palestinians’ practices in producing 
alternative road network in the face of occupation are discussed in Chapter Four.    
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To summarize, as a result of the different policies of using built and open spaces to achieve 
control by the Israeli occupation, different problems have emerged in the PT that make 
Palestinian formal planning processes difficult and sometimes impossible tasks.  These problems 
include: damaged and destroyed cities (see map 1.4); limited availability of land needed for 
future development; shrinkage of open spaces both by the creation of the Israeli settlements and 
the bypass roads and closures, the very policy that affects both the Palestinians’ space and time. 
 
1.2 Afforestation Planning and the Struggle over Space in Palestine 
Trees, in addition to their actual agricultural and economic values, have symbolic meanings.   
The tree with its natural characteristics of roots, trunk and branches along with flowers, fruits 
and color has, as Douglas Davies calls it, a “practical symbolism” (in Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988, 
p. 34).   It presents a living existence that spans many human generations and is “a habitat for 
many other creatures.”   It is “a medium of thought,” and thus, it is “not simply good to climb, [it 
is] good to think.   Much of [trees’] wood is fuel for metaphorical fires” (ibid).  In addition to the 
“practical symbolism” of trees, they have also “ideological symbolism.” This symbolism of trees 
is used, for example, by historians to show how trees display many centuries of cultural 
reflections (Davies, 1988).   In this sense, planting trees reflects people’s thoughts, beliefs, 
religion and culture.   Thus, the landscape becomes not only a representation of natural 
vegetation, but also of the national ideology and will.     
Because of this symbolic meaning of trees, afforestation in Palestine historically reflects—
and was used to achieve—the beliefs of the people who dwell there, or contest the right to do so.   
As a result, planting and afforestation in Palestine have been used as tools to conquer the land.   
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There is an intensive competition for land in Palestine; a struggle that has been transformed into 
a form of “war,” in which the tools or “weapons” are the trees (Cohen, 1993).   Thus, 
afforestation in Palestine has been used historically to impose control, and at the same time to 
assist resistance and to claim rights to the land.    
According to Baruch Kimmerling (1977) three elements are in the struggle over a territory or 
a space: sovereignty, ownership and presence.   That is “With sovereignty as the ultimate goal, 
each side strives for ownership of land wherever possible, along with as visible and constant a 
presence as practical, both on land owned and land disputed” (p. 171).  Thus planting trees (and 
other agricultural activities) is used in the struggle over space as a permanent and vital method to 
establish presence on the land, to prevent encroachment, and then to conquer and control it.  This 
struggle to achieve “presence” on the Palestinian land stems from the ideological basis of the 
actors involved in the struggle: the Israelis7 and the Palestinians.   The symbolic power of using 
planting in the struggle over space is connected to the participants’ ideology of land and the 
practices related to it, and to their cultural framework in terms of the meaning of trees and their 
significance.   
The Israelis and the Palestinians have distinct religious, historical, social, economic and 
political reasons for their claims to the land.   Religious reasons for the Israelis stem from the 
idea that landscape and nature consciousness is related to their long-standing national goal of 
making “the desert bloom,” along with the sense of pioneering that accompanies that (Cohen, 
1993).   The Bible and other written sources of Jewish faith make overwhelming references to 
 
7 The Israelis benefited from the inherited Ottoman land law, which forms the basis for different legal systems 
pertaining to the area. Legitimacy was given to those who could demonstrate presence on the land. 
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trees as features of the landscape and metaphors for the people and their nation using the image 
of trees being uprooted, burned, or withering in drought to convey God’s displeasure with the 
people.   Trees are treated as positive symbols, and display attachment to the land.   They 
indicate that there is a promise that others should not eat from the fruit planted by Israel.   The 
destruction of trees (naturally or through actions of the enemy) was perceived by the nation as a 
divine punishment, as a metaphor for the people (ibid).   Similarly, for the Palestinians, religious 
attachment to the land stems from Islam.   Muslims are encouraged by both the Quran—the 
Islamic holy book—and Prophet Mohammad to work and cultivate the land (Qur’an 24:35 and 
55; Qur’an 2:30; Aturmuthe, Hadeeth no. 1303; Al-Jame’ Asuheeh, Hadeeth no. 2320 and 2341).  
Land in Islam is God’s blessing.  Thus, working the land is a kind of worship and expression of 
thankfulness.    
An effective concept in the struggle over space for both the Israelis and the Palestinians is the 
concept of homeland.   This concept has a broad base on both sides that claim Palestine/Israel as 
a homeland for a nation.   Stemming from the Zionist ideology, the Israeli people believe that 
Palestine is the “land without a people for the people without a land.”  Because, for the Israelis, 
the land was barren and empty, they took little account of the indigenous local population.   
Their ambition was to transform the urban Jewish communities of Europe into an agricultural, 
pioneering society.   This was to be achieved through a return to their homeland in Palestine, and 
the establishment of an agrarian regime (Cohen, 1993).   Thus, settling and working the land is 
crucial to this ambition.   Although the Jewish population has become overwhelmingly urban, the 
notion of the land, of settlement, and of “Jewish agriculture” still has considerable power.   And, 
as stated by Cohen (1993), in modern days the Israeli government embraced—and legislated—an 
inalienability of land that they consider is in their hands.   
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For the Palestinians, Palestine is their historic land.   Despite the displacement and 
encroachment that has accompanied the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the belief that Palestine 
is their homeland has not changed and continues to develop for both the Palestinians who live in 
Palestine and those who live in exile.   They nurture considerable attachments to the land as they 
believe it existed in 1948.   The Palestinians in the West Bank, for example, have experienced a 
continuous presence without displacement, and this sumud (steadfastness) is a key element in 
their identity.   For them, their sumud is crucial in claiming their rights to the land.  Inspiring by 
Bayat (1994) and (2003), resistance actions are not only those practiced collectively. For him 
resistance also can be through people’s non-collective practices, through practices that are done 
individually to oppose oppression. For example, being present, being there in places where 
power denies people’s use is a kind of resistance. In this sense, the Palestinians’ sumud is a 
spatial means of their resistance, and, thus, has sustained their rights to the land.   
As a result, afforestation and planting in Palestine have become core elements of the struggle 
over space.   Trees, as it is suggested, have become the most efficient way of preventing land 
alienation.   They are also effective in boundary demarcation and boundary building.   They are 
used to create or maintain, and to demonstrate a hold on, the land.   Trees are used to impose 
control (by the occupier), and at the same time they are used to resist occupational control and 
maintain land rights by the Palestinian local people.   This use of forestry planning in Palestine in 
the struggle over space has continued in its long colonial history.    
Throughout its modern history, Palestine had been occupied by various governments and 
colonial powers.   Thus, afforestation policy in Palestine has changed according to the shifts that 
have occurred in ideology and national goals.   It has been a fundamental tool in the struggle 
over space among the different actors in different historic periods.  Afforestation policy also has 
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been maintained during this long history by application of the prevailing land and planning laws.   
Wide ranging legal systems have been referred to in order to give the use of afforestation policies 
in the spatial struggle a ‘legal basis’. 
This dissertation analyzes and documents the ways in which afforestation policies have been 
developed and used by different actors in the spatial struggle during the two periods of the 
study—the British Mandate and the Israeli domination.  It points out that afforestation across the 
long history of Palestine has been the tasks of both the professional planning system and the non-
professional people in the struggle over space.  Additionally, the colonial and occupational 
system have used land and planning laws in the support of their afforestation policies for control.   
At the same time, the local indigenous Palestinians have used afforestation policies as a tool in 
their resistance.   Moreover, this study points out the Israeli closure policy and the Palestinians’ 
spatial practices to resist this policy of control as another example of the involvement of 
professionals and non-professionals in the task of planning open space used as a tool for either 
control or resistance in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.   
The historical analysis of the use of afforestation planning in the struggle over space in 
Palestine leads to the conclusion that the ‘cooperation’ between the colonial or occupational 
professional planning system and their non-professional people helped the colonial or 
occupational government achieve spatial control.   This “covert planning,” using Beard’s (2003) 
term, indeed, helped the establishment of the state of Israel, and has maintained its existence.  
Additionally, the analysis of the Israeli closure policy and the counter Palestinian practices 
unearths the contemporary cooperation between the Palestinian planning system and the 
Palestinian people for these spatial practices to succeed.  From these historical lessons, there is a 
need to develop planning concepts for occupied areas.   In these concepts, planning is not only 
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the task of the professional system, nor is it only the practices of the ordinary people.   Rather, it 
is a cooperative work in which the professional planning system takes into account the practices 
of people, while at the same time, ordinary citizens give their trust and workability to the 
professional system.  In this concept, both the professional planning and the grassroots’ planning 
systems change their tasks accordingly to deal with the problems they face; the grassroots’ 
system takes the responsibility for issues in which the professional system is limited, and vice 
versa.  With these intertwining roles of the professional and non-professional planning systems, 
they are engaged in a kind of “covert planning” that is at the same time an “insurgent planning” 
in the face of the occupying planning system.  
 
1.3 Aims and Significance of the Study 
The main objective of this research is to understand the ways in which planning in areas of 
deep political conflict such as occupied areas is used to achieve societal control, and the ways it 
is used or can be used to resist this control.   Since planning as a tool to achieve control, or to 
resist, operates actively through its territorial dimension, through its substantive matter, which is 
the use of land, the research focuses mainly on spatial planning.   Towards that goal the research 
explores the role of spatial planning in the struggle (control and resistance) over space in the 
complex context of occupation.   In other words, it explores the probabilities and the constraints 
of professional planners’ interventions in such complex contexts.   And it figures out the 
probabilities and the constraints of developing a planning concept that suits areas of occupation.   
This dissertation seeks to achieve the following: 
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(1) To highlight the historical role played by spatial planning in the struggle over space in the 
OPT during the British Mandate and the Israeli occupation; 
(2) To analyze contemporary spatial practices in the Israeli/Palestinian struggle;  
(3) To identify the contributions of such historical understanding for the contemporary spatial 
planning in the OPT;  
(4) To clarify the guiding concepts of planning that emerge from the study of the OPT case 
that can be of relevance and use to areas of deep political conflict such as occupied areas.   
The significance of this research is that it interrogates planning in areas of deep political 
conflict, an endeavor less explored in planning literature.   It addresses the lack of knowledge 
about planning within the complex context of colonial or occupational areas.   It examines the 
relationship between planning and the struggle over space in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
It makes practical and conceptual contributions.  Practically, it documents processes and 
decisions of planning under occupation.   It clarifies the ways in which open space and its control 
is negotiated historically from the British Mandate period to the current Israeli occupation.   As a 
result, it contributes beyond the OPT to other areas of deep conflict by informing planners in 
these areas of a planning approach that helps the local/indigenous planning system to operate for 
the benefit and the empowerment of the local people. At the conceptual level, the study 
contributes to scholarship in planning and political geography by illuminating the spatial 
practices by authorities and people who seek to dominate and control, and/or seek to resist and 
claim their territorial rights.    
The contribution of this study to planning scholarship is significant in that it adds voice to 
those who have called for an expanded definition of planning, such as Sandercock (1998) and 
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2003, Beard (2003), Miraftab (2009), Holston (2009), Roy (2009), and Perera (2009).  That is, 
planning is not limited to practices of trained professionals and officials.   Rather, it includes 
everyday spatial practices of people that are powerful in shaping the space and its territorial 
control.  Focusing on the historically constituted claims and tensions over space, the study is able 
to reveal the range of actors who control space.   They are actors beyond the neat categories of 
professional planners, city officials and plan checkers.   
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
This dissertation is composed of five chapters.  Chapter One serves as an introduction.   It 
presents ideas and arguments that provided the basis for this study.   It reviews the complex 
conditions of planning and the struggle over space in the Palestinian Territories.   Chapter Two 
presents literature review and the research method adopted in this dissertation.  It gives an 
overview of the main arguments of literature related to this study and highlights the existing gaps 
and the contribution of this dissertation in filling those gaps.  It also explains the approach of the 
study, the strategy of examination, the techniques for collection of information, data analysis 
strategy, and the research difficulties.   
Chapters Three and Four document the development of afforestation policy in Palestine, and 
the ways in which it has been used in the struggle over space during the British Mandate period 
(1917-1948), including the Late Ottoman period (late 19th century-early 20th),  and the Israeli 
domination period (1948-present) consecutively.  Additionally, Chapter Four discusses the 
contemporary Israeli closure policy and the Palestinians’ spatial practices in the face of this 
policy.   
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Chapter Five is the concluding one, which includes the synthesis and the research findings 
and its analytical contributions.  It ends with recommendations for developed “covert” and 
insurgent planning concepts that suit the context of occupation in respect to local people and 
local state.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Theoretical Review 
Three main bodies of literature inform this study.   The first, political geography, discusses 
power and the social construction of place and space; the second concerns literature from 
planning theories on insurgent planning; and the third pertains to Palestine, including the British 
Mandate period in the early twentieth century, and the literature that discusses the struggle over 
space during the Israeli occupation period.   This section briefly reviews these main bodies of 
literature, focusing on the major aspects and arguments that are relevant and informative to this 
study.      
2.1.1 Power and the Social Construction of Place and Space: 
There is a body of literature that concerns the social construction of space and the role of 
power in its construction.  It points to the fact that power can take different forms, not only 
imposed from above, but also emerging from below, so that domination and resistance can be 
entangled: the notion that space can be an arena of resistance as well as control (Tuan, 1977; 
Agnew, 1988; Agnew and Duncan, 1989; Cresswell, 1996; Taylor, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Sharp, 
Routledge, Philo, & Paddison, 2000; Allen, 2003; Flint, 2006; Cox, Low, & Robinson, 2008).  
The importance of this literature to my study lies in its contribution to a new understanding of 
planning for areas of deep political conflict, including notions crucial for studying planning in 
occupied areas.  That is, spatial planning practices can be tools for both control and resistance.         
 Literature that develops a new understanding of power in relation to space and place such as 
Cox, Low, & Robinson (2008), Taylor (1999), Agnew (1988, and Allen (2003).   In this new 
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understanding, power is not equated with state power and its territoriality, and there is mutuality 
between power relations and space and place.   Power is conceived as taking different modes—
not only the generally recognized power of the state.  Therefore, power not only dominates 
imposing order from the top downwards, but can also swell up from the bottom, the power of 
resistance.  Resistance is in a dyadic relationship with domination and the two cannot exist 
independently; the one always contains the seeds of the other, and space forms the medium for 
the exercise of both dominance and resistance power (Sharp, Routledge, Philo, & Paddison, 
2000).   Thus, power is spatially exercised; place and space are used in the exercise of power, 
and they also release and display power (Taylor, 1999; Agnew, 1989; and Allen, 2003).   This 
understanding of the spatiality of power and the resistant/dominant dyad contributes to a 
theoretical understanding of planning in colonial or occupied areas.   At the same time, it 
contributes to a new understanding of planning within areas of conflict as a tool to facilitate 
resistance or to oppose domination.   
The notion of the spatiality of power is better understood by reviewing literature in 
geography that highlights the different meanings of space and place and of how power relations 
are practiced in relation to these space or place definitions.   In this literature, some look at both 
space and place as complementary (Taylor, 1999) so that the meanings of space and place cannot 
be defined or explained without explaining or defining the other.   Other scholars—such as 
Agnew (1988), Agnew and Duncan (1989), Cresswell (1996), Mitchell (2000), Tuan (1977), and 
Flint (2006)—distinguish between the definition of space and place.   For them, space is 
conceived as general and abstract, while place is specific, a “social space” and a center of 
meanings (Cresswell, 1996).  Places are produced by experience.  Social actions and reactions 
within a place give it its identity.   The different actions and reactions carried out by different 
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people in a place give it a contestational or a conflictual nature.   Thus, in a “contested place” 
power relations are practiced in order to determine the meaning of the place.   
     Moreover, places are active forces in the reproduction of norms or the definition of 
appropriate practice.   Places constitute our beliefs about what is appropriate as much as they are 
constituted by them.   Thus, power is practiced through the notion of Cresswell’s idea (1996) of 
“out-of-place” through which a specific place is conceived as “ours” while the other is “theirs,” 
and a gap or a distance is produced between “ours” and “theirs.”  This difference between “ours” 
and “theirs” (which also constitute “us” and “them”) plays a clear role in the interpretations of 
events, and these interpretations have political implications.    
     Places as well as spaces are socially constructed, with places providing the settings for 
people’s daily lives and daily experience (Flint, 2006).   The functions of a place, the institutions 
within it and its character are derived by what people do at the level of the everyday urban 
system (Agnew & Duncan, 1989).   The social—as well as the physical—dimension of place is 
profoundly understood by power relations and how they are actively exercised.  Specifically, 
“city” is a good example that represents this feature of “place,” while colonial power is an 
example of using cities as an arena for the exercise of power.  This colonial power is exercised 
within cities by the practice of “urbicide” (Graham, 2003), the use of “bio-politics” and “bare-
life” (Kearns in Gregory & Pred, 2007), and by “order” (Mitchell, 1988).   
2.1.2 Insurgent Planning Literature 
     Insurgent planning literature as part of the spectrum of the radical planning tradition offers 
a promising departure point for analysis of planning in areas of deep political conflict such as 
occupied areas.   Insurgent planning is developed from a planning tradition that acknowledges 
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planning not as the work of experts and professionals who are detached from society and politics.   
Rather, it perceives planning in relation to politics; in other words, it understands planning as 
political with a progressive agenda.   The main argument is that, by either addressing or ignoring 
the exercise of political power in planning, planners can make that process more or less 
democratic (Forester, 1989).   In this sense, planners could exacerbate an undemocratic process 
or indeed a controlled hegemonic one.   Planners serve as sources of this control or, using 
Forester’s words, “misinformation,” because they work within pressing time and other 
constraints, with limited data, and under organizational and political pressures (ibid).   
Acknowledging this tradition of planning as political, insurgent planning insists on the 
importance of “civil society” in planning.   It recognizes insurgent actions and informal practices 
of citizens in the context of political conflict.   This perspective does not limit understanding of 
planning to the practices of professionals and officials in ties and suits, but rather includes 
people’s spatial practices and claims.   The inclusiveness of this perspective allows us to ask 
whether, in a context in which professional planners do not have autonomy and power, and when 
they are ruled and occupied such as those in occupied areas, every-day practices of people on the 
ground and their claims of spaces can be considered as legitimate planning practices that shape 
space.      
The main concept of insurgent planning is the “destabilization,” the “disruption,” and the 
“defamiliarization” by citizens of the hegemonic regime of their state.   In areas of deep political 
conflict such as occupied areas, the informal and insurgent practices are not those carried out by 
citizens in the face of authority, but are the ‘resistance practices’ of citizens that destabilize an 
occupying, a hegemonic and a foreign regime of an occupying state, while stabilizing and 
empowering their own state.  This study explores these insurgent practices and fills the gap in the 
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insurgent planning approach regarding the ways that informal and insurgent practices 
“destabilize” the hegemonic regime of an occupying state, and at the same time “empower” the 
local indigenous state in the face of the occupying one.   
Insurgent planning scholarship—such as Holston (2009), Liggett (2009), Miraftab & Wills 
(2005), Miraftab (2006 and 2009), Perera (2009), Roy (2009a and 2009b), Friedman (1987, 1988, 
and 2002), Sandercock (1998a and 1998b), and Yiftachel (2009)—highlights the themes of 
insurgence and informality and calls for them to be considered in planning which is not 
exclusively related to professional and formal actors.   Additionally, this literature argues the 
entanglement of insurgence and informality; “insurgence often unfolds in a context of 
informalization” (Roy, 2009a, p. 9).  Insurgent planning scholars illuminate the entanglement of 
insurgence and informality in different discussions.   
Holston (2009), building on his study of Brazilian citizenship, conceives of insurgence and 
informality within “insurgent citizenship” that destabilizes the dominant regime of citizenship, or 
what he calls “differentiated citizenship.”   Holston argues that insurgent citizenship can be 
understood within the same context of “differentiated citizenship.”   He discusses the 
phenomenon of our contemporary “democratic” world that witnesses the increasing of political 
democracy coinciding with increasing everyday violence and injustice against citizens. 
Similarly, Miraftab (2009) conceives “insurgent planning” as practices of radical planning 
responding to and disrupting the neoliberal governance that stabilizes oppressive relationships 
through inclusion.   For her, the guiding principles for insurgent planning practices are counter-
hegemonic, transgressive and imaginative.   She insists that insurgent planning practices are 
operated within the process of space-making.   Insurgent planning is operated within the 
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“invited” spaces that are legitimized by the government, and “invented” spaces that are produced 
through the counter politics of the marginalized.   In other words, insurgent planning recognizes 
supports and promotes both the grassroots mechanism exercised within the invited spaces and 
the invented spaces of citizenship. The former refers to spaces of legitimate practices in 
accordance to the government, and the later are spaces where oppositional practices of their own 
terms of engagement are innovated.  While Holtson (2009) and Miraftab (2009) understand 
insurgence and informality as “destabilization,” “disruption” and “defamiliarization” of the 
dominant regime, Perera (2009) conceives of insurgent and informal practices as the 
“familiarization” process of space-making by ordinary people over any official plan.   It is not an 
organized process.   Rather, it is the result of a large number of attempts by different people to 
settle in the city and improve their livelihood in their terms.   
     Additionally, Roy (2009b) articulates “defamiliarization” within Indian cities.   That is, 
the question is not whether good or bad planning can improve Indian cities, but rather, whether 
planning itself can operate in a “state of ambiguity and exception” (Roy, 2009a, p. 10).   Thus, 
informality is not beyond planning, using Roy’s words, “it is not a set of unregulated activities 
that lies beyond the reach of planning” (ibid).   Indeed, she says that the informal is inscribed by 
planning itself through designating some activities as authorized and others as unauthorized, by 
demolishing slums while granting legal status to equally illegal suburban developments.      
     Yiftachel (2009) conceptualizes urban informality as “gray spaces” that contain a large 
number of “groups, bodies, houses, lands, economies and discourses lying in the shadow of the 
formal, planned city, polity and economy” (p. 89).   People settled in these spaces are partially 
incorporated into the urban space and community, and excluded from membership in the city 
polity.   These spaces are “neither integrated nor eliminated forming pseudo-permanent margins 
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of today’s urban regions” (ibid).   Yiftachel argues that these “gray spaces” in planning policies 
are usually “tolerated quietly,” which is to say that they are often encouraged even designated as 
discourses of contamination, criminality and public danger to the desired order of things.   He 
adds that the response to these “stubborn informalities” is usually not through corrective or 
equalizing policy, but rather through a range of delegitimizing and criminalizing discourses.   
Thus, according to Yiftachel (2009), this uneven incorporation of groups and spaces points to the 
reappearance of colonial relations in today’s cities.   
     Parallel to the above themes of insurgence and informality, Thompson (2000) articulates 
other important themes in her discussion of planning in multi-layered cities that contribute to 
planning in areas of deep political conflict.    She addresses key issues that planning should deal 
with carefully in multilayered cities: the equity of the planning process, and the enclave, which 
she defines as an area with a “high proportion of people from a particular ethnic background 
living and working in the locality” (p. 240).   Most importantly, Thompson points to the 
importance of planning legislation and the history of urban governance as important issues for 
planning to deal with in areas of multiplicity, multiculturalism and pluralistic societies.   Her 
argument is crucial for this dissertation since planning and land legislations and the political 
history of Palestine form key issues in studying planning in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT). 
An important piece of literature that is relevant to this study is Scott Bollens’ study of the 
role and influence of urban planning in ethnically polarized cities in ameliorating or intensifying 
deep ethnic conflict.  After analyzing urban planning and policy making in the three ethnically 
polarized cities of Jerusalem, Johannesburg and Belfast, Bollens (1998 and 2002) argues that 
urban policies in the context of ethnically polarized cities are not “impotent”. Rather, they might 
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expose practical problems and create contradictions.  They have a difficult role because city 
officials contend with both broader ideological fundamentals and the particular needs of daily 
life.  Cities and their policy-makers might be capable of activating or moderating extant inter-
group tension.  Therefore, cities, because of their physical and political qualities, are not just 
simple reflectors of larger societal tensions and dynamics.  Rather, they may be able to have 
independent effects on ethnic tension, conflict and violence.  Thus, the physical, social and 
political conditions of a city may have great effects on the relationship between the broader 
causes of ethnic strife, such as political disempowerment and cultural deprivation and urban 
inter-group relations.  Additionally, urban policy has important possible effects on material and 
psychological conditions related to inter-group ethnic stability or volatility.  For example inter-
ethnic relations are directly affected by urban policy through its influence on control of land and 
territoriality.  For Bollens, one important technique of territorial control amidst ethnic tension is 
through altering the spatial distribution of ethnic groups or to manipulate territorial boundaries, 
the very tactic used in the OPT, I argue.  Since urban policy has different potential roles in the 
ethnically polarized cities, Bollens (2006) recommends re-conceptualizing city-building so that it 
nurtures and reinforces ethnic peace.    
2.1.3 Literature on Palestine 
Literature reviewed on Palestine in this dissertation is in two main themes and about two 
main periods: land and planning laws and afforestation, the British Mandate and the Israeli 
domination periods.  
The British Mandate in Palestine.   Palestine was under British rule for more than 30 years, 
from 1917-1948, following an eighty-year period of domination by the Ottoman ruling.  British 
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rule in Palestine occurred in three stages: first as a military government from December 1917-
June 1920; then as a civilian government from July 1920-September 1923; and finally as a 
Mandate Administration declared on 29 September 1923 and lasting until 14 May 1948 (Parkes, 
1949).  Land and planning laws during the British Mandate period are examined by Geddes 
(1921), the British Central Town Planning Commission (1930), Kendall (1948a), Kendall 
(1948b), Stein (1984), Fruchtman (1986), Gavish (1987) & (2005), Khalidi (1997) and Home 
(2003).  These studies document the British legal legacy and show their intensive legislative 
attitudes in building this legal body.   They discuss in detail the wide-range British land and 
planning laws.  They are considered good documentary works on the British land and planning 
legislations through which statutory planning was introduced to Palestine.   
Some studies, such as Khamaisi (1997), highlight the shortcomings of the British statutory 
planning system in Palestine.  Imported from Britain (and other British colonies at the time), the 
British statutory planning system had evolved in an urban and industrial society, whereas the 
society in Palestine was mostly rural.  Thus, Khamaisi concludes that British statutory planning 
did not suit Palestine.   
Another body of literature, such as Home (2003) and Fruchtman (1986), discusses the 
relevance of the British legal system related to land and planning to that of the Ottoman. This 
literature points to the fact that the British embraced the Ottoman system of land tenures to the 
degree it could help them in capturing and controlling Palestinian land. However, the British 
brought with them a modernization project, part of which was aimed at modernizing decadent 
oriental law and administration to bring order to the chaos left by the Ottoman Turks. In this 
respect, the British actually amended the Ottoman system (Home, 2003).   
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The importance of the literature on the British land and planning laws in Palestine for this 
study lies in the discussion of their relevance to those of the Israeli occupation.  The British 
Mandate informed the Israeli occupation with a legacy of means to achieve control over the 
Palestinian Territories, which included complex land laws and regulations and statutory planning 
(Khalidi, 1988; Home, 2003; Khamaisi, 1997), according to Home (2003), “Jewish nationalism 
develops in the womb of British colonialism” (p. 305).  The British laws of land use planning 
contributed to depriving the Palestinians of their land use rights through various discriminatory 
applications including compulsory purchase, defense, development plans, zoning and 
development control.  These applications served the needs of the Israelis in Palestine. While the 
Israelis continued to use the British land and planning system, they initiated amendments when 
and where they found the British legacy did not completely serve their desires and goals (as 
discussed in Chapter Three).  
Studies such as Evans (1948), Sale (1948), Cohen (1993), and El-Eini (2006), discuss the 
British afforestation as part of the British legal body related to land and planning.  These show 
that the British afforestation attempts were legislative, and they document the development of the 
British afforestation laws in Palestine.  This literature also points to the Ottomans’ contribution 
to afforestation in Palestine, and highlights the existing status of the landscape of Palestine 
during the late Ottoman era since it was the context from which the British afforestation had 
been developed. 
The Israeli period. There is a wide range of literature on the Israeli domination in Palestine 
focuses on political issues and its development during the history of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict, such as Parkes (1949), Tawil (1983), Muslih (1988), Shedahed (1992) & (2008), 
Khalidi (1997), Kimmerling & Migdal (2003), Amiry (c2004), Collins (2004), Roy (2004) and 
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Masalah (2005), Beinin & Stein (2006).  While this literature is not related directly to the topic 
of this dissertation, a brief look at it is important for understanding the political context within 
which planning occurred.  
Another body of analysis discusses the territorial problem and its history in the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict.  This focuses on the different policies imposed by the Israeli 
authorities that helped achieve territorial control in Palestine.  These policies include the 
construction of threat with spatial implications, which affect Palestinian life at various levels 
(Rishmawi & Safar, n.d.).  Falah & Flint (2004) discusses the policy of turning Palestinian public 
and private built spaces into geopolitical ones. For them the Israeli authorities impose spatial 
threats in order to achieve political ends by transforming the private and public Palestinian 
spaces into practices of terror. They argue that the practice of the Israelis have the psychological 
effects of breaking the Palestinians’ spirit and will, forcing them to the point of accepting any 
political solutions at all, simply for the sake of achieving a resolution 
Other Israeli policies to achieve territorial control include fragmentation and segregation 
(Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel, 2002; Has, 2002; Lein, 2001; Makdisi, 2008; Dudai, 2001; Misselwitz 
& Rieniets, 2006), and Israelization and de-Palestinization (Rishmawi & Safar, n.d.; Falah & 
Flint, 2004).  This literature points to the Israeli use of spatial organization and closures in order 
to separate and divide the Israeli areas from the Palestinian, and to split Palestinian areas into 
separated enclaves. These Israeli attempts at segregation and fragmentation of Palestinian spaces 
also include practices of Israelization and de-Palestinization by occupying them and declaring 
them as Israeli spaces.  Additionally, some studies, such as Alterman (2002), Dumper ( 1992), 
Rowley (1990),  Monk (2002), Weizman (2007), and Tron (1988),  discuss the Israeli/Palestinian 
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territorial conflict by focusing on the Israeli policies of  land confiscation and expropriation, 
deconstruction and demolition, and Jewish immigration and settlement.  Generally, the body of 
literature that deals with Israeli/Palestinian territorial problem is of notable importance for this 
dissertation because it contributes to the general understanding of the ways that the Israeli 
authorities use space to achieve control.  
One group of studies that discusses Israeli land and planning laws focuses on the Israeli 
selective use of the British legal legacy and its amendment as a way to satisfy Israel’s goals and 
desires (Gouldman, 1966; Shamir, 1996; Coon, 1992; Shehadeh & Jonathan, 1980; Shehadeh, 
1993; LeVine, 1998; Khamaisi, 1997; Falah, 2003).  These studies highlight important legal 
issues in the Israeli legal system, such as proof of ownership and absenteeism, which constitute 
great limitations for Palestinian development.  In general, they highlight the importance of 
Israel’s legal system in implementing its spatial policies.   
Literature that discusses the Israeli afforestation is limited and mainly focuses on early 
decades of the Israeli domination in Palestine; namely the early 1950s-1970s.  It includes work 
by Efrat & Noble (1988), Cohen (1993), Yacobi (2004), and Amir and Rechtman (2006).  Most 
of this work focuses on the Israeli afforestation In Al-Quds (Jerusalem) area, and points to the 
Israeli afforestation as a human need for open space in a city of high density.  Some works, such 
as Amir and Rechtman (2006), focusing on areas within the Israeli state, discusses the Israeli 
afforestation policies that conceive forests as natural resources that should be conserved.  This 
literature also highlights the Israeli planting attempts as memorials for important figures and 
heroes.  The striking aspect of this body of literature is that it does not connect the Israeli 
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afforestation attempts with the British, and with the existing Israeli settlements in the occupied 
areas. 
In this dissertation, my contribution to the sources reviewed above is to examine and 
interpret them within a theoretical framework that recognizes the relationship between space, 
power and planning.  In this sense, because of the spatiality of power, afforestation planning 
could be used as a tool in the practices of power.  And, because of the entanglement of resistance 
and domination, afforestation as a form of spatial planning can be used for both control and 
resistance.  Thus, while studying afforestation planning under the British Mandate and Israeli 
domination, I look at the ways in which it has been used for control and for resistance.  The 
existing literature focuses on documenting afforestation policies without connecting them with 
spatial practices of resistance as well as control that historically exist in Palestine.  My 
contribution is to put together my findings from historical materials to show the picture that is 
formed when the pieces of the puzzle are assembled.  I connect, in this puzzle, afforestation 
policies used during the British period with those used under the Israeli occupation, the insight 
that existing literature lacks.  This is to show that the British afforestation planning in Mandated 
Palestine that had been used to control the country, had also helped the existence of the Israeli 
state, and hence continued to be used by the Israeli occupation.  At the same time the picture 
shows the ways afforestation planning had been also used to resist control, and thus, this could 
be developed to the concept of “resistance planning”; a spatial planning concept for areas of 
occupation.         
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2.2 Methodology 
This study is based mainly on a historical research approach in examining how spatial 
planning has been used as a means for societal control and for resistance to this control under 
occupational/colonial conditions.   Additionally, since the study includes analysis of 
contemporary and current spatial policies and practices, the personal experience as a Palestinian 
who lives in Palestine is also used as a useful reliable research method.  To a large extent, my 
research is exploratory, as it is designed to provide an initial glimpse into planning in areas of 
deep political conflict.   
This study examines different strategies of planning that make it possible for the powerful, in 
this case represented by the colonizer, to achieve control over society.  Among debates on 
planning objectives, the ideal is primarily moral: to help the oppressed and to achieve justice, 
and to work with people for people.   Therefore, the study examines and attempts to understand 
the way planning strategies have been used as a means to enforce oppression.   At the same time, 
it explores spatial strategies from the bottom up by ordinary people, and the ways in which they 
serve as a means of resistance in the face of control.   This is a subject matter that is politically 
sensitive and involves historical dimensions.    
Two periods constitute the focus of this study: the British Mandate period 1917-1948, and 
the Israeli domination period 1948-present.  The British Mandate period is selected because of its 
major connection to the current Israeli occupation. The British Mandate forms the basis for the 
Israeli rule in Palestine, constituting the legal and planning colonial legacy for the Israeli 
occupation in Palestine.  Reasons for the selection of the Israeli period include: the long period 
of the Israeli domination, which continues to the present time; the main role that space has 
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played in this long Israeli/Palestinian conflict; and most importantly the role that spatial planning 
has taken in this complex and long conflict.   
2.2.1 Why is an Historical Research Approach Utilized? 
The success of any research begins with choosing a suitable methodology for that research.   
Methodology can refer to a theory, framework, and/or analysis of how a research project should 
be conducted.   In this study, an historical research approach has been adopted because this 
allows an examination and analysis of the historical dimensions of the research problem. 
Because the modes of planning in the struggle over space in contemporary Palestinian areas 
are historically rooted in the colonial past, the historical research approach provides an important 
historical perspective of this phenomenon over the course.   The purpose of this methodology is 
to understand the present and predict the future by understanding the past.   We live in a 
continuous spectrum within which there is no separation between the past, the present and the 
future.   The present is merely one point in the sequence of time which starts from the past: 
according to Bloch (1964) “now, this real time is, in essence, a continuum, it is also perpetual 
change” (Bloch, 1964, pg. 28).   Therefore, understanding the past evolves us to understand the 
present reality. As Bloch (1964) states, “He who could confine his thought to present time will 
not understand present reality” (pg. 35).  
The importance of understanding the past for an informed analysis of the present is also 
addressed by other scholars.   For example, June Thomas (1994), in an article about the 
connection between planning history in the US and Black history, states that American planners 
“waste valuable theories when [they] do not use past experiences to illuminate present problems” 
(Thomas, 1994, pg. 9).   Moreover, Derek Gregory (2004), in his Colonial Present, points out 
that the contemporary “lazy separation” between the present and the past was the reason for the 
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failure of the post-colonial project; thus the result is an enduring colonial present.   He considers 
generally that the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian Territories is continuous with the past 
colonial period.   So, in this research, the historical methodological approach helps to understand 
deeply the phenomenon under study.   
The usefulness of the historical approach for this research is related to the value and the 
nature of historical thought itself which occurs in the context of not only time but also space.   
Spatial analysis is a subject of planning.   Thus to understand the ways planning operates 
includes understanding space.   Understanding space includes, in addition to the understanding of 
its physical settings, knowing people’s actions in this space.   According to Collingwood (1957), 
the value of the “science of history” is “human self-knowledge,” which “teaches us what man 
has done and thus what man is” (p. 10).   It distinguishes between mere events and actions.   
Historical work is not the investigation of merely what has happened which includes the material 
appearance of an event in terms of bodies and their movements.  Rather, it is the investigation of 
meaningful actions; the material of the event (the outside) and the meaning of the event (the 
inside).   Thus, history is a good method for understanding human self-knowledge, human spatial 
actions, and then for understanding space and planning.   
     Additionally, this research requires critical thinking, which the historical method provides.  
History means not only mere descriptions of human events that were included in a particular 
space.  It is, rather, a way of thinking that criticizes human actions in space.   Collingwood (1957) 
defines history as a “special form of thought,” as a “philosophical thought,” and as a “critical 
thinking” (p. 7).   The historical work includes not only the description of past events and actions, 
but also reflection upon them.  In other words, as Collingwood says: “the historian criticizes the 
past.”   Historical knowledge is not only the knowledge of what humans have done in the past, it 
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requires a conceptual redoing of the past acts, the perpetuating of the past in the present by the 
historian’s rethinking of those past events.   It is the reconstruction of the past through the 
interpretation of evidence in the present.    
     Most importantly, the characteristics of historical evidence contribute to the validity of 
this research approach.    Historical evidence in space is visible, material and observable.   It 
might be an architectural structure, a work of art, or even a tree.   But the peculiarity of historical 
evidence in understanding space and planning is its materialistic existence, which implies real 
interpretation.    
     An historical approach is useful for this study since historical writings are not just 
recollections of past events.   Rather, as argued by Zinn (1990), historical writing is used to 
instruct us, to inspire us from past data.   We take lessons from past events to help us in our 
present life.   For Zinn this subjectivity of historical writings—the commitment to specific 
values—turns the historians’ intellectual energies to the urgent problems of their current time.   
For him, it enlarges the social aspect of historiography and makes the historian become like a 
social reformer.  A commitment to the values of freedom and justice, for example, leads an 
historian to focus on these issues in the past, and to look at how people in the past dealt with 
these problems. 
     Different lessons can be drawn from the past that help understand the present.   History 
can fix the distorted picture of how people live in space currently, wherein the voices of the 
powerful and the privileged of society are heard most loudly.   But if we can manage to find the 
voice of the “underdog” in the past, this will help us to understand what is wrong in present time 
and space.  Moreover, the historical approach can reveal what has been erased from the present 
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visible landscape of space, exposing the social constructedness of the present.  The landscape of 
space could appear, as argued by Mitchell (1994), superficial, full of mere representations and 
images, and with natural beauty where history and its traces have been erased.   So, the historical 
study contributes to a better understanding of space by unearthing the erased traces of history in 
space.   For example, it helps in unfolding the different dimensions of spaces under study, such 
as unearthing the Palestinian origins of spaces that were claimed later as Israeli within the spatial 
struggle.   And this then helps develop a better understanding of the role that spatial planning 
might take in areas of conflict such as occupied areas. 
2.2.2 Data Collection Tools 
The data for this research comes from a variety of mostly secondary sources.  The research 
data include scholarly materials: books and articles; documents in the form of maps, laws, 
restrictions and regulations; photographs and images; newspapers; and writings of people in 
positions of authority.  This combination of data helps ensure that a good understanding of the 
phenomenon under study may likely be obtained.   These data have been collected from a 
number of places such as British libraries, Palestinian institutions, organizations and research 
centers, as well as the UIUC libraries.  Some of the data come from personal experience, 
personal observations, and stories that I have heard from relatives, friends, colleagues, and 
neighbors.   
Data collected in this research are about key moments or events, snapshots of the two periods 
of the study (the British Mandate and the Israeli domination).  The following paragraphs detail 
the data collection for each area covered in the study: 
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 Literature on land laws and ownership; planning laws and development plans; and 
development and building regulations and restrictions during the British Mandate period 
and the Israeli domination period in Palestine.   This includes scholarly authors, such as 
Rachelle Alterman, D. M. Gouldman, Ronen Shamir, Raja Shehadeh, Anthony Coon, Joseph 
Fruchtman, Dov Gavish, Robert Home, Rashid Khalidi, Rasem Khamaisi, Mark LeVine, 
Kenneth Stein and Joel Migdal.    It also includes reports and writings of planners and 
architects in positions of authority, such as Henry Kendall, the British planner in Palestine, 
and historical and contemporary official studies, reports, and land and planning acts, such as 
the work of the British Central Town Planning Commission in Mandatory Palestine and the 
Palestinian Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) and Ministry of Planning (MoP).      
 Literature on the work of forestry during the British Mandate period (1917-1948), the Israeli 
occupation period that covers the early period (1948-1970s) and late period (1970s-1990s) 
of the occupation and the current period with the existence of the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) (1990s-present).  This includes the work of a number of scholars such as 
Rosa El-Eini, Shaul Cohen, Elisha Efrat, J. Evans, Shaul Amir and Orly Rechtman, Aref 
Abu-Rabia, Ismael Abu Saad and Haim Yacobi.   It also includes writings of people in 
position of authority, such as Gilbert N. Sale, the British first Conservator of Forests and the 
Head of the British Department of Forests.   This literature includes reports, studies and 
statistics done by Palestinian institutions and organizations: the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA), the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), the Palestinian NGOs, and the Land 
Research Center (LRC), as well as international organizations such as the UN Development 
Program (UNDP).  
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 Data on Israeli closure policy are mostly from personal experience and observations.  Some 
information comes from works of scholars such as Graham Usher, Oren Yiftachel, Amira 
Hass, Shaul Cohen, Beshara Doumani, and Alison Brown.   It also includes reports and 
studies done by international, Israeli, and Palestinian organizations and human rights such as  
the UNDP, the UNICEF, the Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (SDC), the 
Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), the 
Palestinain National Infromation Center, the Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ), 
Al-Haq, and Ma’an, in addition to information from the Palestinian institutions: the MoLG 
and the Ministry of General Work and Housing (MoGWH).   
2.2.3 Data Analysis 
Two types of analysis are applied in this study: analysis of the written sources (documents 
analysis), and analysis of the visual sources (maps, images and photographs).   
Documents analysis.   According to Denzin & Lincoln (2003), texts provide a “truer” 
indication in the research than any other types of evidence.   Furthermore, Derrida (1978) (in 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2003) shows that texts are contextualized, i.e., different meanings of the text 
can be given by reading it in different contexts.   Therefore, in the document analysis process in 
this research, different types of texts are understood in the contexts of their conditions of 
production and reading.   For example, was the text written as a result of firsthand experience or 
secondary sources, has it been edited or not, is it anonymous or signed? 
     Document analysis in this research is also concerned with different features of the written 
data: such as whether these data are “genuine” or not.   This is accomplished by asking the 
questions of where, when and by whom these documents were created.   Another concern is 
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related to the quality of the written source and the question of its “genealogy”; whether it is 
original or a copy.   The question of the “genesis” of the source is also a concern: what kind of 
institution or individual produced the source, with what authority, under what circumstances.   
And finally the authorial authority of the text is questioned: did the author of the source speak 
him/herself? Was he/she an eyewitness? And so on (Howell & Prevenier, 2001).   Questioning 
the above features of the document is highly important in the data analysis because of the 
significant effect they have on the intended meaning of the text, which in turn affects the 
interpretation of the document.    
     Finally, the most important part of document analysis is the interpretation.   As stated by 
Howell & Prevenier (2001), document interpretation is not a simple task, and it is technically 
demanding.   Nowadays, historians employ a variety of tools to interpret a document, including 
comparison of sources and establishing evidentiary satisfaction8 (ibid).  In line with this, this 
study applies such tools in the interpretation of the documents.   
Since this research depends mostly on secondary sources, the “genealogy” of the materials 
must be examined critically to ascertain when, where and by whom the resource was created, 
what kind of institution was involved and under what circumstances, and if the author was an 
eyewitness or not.   Using these tools along with comparison and the triangulation among 
sources helps in reaching evidentiary satisfaction for the research.     
 Analysis of visual materials.   In analyzing visual materials, different points are taken into 
consideration such as the quality of the source, the purpose for which the material is used, and by 
 
8 Evidentiary satisfaction related to the fact that perfect certainty is never achievable. So there are gradations of 
plausibility; some kinds of evidence are better than others, some kinds of interpretations are easier to support. 
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whom and for whom it was produced.   One important point is considered while analyzing visual 
materials is that a visual work usually has more effect on human perceptions (and their 
subsequent interpretation) than any other type of source.   Visual images are different from 
written texts in that images can be read easier and faster; there is no language barrier within 
images.   It is like the difference between watching a film and reading a book.   The film has a 
stronger effect on the viewer since it has two dimensions with which to work: the text (the 
dialogue or the speech of the film), and the visual image (the picture).   The film, like visual 
images, remains in memories for a long period of time.   Written texts hold the reader in a 
situation of fiction, with one’s imagination related to the context of the written material.  Visual 
images, on the other hand, create a kind of real life regarding the context of the image.   The 
reader believes more in what can be seen.   So, visual images might be viewed as more correct, 
as more of reflection of reality.   This belief, however, is dangerous in the study, since images 
can be elusive.   So, in this research a comparison between the information taken from the 
written resources and the visual materials is applied in order to reach a more satisfactory 
interpretation.  
 
2.3 Research Difficulties 
This research has faced various difficulties regarding data collection, including logistical 
problems.  Most data are from the British library and the Palestinian institutions and 
organizations.   It has been difficult for me to approach these data physically by going to their 
locations; but I have been able to access them through University of Illinois Library system. 
Another research problem is related to the fact that some documents and materials on 
Palestinian spatial planning have been lost or are incomplete due to the political instability of the 
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region.  During the last decade, many of the Palestinian institutions and organizations, such as 
Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Land Research Center, the Orient House, Al-Haq Organization, and the Dameer 
Organization, have been the subject of Israeli military operations, and hence, have been damaged 
or destroyed by bulldozing or bombing.  Much of their archival materials and equipment have 
been lost, or some have been stolen by the Israeli attackers.  For example, after the Israeli 
bombardment on the West Bank in April 2002, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing in 
Ramallah was compelled to resume its work using the laptop of the General Manager of the 
office on the rubble in the site of what was once the Ministry’s office.  These are difficult 
archival conditions, impeding my ability to acquire all the materials needed for this research.    
Moreover, a number of Palestinian institutions tend not to document most of their works, 
especially when related to sensitive topics or problems with the Israelis.   Many decisions are 
made on the spot, in the field and without documentation.   Specifically this is the case for the 
organizations and institutions that work to facilitate the Palestinian people’s lives in the face of 
the occupation.  This includes the cultivation and use of sensitive land adjacent to Israeli 
settlements or the Separation Wall.  In other words, it has been difficult to find evidence 
regarding the practices of Palestinian “covert planning.”  Such materials have been obtained 
from the very few sources that are found in some of the Palestinian organizations. 
Most importantly, one of the big issues facing me as a researcher in this study is the dilemma 
of revealing Palestinian “covert planning,” as if I am exposing one secret of Palestinians’ 
resistance.  This, indeed, gives an important glimpse for other planning researchers on “covert 
planning” that should be taken into consideration and needs further discussion and research on 
the ways of writing that could be used in “covert planning” research.       
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
POLICIES PERTAINING TO LAND AND TREES IN THE BRITISH MANDATE 
PERIOD, 1917-1948 
 
Palestine became a British territory in 1917 when the British forces took control over the 
Ottomans who had ruled the country for eighty years.  The Ottoman period is significant in 
Palestine’s history since it provided a legal and administrative legacy that has remained active 
until the present time.  The Ottomans’ laws with respect to land were the basis on which all 
successor governments of Palestine, including the British Mandate government, built their legal 
systems concerning land issues.  The initial stage in the development of afforestation policy in 
Palestine took shape in the late Ottoman period (late 19th century-early 20th century).  It included 
the basic initiatives of afforestation that were the cornerstones in the structure of forestry policy 
in Palestine. While the use of afforestation in the struggle over space during the Ottoman period 
started as a form of ‘rhetorical or discourse struggle’, the British afforestation in Mandatory 
Palestine featured the bureaucratic application of forestry legislations in order to control the 
country.     
Palestine’s afforestation during the British Mandate period had been the task of two main 
actors: the British Mandate government and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) representing the 
Jewish communities in Palestine9.  The afforestation policy reflected the desires, interests, and 
goals of each of these actors, each using afforestation as its main tool to achieve control over the 
area, but for different reasons.  While for the British the planting of trees had a strategic 
economic purpose, the Jewish afforestation activities were practical, with the aim of possessing 
 
9 The influx of Jewish immigrants to Palestine referred to the early 1880s. In Mandatory Palestine those Jewish 
immigrants had their own communities and neighborhoods.  
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the land, protecting the Jewish land holdings, and facilitating Jewish settlement.  Although they 
had different goals, the British Government and the JNF were on the same side in the struggle 
over space.  On the other side were the indigenous Palestinian people.     
The Palestinians’ role in afforestation strategies did not materialize until 1936 with the 
outbreak of the Arab Revolt.10  They developed a policy of anti-afforestation as a tool of 
resistance towards the Jewish and the British afforestation policies of control.   
The British used a wide range of legislation as well as their legal system related to land and 
land use planning in order to legitimize their policies of planting trees.  Their legal system was in 
conformity with that of the Ottomans but with amendments to achieve the British desires and 
goals.  The JNF’s afforestation practices exploited the British legal system to facilitate their 
settlement of the land.   
By documenting and analyzing the afforestation policies and practices of all the actors 
involved, we can examine the way afforestation policies were used in their various spatial 
struggles.  While indigenous Palestinians applied their anti-afforestation strategies as a form of 
resistance, both the British government and the Jewish communities used their afforestation 
policies to achieve their desires for control.  Moreover, the cooperation between the British 
government and the Jewish communities (the JNF) led to the spatial control of these actors.  
There was “covert” afforestation planning between the British government and the Jewish 
communities, and this “covert planning” helped to build the state of Israel.  
 
10 The Palestinian uprising against the Mandatory authorities over the mass Jewish immigration: lasted from 1936-
1939. It started as a general strike with the main demand of ending Jewish immigration to Palestine and a 
prohibition of land sales to Jews. Started in Nablus, the strike spread to other regions of Palestine. There was 
sporadic armed insurrection in the countryside which, with time, became more organized (Parkes, 1949). 
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This process occurred within the context of the large geopolitics of the region at the time. 
The British commitment to Jewish settlement in Palestine was part of the European colonial 
project in the Middle East, and hence, was due to various strategic as well as ideological reasons.  
In addition to Jewish settlement, the British government regarded Palestine as a useful tool for 
military expansion.  In WWI, the British government encountered unexpected problems 
regarding the advance of the Allies’ armies across Western Europe. After British recognition of 
the failure to concentrate all war forces in Western Europe, looking for solutions to the War in 
the East had been raised, basically by David Lloyd George, a British minister who stayed in the 
Cabinet from the outbreak of WWI until its end (Fromkin, 1989; Muslih, 1988).  Lloyd George 
believed that including the East in the War would “have produced a decisive effect on the 
fortunes of the war” (Fromkin, 1989, p. 264).  Part of the “Great Game” was defeating the 
Germans by approaching them through the Balkans, and beating France by cutting the French 
way in the Middle East and then preventing their advance from Lebanon (Muslih, 1988).  Thus, 
for the British, intervention in the Ottoman Empire was needed and could be possible by 
establishing a British-backed Jewish state in Palestine.  Additionally, Palestine was of significant 
importance for the British Empire because of its strategic location in the Mediterranean at a 
halfway point to its colonies in India.  
In addition to reasons of military logic and motivation, the British support for building a 
Jewish state in Palestine stemmed from ideological incentives and ideas about Zionism and 
European nationalism. Zionist beliefs related back to Puritan enthusiasm among key figures in 
the British government in the mid nineteenth century and twentieth century had great effects that 
caused Britain to embrace the idea of restoring the Jews to Palestine.  Among them were 
Viscount Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary; Sir Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster General in the 
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British Cabinet; and David Lloyd George, who acquired the position of the British Prime 
Minister (Fromkin, 1989). Palmerston’s policy was connected with “a mystical idea” that 
“Britain was to be the chosen instrument of God to bring back the Jews to the holy land” 
(Fromkin, 1989, p. 269), thus restoring the holy land to its biblical character. Samuel was one of 
the leaders of the liberal party, and the first person of the Jewish faith in the British Cabinet. In 
his memorandum of 1915, he proposed that Palestine had to become a British protectorate and 
urged large-scale Jewish settlement in Palestine (ibid). 
Lloyd George, according to Fromkin (1989), wanted to acquire Palestine in order to 
encourage the development of a Jewish homeland in it.  He objected to the proposed division of 
Palestine in the Sykes-Picon Agreement (most of it to France or to international zone).  Unlike 
his colleagues, Lloyd was educated on the bible.  He was of Nonconformist faith, which referred 
to the centuries-old tendencies of the British Nonconformist and Evangelical thought that called 
for restoring the Jews to Zion.  Additionally, Lloyd George was born in Manchester, the home of 
Britain’s largest Jewish community, and his closest political confident, C. P. Scott, the editor of 
the Manchester Guardian, was converted to Zionism in 1914 by Chaim Wiezmann, a Russian 
Jew who settled in Manchester (Fromkin, 1989, p. 270).  Most importantly, Lloyd George had 
been appointed in 1903 as the attorney for the Zionist movement and for its founder, Theodore 
Herzl (ibid). Thus, he was in a position to understand the dilemma of the movement.  In addition 
to Lloyd George’s ideology related to establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and because 
of his political position in the British government, there had been further conditions that 
encouraged British commitment to Palestine.  Among these conditions were the inclusion of the 
“dangerous” politician (Fromkin, 1989), Winston Churchill, in Lloyd’s government and Arthur 
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Balfour as a member of the Parliament.  Notably, Balfour and Churchill were Parliament 
members for Manchester who were aware of the concerns of their Jewish constituents.  
Nationalism, which had become prevalent in Europe, encouraged and deepened Zionist 
ideology of forming a Jewish state in Palestine.  A common idea of the time was that every 
nation ought to have an independent country of its own, and that the converse to this proposition 
caused the world’s problems, that some nations were being kept from achieving unity or 
independence. The nationalism of each nation included not only the interests of its own but also 
those of its neighbors.  Therefore, thoughts of European nationalism accompanied with the 
intolerance of groups different from the majority. For example, the Jews of Germany and France 
were questioned whether they were German and French, as though one could not possess both 
identities together.  Therefore, as a result of this rise in nationalistic beliefs, the Jews of Western 
Europe by the end of the nineteenth century, although they had achieved emancipation from 
many of the former social and economic restrictions, still encountered hostility from their 
neighbors who considered them aliens (Fromkin, 1989).  The creation of a new nation where 
Jewishness and nationality would be inflated was suggested as the answer to the Jewish problem.  
It is against this backdrop of broader geopolitical considerations in the region, that forestry 
planning took shape during the British Mandate period in Palestine. But since the British system 
stemmed from the legacy of the Ottoman era, we must begin from the late Ottoman period.   
 
3.1 Existing Conditions during the Late Ottoman Period, Late 19th Century-Late 
20th Century 
 
In the late 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, forest resources in Palestine 
were overcut, over-grazed and burned.  The characteristics of the vegetative landscape had been 
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changed so that naturally forested areas were transformed into artificial scrublands.  According 
to the Peel Report of 1937, “there were no real forests in Palestine. A country should be 15 % 
forested; Palestine had only 5% under forest cover” (in El-Eini, 2006, p. 191).  The explanation 
given for this destruction was the poor management of the Ottomans.   
The reasons for the destruction of the landscape in Palestine under the Ottomans are: the lack 
of the enforcement of Forest Conservation and Management Laws by the Ottomans, the Ottoman 
tax practices, and the lack of re-afforestation work from the Turkish administration or 
government.  Taxation was disproportionate, and the burden of it fell on the poor individuals. 
Trees were taxed as they stood, “A man was assessed on what his vineyard or olive grove could 
bear in an exceptionally good year no matter what the actual harvest might be” (Cohen, 1993, p. 
45).  The Turkish administration or government was rarely engaged in repairing damage and 
maintaining existing forests.  Planting that had been carried out in this period was limited, on a 
small scale, and for the most done by European foreigners stationed in Palestine for 
organizational or political purposes.   
Other reasons for the denuded conditions of the landscape of Palestine were environmental 
and related to the lack of natural resources.  There was a continual demand for fuel, and the 
wood of the forests was the primary source in the region in this period.  Other human reasons are 
related to the expansion of the villages towards their periphery, overgrazing, and the practices of 
the armies in WWI.  According to El-Eini (2006), the Turkish army destroyed 60% of the 
country’s olive trees for use as railroad fuel (p. 191).  
There is no agreement in the literature regarding the role of the Ottomans in the 
establishment or development of a real afforestation policy in Palestine.  For El-Eini (2006), the 
Ottoman period in Palestine did not lack afforestation, but for Amir & Rechtman (2006) and 
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Cohen (1993), the Ottomans did nothing regarding afforestation.  El-Eini argues that the 
Ottomans’ legacy for afforestation was not the uprooting of trees for military needs but that they 
had established a legal and administrative legacy that was used by subsequent governments in 
developing afforestation policy.  This was through their detailed land laws with specific attention 
to trees (Ottoman land laws will be discussed later in this chapter).  However, Amir and 
Rechtman (2006), state that afforestation in Palestine was a Jewish invention at the end of the 
19th century, by the Jewish immigrants.  For Cohen (1993), afforestation is the work of 
agriculture done by the peasants.  Thus, it can be said that the Ottomans did nothing to advance 
the level of agriculture in Palestine, and villagers were victims of a combination of ecological 
and administrative pressures. 
 
3.2 Land and Planning Laws 
3.2.1 The Ottoman Legacy 
The Ottoman’s land laws represented by the Land Code of 1858 formed the basis for the land 
legal system in Palestine during the successive periods of the British Mandate, the Jordanian, and 
the Israeli periods (Shehadeh, 1980, 1993; Fruchtman, 1986; Coon, 1992; Cohen, 1993; Khmaisi, 
1997; Falah, 2003; Home, 2003; El-Eini, 2006).  The reason for establishing this Code was to 
serve the state’s interest in extracting tax revenue from the land.  The Ottoman’s intention was to 
tax every piece of land by establishing the title to the land and registering its legal owner 
(Shehadeh, 1993).  To achieve this, the Code reorganized land ownership by recording and 
redistributing it (Khmaisi, 1997).  Before this, the Ottoman Government had applied different 
strategies to collect land revenue.  Prior to 1858 land grants had been made to military leaders as 
a reward for their services (Shehadeh, 1993).  In 1839, the Ottoman Government replaced this
 system with “tax farmers” (multazimeen) whose main task was to raise from the peasants a 
stipulated amount.  The multazimeen enjoyed too much power, and their extortionist and abusive 
practices caused the government to replace them with the “tax collectors” (muhasileen).  
However, the muhasileen likewise failed, which led to the establishment of the Ottoman Land 
Code of 1858 (ibid).  Shehadeh (1993) argues that the introduction of the Code was also due to 
the increasing influence of the European mainly French system of law on the Ottoman Empire. 
Through this Code, the Ottomans classified the Land in Palestine into five categories: waqf, 
mulk, miri, matrouk and mawat.  The main theory behind this subdivision is that the conquerors, 
such as the sultan or emir, regarded themselves as the true owners of all the conquered lands 
(Shehadeh, 1993).  As a result, most titles, or the “rakaba,” of the land of Palestine was owned 
by the Emir (ibid).  These lands were classified as emirieh or miri lands.   
In addition to the main principle underlying the land law as mentioned above, there was 
another principle that affected this law: ownership was limited by use (Shehadeh, 1993).  The 
Sultan, as the ultimate owner of the conquered lands, granted Iqtaa Lands to private individuals 
for cultivation.  These grantees were given either a right of mulk ownership, or a more restricted 
right to hold the land while the ultimate true ownership remained in the hands of the sultan or 
emir (ibid).  After the establishment of the Land Code of 1858, miri land, which comprised the 
majority of land in Palestine, was obtained by the agent of the government appointed for the 
purpose.  At first, the officials of the Treasury (Maliya) were entrusted with this task.  Later, 
“Land Registries” were established, which to this day are still commonly called Tabu (Turkish 
for soil) (ibid).  After that, the right of possession was granted directly by the state upon the 
payment of a sum in advance (Muajele), called the Tabu fee.  In return, the possessor was 
granted a title deed bearing the imperial cipher (Shehadeh, 1993, p. 14). 
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 Land Categories under the Land Code of 1858: The Ottoman Land Code classified land 
according to five forms of tenures that have been interpreted by the successive governments of 
Palestine (as we’ll see in the coming chapters) in such a way as to provide a wide degree of 
public or state domain and thereby possess and control the land.  The Ottoman land categories 
are as follows:  
1.  Waqf lands: Lands held in trust for Muslim religious charitable purposes.  The waqf land is 
inalienable and non-heritable “in perpetuity.”  Dedicating land to a family waqf (waqf dhurri) 
protected it by the strongest legal and religious sanctions known to Muslim law from seizure 
by the state.  This advantage of Waqf land encouraged many landowners to turn their lands 
into the Waqf category and consequently, a large proportion of land in Palestine came to be 
under Waqf land.   
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2. Mulk lands: these are “fully owned urban freehold property” (Home, 2003, p. 296).  This 
category originally concerned the “Ushuri” and the “kharaji”11 lands given respectively to 
the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the conquered areas (Shehadeh, 1993).  After t
establishment of the 1858 Land Code, the mulk land category was enlarged to include four 
kinds which were enumerated in Article 2 of the Code.  These included, in addition to the 
two above, “land which comprises sites for houses within towns or villages, and pieces of 
land of an extent not exceeding half a dunam situated on the confines of towns and villages, 
 
11 Ushri land: the land granted to the local inhabitants who embraced Islam by paying tithes amounting to one tenth 
of the gross yield of the land; Kharaji land: owned or granted to non-Muslim inhabitants who paid either a tribute 
proportional to the gross yield, or a fixed amount which was due as soon as the land was fit to cultivate (Shehadeh, 
1993, p. 12). 
 
 
 which can be considered as appurtenant to dwelling houses” and “land separated from miri 
land and made mulk in a valid way.” (ibid). 
3. Miri, matrouk and mawat lands: all lands owned by the sultan comprising arable fields, 
meadows, summer and winter pasturing grounds, woodland and the like, were within the 
category of miri land.  Miri land lay close to the villages, and had heritable use rights.  It 
could revert to the state if not cultivated after three years (became mahlul), and then could be 
auctioned to anyone prepared to cultivate it (Home, 2003).   
Matrouk lands are lands used for public purposes within villages, and lands falling between 
several villages and used by all as a common pasture.  This kind of land includes public 
highways, military base, roads, forest land and public open spaces.  The word matrouk 
expresses the conception behind this category, meaning lands that the state has left (tarakat), 
hence matrouk for public use (Shehadeh, 1993).   
The last land category of this class is mawat or dead land, which is vacant land such as 
mountains, rocky places, stony fields and grazing ground.  This kind of land is not in 
possession of anyone by title deed, and lies far from towns and villages, at a distance from 
which a human voice cannot be heard in the nearest inhabited place (Shehadeh, 1993; Home, 
2003).  This distance was estimated in practice as a mile and a half (Home, 2003).    
Ottomans’ Absenteeism.  Some of the regulations under the Ottoman Land Code that most 
influenced both the British and the Israelis were those that dealt with abandoned places and 
vacant land.  The Ottomans’ Absenteeism has been interpreted differently by each subsequent 
government in Palestine, including the Israelis, which has helped impose control over the 
Palestinian land.  The Code considered abandoned villages and vacant land lying “idle and 
exposed to the sun” as state domain (Home, 2003, p. 300).  Ottoman land law distinguished 
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 various categories of absenteeism: simply not present, of unknown abode, uncertain if alive or 
dead, absent under conditions of absolute disappearance, absent and known to be alive, and 
absent on a journey.  While the Miri land that was uncultivated for three years could be 
reclaimed by the state, absentees were not presumed dead until 90 years after their date of birth, 
and property was theoretically held in suspension or trust (ibid).  
Musha’ Land System.  The Musha’ Land System in Palestine is a source of confusion related 
to landownership and land use, in part because of the many definitions that exist within the 
system.  The origin of this land system is referred to as the Ottoman Era.  According to El-Eini 
(2006), Musha’ was a complex land system related to the agrarian use of undivided Miri land 
held equally and in common as the property of the whole community (p. 289).  In practice, it 
often consisted of strips of cultivated land less than 10 meters wide and over 500 meters long, 
which were periodically redistributed (about every 1 to 5 years) among the shareholders, usually 
by a system of drawing lots.  Within this Musha’ system, each member of the community had the 
right by inheritance to plough and to sow Musha’ lands, because of the Hak al-Muzara’a (the 
right of cultivating).  It is argued that these strip holdings are fairly homogenous in the type of 
soil, terrain and access to the village, while different in form.  The number of shares allocated to 
a person or family depended on various factors such as the number of males in a family.  This 
resulted in the fragmentation of the land, often through inheritance (ibid). 
During the early twentieth century the legacy of confusion about this Musha’ system of land 
ownership contributed to the Jewish possession of the Palestinian land.  The decline in the 
number of large landowners and the continuation of the fellaheen indebtedness made musha’ the 
main source for Jews seeking to obtain land (El-Eini, 2006, p. 291).  
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The Ottomans’ planning laws and regulations.  The Ottoman urban and rural land use 
system included several regulations and institutions.  However, the literature depicts the Ottoman 
era as lacking a structured planning system and legislation (Khamaisi, 1997).  The Ottoman 
planning system was criticized because it never properly applied the regulations, and because it 
focused on a merely revenue-producing measure (Coon, 1992).  With respect to the
Ottoman planning law, the literature noticeably refers to the Land Code of 1858, which seems to 
be the basis for all Ottoman legislations.  
In general, the main aim of the Ottoman planning system was to manage physical 
development that included roads and buildings, particularly in towns (Khamaisi, 1997).  There 
was an implicit assumption that development of economic and social aspects of life would be 
achieved through the implementation of physical order.  Additionally, social and economic 
aspects were determined by Islamic Law on which the Ottoman planning system was based 
(ibid).   
In 1868 and again in 1891 special regulations for the development and construction of roads 
were issued.  In 1877, Municipality Regulations were announced which dealt with the 
establishment and formation of municipalities in localities (Khamaisi, 1997).  These regulations 
established a system of building permits to control development in towns (Coon, 1992; 
Khamaisi, 1997).  
The importance of the Ottoman’s planning regulations was represented, as we will see in the 
coming chapters, by their influence on successive planning systems in Palestine.  The Ottoman 
planning regulations formed a legacy for the British Mandate in Palestine and the Israelis, 
specifically the municipal regulations. 
 
 3.2.2 The British Legislations 
Land law was central to the success of the British colonial project in Palestine, as it has been 
to the Zionist project because “territory had to be controlled by the state through legal 
instruments” (Home, 2003, p. 293).  Indeed, the main theory behind the British Mandatory land 
laws stemmed from the Mandate obligations of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine 
(Shehadeh, 1993; Home, 2003; El-Eini, 2006).  To achieve this, a clear division of land between 
the Jews and the Palestinians had to be made.  Thus, the British Mandate introduced its own 
version of the legal system as it related to land, resulting in a vast number of additional 
legislations.   
During the first 15 years of the British Mandate in Palestine, the British administration 
passed 40 ordinances on land matters (Home, 2003, p. 294).  In these legislations, the British 
embraced the Ottoman land tenure system but, based on their experience in their other colonies, 
amended it (Shehadeh, 1993; Home, 2003).  Notably, the British introduced a new and hitherto 
unknown category of land which is, strictly speaking, neither state nor public land (Shehadeh, 
1993, p. 18).  
The British land legal system, along with their afforestation policy, played a great role in 
achieving the Zionist project two ways.  First, it helped the settlement of immigrant Jews by 
facilitating land acquisition.  Once the Jews acquisitioned the land, they planted it through their 
afforestation policies, and these forests then became the sites of their settlements.  Second, it 
provided the then-Israeli state (in 1948), by selective Israeli application and self-interpretation, 
legal instruments for controlling and capturing the land of Palestine.  As stated by Home (2003), 
the Mandate land system “created a bridge allowing the mutation of the despised but useful 
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 Ottoman/Islamic land law for Israeli purposes, and retaining a religious communal basis which 
could be preempted” (p. 306).   
The following is a summary of the British Mandate land legislations: 
1. The first actions of the British regarding land law in Palestine were closing the Ottoman land 
registers, prohibiting all land transaction until a new registry was installed, and transferring 
jurisdiction in land matters from Islamic Sharia courts to new secular courts (Home, 2003, p. 
295).  
2. In its attempts to establish a clear division of land between the Arab Palestinians and the 
Jews, the British government conducted land surveys and settlement of dispute operations 
specifically in areas where the Jews were interested in purchasing land.  This gave land 
purchasers a clear and undisputable title over land (Shehadeh, 1993, p. 18).  
3. The Protection of Cultivators Ordinances (POCOs) of the 1920s: this legislation aimed at 
protecting tenants from being evicted by determining that they could keep maintenance land 
to sustain themselves and their families (El-Eini, 1006, p. 259).  These laws were exploited 
especially by Jewish tenants, who became “sitting tenants,” and could thereby claim their 
statutory rights to the land (ibid).   
4. The enactment of the 1921 Mawat Land Ordinance contributed to a clear land division 
between the Jews and the Palestinians in Palestine.  Under this ordinance, any parcel of land 
that had been possessed at any time previous to the issue of this Ordinance had become 
vacant (Mahlul).  Also under the Mawat Land Ordinance, Article 103 of the Land Code was 
amended to include a provision that anyone who, without obtaining the consent of the 
Director of Lands, broke up or cultivated any waste land would obtain no right to a title deed 
for such land and would be liable to be prosecuted for trespass (Shehadeh, 1993, p. 18).  
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 5.   The Land Transfer Ordinance of 1940, which was one of the British Government’s most 
controversial pieces of legislation, required a permit to be obtained before land could be 
transferred (Shehadeh, 1993; El-Eini, 2006). 
Land Transfer Regulations divided Palestine into three zones (El-Eini, 2006, p. 261) (see 
map 3.1).  In Zone A, which formed 63% of Palestine’s total area, “land transfer to 
Palestinian Arabs was prohibited” (ibid).  However, the High Commissioner could permit 
land transfer in this zone in limited cases that included: the mortgage of the land by societies 
or companies with the approval of the High Commissioner; the sale of the land by a religious 
or charitable institute; the transfer of the land to consolidate existing holdings or for parceling 
village Musha’; and the land transfer of the land between two persons who were not 
Palestinian Arabs.  In Zone B, which formed 32% of Palestine’s total area, land transfer was 
only permitted between Palestinian Arabs.  Land transfer between non-Arabs was permitted 
in Zone B if “approved by the High Commissioner or by a judgment or order by the Chief 
Execution or Land Settlement Officers in execution of a mortgage registered before the 
regulations’ enforcement, or undertaken prior to Regulations” (El-Eini, 2006, p. 263).  In 
Zone C or the “Free Zone”, 5% of Palestine’s total area, land transfer was freely permitted 
and there was no need for the High Commissioner’s permission for transfers (ibid).  All 
information on transactions under regulations of the Land Transfer Ordinance was deposited 
at the Land Registry Department.  Interestingly, Regulation 8 (b) of this Ordinance 
maintained the government’s right to dispose of State Domain and Waste Land at its 
discretion (ibid).   
Although the Land Transfer Regulations were restrictive, it was possible to escape them 
(El-Eini, 2006).  The most common method was through “mortgage foreclosures” (p. 266).  
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 Another method utilized by the Jews was to enter into leases with Arabs on Arab land, and 
then cultivate the land in order to acquire rights to it under the Cultivators’ Protection 
Ordinance (p. 267).  One important factor of the regulations that had been widely exploited 
by the Jews was that the High Commissioner could grant permission for land transfers if he 
saw this was necessary to consolidate existing holdings.  Under this consolidation principle, 
large Jewish blocks of land with small Arab blocks in between could be consolidated.  So, for 
example, consolidation was given for a 1,301 dunam transfer from a Palestinian Arab to the 
JNF in As-Sakhina in the Beisan Sub-District in Zone B because the JNF owned most of the 
Land (ibid).   
Although the Mandate government claimed a 50% drop in land purchase by the Jews 
from the Arabs as a result of the Land Transfer Regulations, these regulations were avoided 
in many ways (as discussed above) (El-Eini, 2006, p. 270).  Almost 75% of the lands bought 
by the Jews in 1940-1946 were in Zones A and B as the Jews planned for their own state 
(ibid). 
6. One important action of the Mandate government regarding land law in Palestine was the 
introduction of a new “State or Public Land” category that applied strict definitions not 
known during the Ottoman Era (Shehadeh, 1993).  State or Public Lands, as defined in 
Article 2 of the Order in Council of 1922, are  
All lands in Palestine which are subject to the control of the government of Palestine by 
virtue of Treaty, Convention, Agreement, or Succession and all lands which are or shall 
be acquired for the public services or otherwise (Shehadeh, 1993; p. 19).  
 
Using the Ottomans’ Land legacy, the British Mandate in Palestine, as stated by El-Eini 
(2006), classified State or Public Lands under the following categories: Miri that became 
Mahlul (vacant); Mawat; Matrouka; Forest Reserves; mines and minerals; and lands and 
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 buildings purchased by the state (which were neither Matrouka nor Mawat but included, for 
example, government buildings) (p. 272). 
All rights of the “State Domain” were vested under article 12 and 13 of the 1922 Order in 
Council to the High Commissioner in trust for the Government (Shehedeh, 1993; El-Eini, 
2006).  This Article gave the High Commissioner the right to make grants or leases of the 
land, or provide for its temporary occupation.  In spite of this “clear-cut power,” (El-Eini, 
2006), given to the High Commissioner, no official policy was formulated for State Domain 
until 1940 (p. 272).  A Committee on State Domain was formed on March 11, 1937.   
State Domain was subject to lease rather than sale.  Several large areas of State Domain 
were leased or made up partly of concessions (Imtyaz)—some dating from Ottoman times—
or were declared Forest Reserves (ibid).  However, the Commissioner for Lands and Surveys 
F. J. Salmon supported the sale of plots of lands that were too small to maintain, such as 
uncultivable pieces intermingled with village lands.  According to El-Eini (2006), analyzing 
terms of leases of State Land, its sales and concessions, and its management would lead to 
the conclusion that the British Mandatory government gave great importance to its 
development.  Thus, the Ottoman land regulation to prevent alienation and assure 
productivity of miri land by continuous cultivation was extremely important to the British 
regarding State Land. 
However, further analysis of the Ottoman land categories leads to questioning the British 
interpretation of miri land as State Land.  In a legal analysis of the Ottoman land categories, 
Raja Shehadeh (1993) concludes that the Ottoman miri, mawat and matrouka Lands were not 
in fact State Land.  He argues that the basis of land law in Palestine was that the Sultan was 
the true and only owner of all conquered land, similar to the theoretical basis of English land 
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 law in Britain whereas all land is owned by the Crown (p.20).  Subsequently, the difference 
between the real and actual ownership of land by the sultan slowly faded.  In English law, 
Parliament passed laws on land, amending the nature and increasing the possibility of the 
variety of tenures and estates without changing the theoretical basis whereby the ultimate 
ownership of the land is in the Crown (ibid).  This does not now mean that all English land is 
State Land.  Just as in English Land Law, so it is in Palestine.    
Before the Ottomans’ Land Code of 1858, the main principle was that Miri land was 
cultivable and it must be kept under cultivation at all times.  Thus, in conformity with this 
principle, the Land Code detailed the restrictions on what was allowed and what was 
prohibited on miri land.  For example, digging miri land to make bricks, mining, and burial 
of the dead on miri land was prohibited.  This was because the land was essentially granted 
for cultivation.  However, the Land Code included a number of changes permitting non-
cultivation work on miri land (such as building or planting trees) (Shehadeh, 1993, p. 22).  
These changes preserved the original principle of continuous cultivation of land.  That is, if 
land was left uncultivated without legal excuse for more than three years, then it transferred 
to the sultan and became Mahlul12 land.  The Mahlul lands, according to the Code, were 
subject to the right of Tabu13 (mustaheki Tabu).  This meant that the Sultan was not entirely 
free to grant them to any person he chose, but was restricted to certain persons who had 
preferential rights to obtain a grant by Tabu of the land.   
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12 Mahlul land can be explained linguistically in the following manner: when the land was still under cultivation and 
therefore Miri, a certain tie or nexus existed between the Sultan and the Mutassarif. This tie was loosed and severed 
(in Turkish mahlul) when the Mutassarif failed to cultivate it. The land therefore became Mahlul land (Shehadeh, 
199, p. 22). 
13 Registered in the name of specific person(s). 
 
 The discussion above indicates that before the Code, miri holding was personal and could 
not be transferred.  However, the Code granted miri holders a legal right of disposition 
(Shehadeh, 1993).  Disposition was limited to the use (tessaruf) of the land; it could not 
affect the ultimate ownership (Rakaba), which remained with the Sultan.  This means that 
while preserving the theoretical basis of land ownership, more rights over the land were 
conferred and others were defined.  However, this was conditioned by the Mandatory 
legislation.   
This demonstrates that, as stated by Shehadeh (1993), miri land is not State Land, and nor 
is mawat or matrouka land.  For these land categories, the state in theory retained the 
ultimate responsibility.  Matrouka land is land left for public use, such as the building of 
roads, and the maintenance of which is the responsibility of the state.  Mawat land means that 
no illegal use is made of the lands—such as setting fires (ibid).  Because all land in Palestine, 
according to the British Order-in-Council of 1922, fell under one or the other of the Ottoman 
land categories (miri, matrouka, mawat, waqf and mulk ), Shehadeh (1993) asserts that  no 
“state land” was in existence at that time.    
7. Compulsory Purchase Ordinances were passed by the British government to allow the state 
to confiscate land with minimal compensation (Home, 2003).  Built mainly on the British 
Compulsory Purchase Law and Procedure in Britain, these compulsory Purchase Ordinances 
included: the Expropriation of Land Ordinance in 1924; the Acquisition of Land for the 
Army and Air Force Ordinance in 1925 (which was consolidated in 1926); and the Land 
(acquisition for public purposes) Ordinance in 1943 (p. 302).  
8. Legislation related to defense issues: in 1945 the British Mandate Government formed the 
Defense (Emergency) Regulations (Home, 2003, p. 302).  Under these regulations the 
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 military commanders gained great power to declare areas closed.  This declaration was 
sufficient to evacuate areas (including whole villages) to facilitate subsequent transfer of 
ownership to the Israeli state.  Additionally, through this ordinance, Palestinian property was 
demolished on a large scale in the old city of Jaffa in the 1930s (ibid).  
9. The 1933 Musha’ Land Ordinance based on the Musha’ land system that had existed in 
Palestine during the Ottoman period, continued during the British Mandate period.  The 
Musha’ land during the British Mandate was estimated as making up 70% of the land in 
1914, 55% of the cultivated land in 1922, 46% in 1930, and 25% at the end of the Mandate 
(El-Eini, 2006, p. 292).  
However, the Musha’ land system faced increasing antagonism from both the Mandatory 
government and the Jews (ibid).  For the British, Musha’ land was an obstacle to agricultural 
development and its redistribution would lead to problems in land settlement. For the Jews 
Musha’ was “more like a dangerous pest than an established land-use pattern” (El-Eini, 2006, 
p. 296), and should be “quashed.”   
Interestingly, El-Eini (2006), states that the Jewish shares in undivided land were 
geographically parallel to those lands classified as in full Jewish possession (p. 291).  
Furthermore, the purchase of Musha’ by the Jews played an important role in both extending 
and consolidating their settlement.  Thus, the Jewish antagonism for the Musha’ system and 
their desires to abolish it were, I argue, because they wanted to establish private ownership 
over their own shares of Musha’ land, which would help extend the nearby Jewish 
settlement.  That is, the division of Musha’ land would result in the clear-cut establishment of 
Jewish ownership over their shares of the holdings.   
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 Due to the increasing criticism of the Musha’ land system, London approved the 1933 draft 
Ordinance to provide for partition of village Musha’ lands in advance of settlement (El-Eini, 
2006, p. 297).  This Musha’ land Ordinance abolished the Ottoman Provisional Law of 
Partition of 1916 relating to partition.  Most of the partitioning of Musha’ land under the 
1933 Ordinance occurred, as stated in a report by the Lands Commissioner in 1936, within 
settlement areas (ibid). 
The British planning legacy.  Exploring the Mandatory land use planning laws14 in 
accordance with afforestation is not separated from a general analysis of these laws.  What is 
striking is that, when the literature talks about the British statutory planning, reference is made to 
land laws.  This relationship, I argue, derives from the fact that the British land laws and 
planning laws supported each other in a general statutory system.   
The British government imposed the Mandatory land use planning laws to expand Jewish 
settlements and constrain those of the Palestinians (Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 1997; Home, 2003). 
This was noticeable in the plans made by the Mandate.  For example, the Palestinian town of 
Nazareth was allocated 1420 ha of urban land for a population of 60,000, while its twin Jewish 
town of Nazerat Illit had 3400 ha for 45,000 people (Home, 2003, p. 303).  Moreover, the plans 
prepared by the British government for Palestinian settlements were very restrictive in their 
boundaries (often smaller than the built-area of the village), followed by the demolition of 
houses beyond the boundaries. 
The statutory planning developed by the Mandate government in Palestine was part of the 
British colonization project of imposing order and law in the Empire’s colonies. The official 
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 term of “town planning” first emerged in Britain in 1906 with the introduction of direct public 
policy action in order to control the growth of cities (Khamaisi, 1997).  The first Statutory Town 
Planning Act passed in Britain in 1909, was aimed at increasing the efficiency of public control 
of development and land use by “nationalizing the right to develop land” (p. 323).  Thus, the 
British government exported this planning act to its colonies in order to achieve control and 
domination over these countries.  The British used the statutory planning system for land use to 
control racial and ethnic conflict in colonies such as Nigeria, India and Palestine (ibid).  
Additionally, Khamaisi (1997) argues that the Mandate planning and regulation system was not 
suitable to the context of Palestine because the system was originally formed to suit the industrial 
urban society of Britain, which was contrary to the semi-urban and rural Palestinian society.  
This is further demonstrated by the limited development that occurred in Palestinian villages and 
the absence of a system of local commissions or government to initiate and implement plans 
(ibid). 
One important feature of the Mandatory planning system was centrality (Coon, 2003; El-
Eini, 2006; Fruchtman, 1986).  Orders of senior staff were to be obeyed strictly without 
questioning.  Obeying orders was first; making enquiries and explanations came afterwards 
(ibid).  This centrality, which was laid out in the main Planning Acts of this system (the Planning 
Act of 1921 and 1936), will be discussed later in this section.  These acts gave much power to 
the Central Planning Commission, at the expense of local commissions, and the local indigenous 
Palestinians had little opportunity to participate or object (Khamaisi, 1997; Home, 2003).  While 
the Palestinians were excluded from the planning process, the Jews were included at a high level 
of decision-making.  For example, as stated by Khamaisi (1997), most of the employees in the 
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 Planning Advisor’s Office and in the District Commissions were Jews, who gave more attention 
to Jewish towns than to the implementation of the British policy (p. 328).   
More importantly, the local indigenous Palestinians were not only excluded from the 
planning process, but, compared to the Jews, were subjected to restrictive statutory and physical 
planning (Khamaisi, 1997).  Land surveys were used to confiscate Palestinians’ land, while the 
Mandate planning system did not require “approved structure plans” for the Jewish agricultural 
settlements.  Thus, several Jewish towns and settlements were able to rapidly develop to absorb 
the large wave of Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine especially after WWII (ibid).  In 
contrast, the Mandate government usually delayed approval of any community plans prepared by 
and for the Palestinians (Home, 2003).  The British restrictive statutory planning toward the 
Palestinians included limiting new development of Palestinian areas to infill, forcing Palestinian 
people to stay in their overcrowded villages for fear of property expropriation if they moved 
away for work, and ignoring Palestinian population growth (ibid).  For example, the two 
Mandate regional plans—the Jerusalem Plan (RJ5) and the Samaria Plan (S15)—lacked any 
provision for the explosive growth of the population (Coon, 1992, p. 76).  
The Mandatory planning acts.  The first British Town Planning Order (TPO) in Palestine 
was into effect in 1921 (Khamaisi, 1997; Coon, 2003; El-Eini, 2006; Fruchtman, 1986).  This 
established a structured statutory physical planning system in Palestine, which included a special 
system for control of development.  It was limited to municipalities, and created a centralized 
and restrictive planning system of two tiers: the central and the local planning commissions.  The 
central planning commission was given the power to enforce or defeat decisions of local 
commissions, and the borders for Palestinian towns were laid out (ibid).  These towns included 
Al-Quds (Jerusalem), Haifa, Yafa, Nablus, Hebron and Gaza, with special concern given to the 
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 conservation of Al-Quds15 (Coon, 1992).  The process of preparing these plans emulated that of 
the 1909 Town Planning Act in Britain, and, despite the different conditions found in Palestine, a 
number of amendments to the TPO of 1921 were passed (These amendments were actually made 
to the 1909 Town planning act in Britain).  In 1932 a new Town and Country Planning Act was 
issued, which added the regional district level for planning structure and activity (Khamaisi, 
1997, p. 325). 
In 1936, the TPO of 1921 was amended and replaced (Khamaisi, 1997; Coon, 2003; El-Eini, 
2006; Fruchtman, 1986).  The new TPO added a regional level (Khamaisi, 1997; Coon, 2003), so 
that the planning system now consisted of the High Planning Commission, District Planning 
Commission, and Local Planning Commission. Although the TPO of 1936 is considered a 
decentralized system in comparison to the 1921 TPO, it was in practice a centralized Order.  The 
Planning Advisor of the High Planning Commission, Henry Kendall, prepared most of the 
district and local plans, or was directly involved in preparing them.  The responsibility of the 
Planning Advisor was not only to prepare plans and advise the High Commissioner, he was also 
involved in appointing members and planners of district commissions, and in controlling the 
work of local commissions (Khamaisi, 1997).   
The TPO of 1936 divided Palestine into six districts, with the West Bank including the larger 
part of the two districts of Samaria and Jerusalem (Khamaisi, 1997).  It also included the 
preparation of statutory district plans for areas outside the municipality’s boundaries in every 
district, and outline plans for all existing municipalities.  However, plans for villages were very 
limited even though villages comprised most of Palestine’s localities.  Outline plans were 
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prepared for only 25 Arab Palestinian villages, eight of them in the West Bank (p. 326).  Most 
importantly, the TPO of 1936 formed the basis for all subsequent planning legislation in both 
Jordan and Israel (Coon, 2003). 
A notable feature of the Mandatory plans in Palestine was zoning (El-Eini, 2006; Fruchtman, 
1986).  The Mandate plans were strictly defined (Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 1997; El-Eini, 2006) 
according to agricultural zones; development zones; nature reserves; and state domain (see map 
3.2).  Only the agricultural and development zones were allowed to have development or 
building after acquiring the proper permits according to planning regulations.  In nature reserves 
and state domain zones, development and construction were prevented (ibid).  Most importantly, 
the 1936 TPO gave the central government the power to take on temporary development and 
building without a permit from a local or a district commission (Khamaisi, 1997).  
Zoning in the Mandate plans was a constraint for development of Palestinian areas, but a 
benefit for the Jewish areas (El-Eini, 2006).  The Jews expressed much interest in town planning, 
and maintained close relations with the Mandate Planning Commissions.  They benefited from 
the strict zoning that constrained Palestinian development, giving them a ‘free hand’ in their own 
development.   
In accordance with afforestation, the Mandatory statutory planning system was used by the 
Mandate government to achieve its goals of control in Palestine.  This planning system, with its 
main aim of increasing control of development and land use, and its main features of strict 
zoning, centrality and exclusion of local people, was crucial to implementing the afforestation 
policies of control.
 
 
 3.3 Afforestation Policies and their Use in Spatial Struggle in Mandatory Palestine 
3.3.1 The Late Ottoman Period 
Despite the destruction that had been taken place of the landscape in Palestine, the late 
Ottoman period (late 19th century-early 20th century) witnessed important events that established 
the basic elements of afforestation policies in the country.  Afforestation attempts of this period 
were basically related to the strategies and practices of Jewish immigrants to achieve territorial 
control.  The contribution of the Ottoman government to afforestation lies within the general 
Ottoman legal system; mainly the part that considered plantation. 
Spatial struggle during this period was mainly between the local Palestinians and the Jewish 
immigrants, rather than the local Palestinians and the Turkish government.  The control practices 
by the Jewish immigrants were not met with any policies by the Turkish government to stop 
them, nor by Palestinian systematic afforestation practices or strategies to resist them.  There 
were other forms of resistance, such as military attacks by the local Palestinians.  These attacks 
included, for example, the 1886 attack by the Palestinian residents of Al-Yahudiyya village on 
the Jewish colony Petah Tikva after the Jewish settlers denied the villagers’ grazing access, and 
the 1911 armed clash between Palestinian peasants and the Jewish settlers of Merhavia near Al-
Afulla (Muslih, 1988, p. 72). 
The lack of using afforestation strategies as a tool in Palestinian resistance and of imposing 
governmental policies to stop afforestation practices of Jewish immigrants during this period, I 
argue, was due to the following possible reasons. The Palestinian people at the time were living 
in an extreme hardship as a result of the ongoing war (the WWI), and the long period of foreign 
rule (more than seventy years). Under such circumstances, they did not have the strength to 
undertake any initiatives of systematic organized afforestation as a resistance to control.  
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 The Turkish government in this period was weak, exhausted by the War and bad 
administration, and so, it did not have much power to follow up on the law that should have been 
enforced during that period.  The Turkish “sick man” government was so vulnerable that it could 
not handle any conflict with any social group.  Therefore, and in order to keep control over the 
region, the government intended to settle the Jewish immigrants as a way to cool down any 
possible conflict from the Jewish people against the Turkish government.  At the same time, the 
Jewish immigrants were supported by the Zionist movements that had developed and became a 
strong body for the Jewish people in Palestine.  
 The struggle over space in this period started as rhetorical, and is represented in both the 
discourse of the Jewish people and that of the Palestinians (the Arabs).  The Zionist story and the 
Arab story were contradictory.  For Zionists, the land was barren, empty, sparsely cultivated, and 
needed the Jewish rehabilitation of the area to bring the area into renewed productivity (Khalidi, 
1997; Falah, 2003).  However, for the Arabs, these descriptions of the debilitated condition of 
the land in late Ottoman time were not only exaggerated, but were calculated to give a picture of 
denuded existing physical conditions as justifications for the Jewish project in Palestine.  It was 
aimed to justify the widely-propagated Zionist slogan that Palestine is “A land without a people 
for a people without a land.”  Indeed, the land of Palestine was pictured more barren than it 
actually was.  A testimony by the famed Zionist writer Ahad Ha-Am in his essay Truth from the 
Land of Palestine clarifies the actual situation in Palestine.  After a three-month visit to Palestine 
in 1891, Ha-Am wrote: 
We abroad are used to believing that Eretz Israel [Palestine] is now almost totally desolate, a 
desert that is not sowed, and that anyone who wishes to purchase land there may come and 
purchase as much as he desires. But in truth this is not the case. Throughout the country it is 
difficult to find fields that are not sowed. Only sand dunes and stony mountains are not fit to 
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 grow anything but fruit trees—and this only after hard labor and great expense of clearing 
and reclamation—only these are not cultivated (Khalidi, 1997, p. 101; Falah, 2003, p. 185).  
 
Along with the rhetorical struggle, there had been the use of actual plantation in order to 
control and acquire the Palestinian land by the Jewish immigrants.  We will see this in the 
following paragraphs that discuss the role of different actors in afforestation attempts.     
The Jewish afforestation activities. In the late 19th century, there was an increase in the wave 
of Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine that accompanied the growth of the Zionist 
movement.16  As a result, tree planting started to have a systematic character that it had 
previously lacked.  The first deliberate planting of trees that took place for a purpose other than 
fruit and nut cultivation was the planting of “eucalyptus” trees imported from Australia (El-Eini, 
2006).  Zionist supporters encouraged the importation and plantation of eucalyptus trees in 
Palestine because experimentation on different strains of eucalyptus showed that the trees 
assisted the drainage and drying of swampland (Cohen, 1993).  This was of particular importance 
to the Zionists’ goal of reclamation and acquisition of swamplands.  In the 1880s, the eucalyptus 
was used in the area of the Central Coastal Plain, and subsequently spread elsewhere such as in 
the northern valleys (ibid).   
Therefore, the selection of swamp areas as sites for Jewish forests and the eucalyptus trees, I 
argue, helped their ‘easy’ possession of land.  These sites were not desirable for the poor local 
population, and needing much work to be cultivated, would be, for the Jews, easier and cheaper 
to be purchased.  For poor local Palestinian owners, selling these swamp and waste lands for 
cash was more profitable than working these lands.  These circumstances facilitated Jewish land 
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 purchase.  Moreover, any plantation (by the Jews) on these sites would not cause negative 
reactions by the local populations, but would instead be regarded as landscape improvement.  
Eucalyptus trees, therefore, with their trait of drying swamps, helped the Jewish people to 
acquire the land with the least work and money and limited opposition by the local population.  
In the late Ottoman period, planting also started to take on a symbolic meaning as a sign of 
presence on the land (Cohen, 1993).  This was expressed clearly by Theodor Herzl, the founder 
of modern Zionism, when in his first and only visit to Palestine in 1898 he participated in a tree-
planting ceremony in a village near Jerusalem.  Following his visit, he called on Jews all over the 
world to donate a tree or, even more, to provide the money for the goal of planting 10 million 
trees in Palestine (Cohen, 1993, p. 46).  This symbolism was again expressed by the Zionists a 
few years later, after the death of Herzl in 1904, when the cypress tree that he had planted was 
damaged.  In response, they planted more than two hundred trees on the site in a ceremony 
attended by officials of the movement (ibid).  
Most importantly, this symbolic meaning given to forests and plantation, I argue,  
impassioned the Jewish communities, especially those outside Palestine, reminding them of their 
promise, and thus encouraging donations for plantation.  Thus, this financial, emotional and 
ideological support was crucial to Jewish communities’ ability to gain more control over the 
Palestinian land.   
Parallel with the symbolic meaning of planting trees in Palestine; the year 1901 witnessed the 
foundation of the Agency of the Keren Keyemet L’Yisrael (KKL), (the Jewish National Fund, 
JNF) (Amir and Rechtman, 2004).  The JNF was founded according to the recommendations of 
the Zionist Congresses in the 1880s to develop a formal framework to deal with the increasing 
number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine (Cohen, 1993).  It was aimed at providing and funding 
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 a mechanism for purchasing land and hence to develop an independent Jewish community.  
Therefore, emphasis was focused on the purchase of rural land to be used for agricultural 
purposes.  The JNF, one of several land acquisition bodies at the time, soon became the 
dominant institution for purchasing land in Palestine and developing it for Jewish settlement.  
The JNF was a private institution and had no tax base to finance its activities.  Instead, it was 
funded through donations from Jewish communities all over the world.  In 1903, at the sixth 
Zionist Congress, a special fund was created for “donation of olive trees in Eretz Yisrael” to be 
planted on land purchased by the JNF (ibid).  Therefore, I argue, the foundation of the KKL 
(JNF), as a supportive organized body with its private (non-governmental) status, that organized 
purchasing and settling the land, had a central role in the Jewish success of land acquisition 
during this period.   
The first afforestation project directed by the JNF began in 1908 on the land near the village 
of Lod.  The total area, executed in a number of stages over several years, came to 2,158 dunams 
(or 215.8 Hectares) (Cohen, 1993, p. 48).  This land that took the name of “Herzl” was planted 
first with olive trees and then with pine trees and eucalyptus that became a forest rather than a 
commercial olive grove (ibid).   
The experience of the JNF in Herzl Forest is considered an important transaction stage in 
afforestation policy by the dominant agency responsible for planting in the area.  At this time, the 
JNF shifted from planting olive trees to primarily forest trees, recognizing that olive trees were 
not economical for the afforestation project.  Although olive trees did not demand much labor, 
they were not the easiest trees to work with.  With this shift, the goal had become to find the 
simplest and cheapest method of planting in order to hold the land purchased (Cohen, 1993, p. 
49).  
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 Thus, this shift to the use of forest trees instead of olive trees was, I argue, a way to give a 
distinguishable character to the Jewish communities, since olive trees are traditional in 
Palestinian agriculture.  This Jewish identity provided a kind of coalescing in order to form a 
strong body for the formation of a nation.  This shift also was a means to protect areas of forest 
trees from any possible claims to land ownership rights by the Palestinians, by keeping them 
from Palestinian use.  If these areas were planted with olives, then local Palestinian populations 
might start using these lands, benefiting from the fruits, and then claim their right of ownership.  
However, Palestinian people would not benefit from forest trees; they are fruitless.   
In this period, forests came to be valued as a powerful tool for Jewish settlement.  To settle 
the land by people, I argue, there need to be strong factors of attraction.  Therefore, afforestation 
presented job opportunities for the new Jewish immigrants, which had a great effect on settling 
them in the acquired land and connecting them with the new homes and towns.  For the Zionists, 
afforestation was seen as one of the tools of the broader settlement effort: it improved the land 
and living conditions, and provided employment for new immigrants, who were directed to 
afforest the area near their homes.  For example, in 1914, two thousand dunams of Dilab, the 
Kiryat Anavim settlement—12 km from Al-Quds (Jerusalem)—(see picture no. 2), were 
purchased and slated for planting with pine trees by immigrants (p. 49).   
This use of afforestation as providing job opportunities, I argue, benefitted the Jewish 
immigrants in two ways: settling them in the new land, and preventing possible conflict with the 
local Palestinians by including them.  Including Palestinian workers in the plantation of forests 
was a golden opportunity for them because they were suffering from further living difficulties.  It 
was, in fact, “control by inclusion,” despite the fact that the inclusion of the Palestinians in this 
period was not agreed upon by the Jewish community as a whole.  There were cases where trees 
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 planted by the local Palestinians were uprooted and replanted by the Jewish people.  This issue is 
important at this stage as it gives a strong vision of future Jewish (Israeli) efforts of control in 
Palestine.   
 
Picture no. (2): Not dated photo of the work of plantation of the then settlement of Kiryat Anavim 
Source: http://enc.slider.com/Enc/Kibbutz_Kiryat_Anavim. Retrieved  July 13, 2009 
 
In addition to the above, there were other significant purposes of the afforestation activities 
of the JNF.  These included: utilizing lands that were unsuitable for agriculture in the face of 
Ottoman regulations; assisting the drainage of swamps in the coastal and northern areas of 
Palestine; preventing or slowing down the drift of sand dunes in other areas; preventing soil 
erosion in hilly areas and increasing hydrologic infiltration; decreasing wind erosion and crop 
damage through the planting of windbreaks (El-Eini, 2006).  Despite this wide range of 
activities, the JNF’s afforestation task was still, according to Cohen (1993), in its “inception.”  
The significant “boost” in the afforestation effort in Palestine came with the advent of the British 
Mandate.  
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 Afforestation of the Ottoman government. The main contribution of the Ottomans to 
establishing a systematic afforestation policy in Palestine was in general through their land and 
planning legal system, and in particular the part that concerned planting and cutting trees. 
The Land Code of 1858, which played a determining role in land rights, gave significant 
attention to the trees growing on miri land.  Cohen (1993) summarizes these regulations in the 
following: They were issues of planting, grafting, harvesting, cutting down, and transferring 
individual trees as well as groves, and differentiated between types of trees and between those 
growing naturally and those being cultivated.  However, there was complexity in the regulations 
regarding planting and cutting trees.  While trees could be owned by individuals, property rights 
governing their use were limited by the state.  Complicating matters further was that trees could 
be owned by an individual who did not possess the title to the land on which they grew.  When 
land was sold by one party, trees that had been planted on that land by another remained the 
possession of the planter, while trees growing naturally were considered part of the land 
transaction.  Thus, trees growing naturally on miri land were the property of the landowner.  If 
trees were planted on land by its owner, subsequent sale of the trees implied a sale of the land as 
well. 
Focusing on planning legislations that related to afforestation aspects within the Ottoman 
planning system, the most important were those related to land confiscation.  The regulations of 
1868 and 1877 gave municipalities the power to confiscate land for public use (Khamaisi, 1997).  
They were allowed to confiscate up to a quarter of the land for redevelopment or road 
construction (Coon, 1992).  These regulations also included imposing a charge because of the 
increase of the land’s value following construction of a new road (ibid).   
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Most importantly, the Ottoman land and planning legal system, I argue, laid out the practices 
of control for future governments in Palestine.  The significance of this legal system regarding 
afforestation policies was not only to the Ottomans themselves but also, as we will see, to the 
successive governments in Palestine.  It established the legal basis for using afforestation policies 
as a means to control the Palestinian land by the British and the Israeli governments.  The 
vagueness of the Ottoman legal system allowed these governments to achieve their desires and 
goals of controlling the country.  For instance, they interpreted the different land categories 
under the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in such a way that most of the land of Palestine would be 
in the state or public domain.  This contributed to the transfer of land into the hands of the then 
Israeli state, in 1948.  Additionally, the Ottoman policy on absenteeism was the basis for the 
vigorous Israeli absentee system.  The Ottomans’ confusing land ownership system and 
regulations on trees were used intently by the Israeli government to prohibit development of the 
Palestinian land.   
During the late Ottoman period, afforestation of land in Palestine empowered the Jewish 
communities in distinct ways.  It provided them with the land, and with financial, emotional and 
ideological support.  This period, I argue, witnessed the formation of the three main elements of 
a state: the land, the people and the power.  Afforestation played the main role in this formation.   
3.3.2 The British Mandate Period 
During the British period, afforestation was used deliberately in the struggle over space.  It 
was used to impose control and to achieve the desires and goals of the actors involved in 
afforestation: the British Mandate government and the Jewish communities, as represented in the 
JNF.  At the same time, anti-afforestation policy had been used by the local indigenous 
population, the Palestinians, to resist this control.  Afforestation policies and activities of each 
 group of actors and the ways they were used for control and resistance are discussed in the 
following paragraphs.  
The Mandatory afforestation policies. With the advent of the British Mandate in Palestine, 
the British government took the lead in forest regulation and administration, but practically, the 
JNF continued to be the primary planter.  British planning efforts in Palestine included the 
development and supervision of the olive industry and standard afforestation. The British 
afforestation efforts, indeed, played a great role in their control of the area, and at the same time 
served the Zionist project in Palestine.   
In 1920 the Mandatory government organized a special Forestry Service with the aims of 
protecting existing resources, ameliorating the situation left after WWI, and fostering the 
economy (Cohen, 1993; El-Eini, 2006).  Also in 1920, the Woods and Forests Ordinance was 
enacted consolidating the British laws made in 1917-1918 by the Occupied Enemy Territory 
Administration (OETA).  It was based on a Cypriotic Ordinance from 1898, which itself was 
based on Indian Forestry Legislation and the Ottoman Ordinance of 1870 (ibid).  At its core was 
a conservation staff whose work initially focused on “alleviating fuel shortages” by protecting 
certain economically important trees17.  In this stage, the British afforestation policy in Palestine 
was conservational and utilitarian (El-Eini, 2006).  One of the first important projects of the 
British Mandate in Palestine was assessment of the conditions of existing natural forests, groves 
and orchards for preservation and improvement.  Although this work was approached, in part, in 
terms of physical care of the trees, the main focus of the attempt was legislative in nature 
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government. The 1926 Forest Ordinance (section 19) set a six-month jail term and/or a £50 fine for breech of this 
regulation. The 1947 amendment of the ordinance doubled the punishment for infraction (Cohen, 1993, p. 53). 
 
 (Cohen, 1993).  The British treated trees as a resource and sought to control and regulate their 
use and to ensure their protection.  In 1922, a new British policy of “conservation and 
development” outlined by the Director of Agriculture, E. R. Sawer (El-Eini, 2006), aimed to 
stimulate forestry that would eventually contribute to revenue. 
Additionally, the British efforts in respect to olive cultivation had a more direct impact on the 
local Palestinian population.  The olive was, and still is, an important element of the Palestinian 
diet, and contributed to the economy through the trade of olive oil and soap.  Olive cultivation in 
Palestine is subject to “fluctuation” because it depends on rainfall.  To manage this sector and 
direct it for their economic benefits, the British had noticeable efforts in protecting olive trees. 
Additionally, the British government in 1943 passed the Olive Control Ordinance, which dictated 
the creation of the Olive Control Board (Cohen, 1993; El-Eini, 2006).  Indeed, with millions of 
new trees there was a danger of “flooding” market.  As a result, the Olive Control Board started 
developing foreign markets for Palestinian olive oil, mainly in the Arab lands to the east, while 
supervising production and setting standards for quality. 
  Thus, it is clear that the British interest in protecting the remnants of the natural forests and 
olive groves of Palestine, I argue, had been for economic and strategic benefits.  Producing wood 
fuel in Palestine, with its strategic location for the British Empire, in an area that lacked this 
resource, and under difficult wartime conditions, was important, economically beneficial, and 
added to the power of the British authorities.  Moreover, Britain’s interest in and support of the 
olive industry was motivated by an economic logic as well as a political one: greater control over 
the Palestinian local economy, would produce greater political power in the area. 
The British efforts focused, not only on the protection and improvement of the old remnant 
forests in Palestine, but also on the creation of new forests, through which they gain additional 
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 power to control the area.  By virtue of the Forests Ordinances of 1926 and its amendment of 
1947 (El-Eini, 2006; Fruchtman, 1986), existing forests were licensed and monitored, state lands, 
uncultivable lands, as well as private property could be claimed as “Forest Reserves.”  This was 
supported by the prevailing British land and zoning laws at the time.  The British land laws 
considered all the Ottoman Miri, Mawat and Matrouka land categories as State Land.  This 
provided large areas of the land as State Land and what was then considered Forest Reserves or 
Special Areas under the Forest Ordinance (see maps 3.3 and 3.4).  For example, areas claimed as 
Forest Reserves under this ordinance reached 200,000 acres (Evans, 1948, p. 220).   
Despite efforts by the Mandatory government to regulate and control forests in Palestine by 
the legislative body of the Forest Ordinances through the declaration of Forest Reserves, this 
system had many problems. These included vague demarcation of boundaries described by a 
colloquial system, and the exploitation of the system by the British government to claim land 
rights.  The British government, instead of establishing formal land settlement, used the Forest 
Reserve as one method of establishing or maintaining governmental land rights.  For example, in 
many localities, settlement officers recorded the whole of a Forest Reserve as State Domain.  
Thus through afforestation the government had become a significant owner of village lands.  In 
many cases, the Mandatory actions were contested by the local population.  
The British Forest Ordinance of 1926 (and its amendment in 1947) had been used, I argue, as 
an active tool to limit and control Palestinian development. This was basically because the 
majority of the land that was declared as Forest Reserves, Special Areas or State Domain was 
Arab Palestinian land, for example land of Palestinian ownership covered 5 million dunams, 
while the Jewish land was 200,000 dunams (Cohen, 1993, p. 54).  In these areas, cultivation and 
agriculture by local Palestinian were limited and could be prevented anywhere, even on public or 
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 private land.  Additionally, building was limited, and not permitted at all if it caused soil erosion.  
These restrictions on development were not only legitimated by afforestation legislations, they 
were also supported by the restrictive zoning of the British land use plans of Palestine, as 
discussed above.  
Most importantly, the British Forest Ordinances (in 1926 and 1947) in Palestine, I argue, 
served the Zionist goals by assisting land transfer to the Jews through the declaration of Forest 
Reserves, Special Areas and State Domain.  The vagueness of this system related to the use of 
colloquial descriptions of boundaries, and the unclear ownership of land was exploited by the 
British government to claim more rights to land.  The importance of this title to the Jews is 
indeed rooted in article 6 of the Mandate that the reserves would be given to the Jews.  This 
article stipulated that “the government was to encourage the close settlement by Jews on State 
and waste lands” (see appendix C) (El-Eini, 2006, p. 201).  That is, more Forest Reserves and 
Special Areas as State Domain meant more land to the Jews.  This was very important to 
achieving the Zionist goal of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, because it provided one of the most 
important factors required for building a state, which is the land.   
State Land during the British period had to be transferred to the newly born state “the State 
of Israel,” which resulted in Israel’s acquisition of most of Palestine’s land.  This appears from 
the locations of areas declared as State Domain and Special Areas; most of which were located in 
the then Israeli state when established in 1948 (see maps 3.5 and 3.6). At the same time, most of 
the British projects that dealt with swamp areas concentrated in the areas that became in 1948 
within the Israeli state (see map 3.7).  Most importantly, the British introduction of State or 
Public Domain as included the Ottoman Miri, Mawat, and Matrouka categories of land, 
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 contributed to increasing the area of State Domain, that is most of Palestine’s land became State 
Land, which benefited the British successors: the Israelis.  
The British Mandatory afforestation during the 1920s was mainly experimental and at small-
scale (El-Eini, 2006).  It consisted of attempts to have an officially accepted forestry policy.18  
Forestry in this period preserved and protected potential state forests, emphasized soil 
conservation, and ensured wood supplies and pasturage looking to the state’s ultimate financial 
advantage.  In this period, the Forest Service suffered from staff changes and discontinuity.   
During the 1930s, interest in forestry had been carefully developed in the central 
government—though only confirmed during the last decade of the British rule in Palestine.  As a 
result, forestry policy was broadened (El-Eini, 2006).  In 1931, a new Development Department 
was established with the aim of improving the land and relieving congestion among the “hill 
fellaheen” in Judea, Samaria and the Upper Galilee (El-Eini, 2006, p. 193).  In the same year F. 
J. Tear (the British advisor to Palestine) proposed a policy focusing on the problems of the 
rapidly increasing population, the increased demands for forest products and water wastage in 
the hills (see appendix A).  He called for water and soil conservation and timber import 
substitution, but his proposed policy was rejected.  In a meeting set by the High commissioner 
Sir Arthur Wauchope in 1932, Tear pushed for forestry.  He discussed the problem of the slow 
rate of land settlement, which had been noticeable since the establishment of the Forests 
Ordinance of 1926, and demanded the settlement of more land titles to be carried out in the Hills 
(ibid).   
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18 During this period a number of figures contributed to setting out the basic themes of the British forestry policy in 
Palestine, such as: E. R. Sawer, the Director of Agriculture; F. J. Tear  the Advisor to Palestine who shaped policy 
through 1920-1935; and Sir Ernest M. Dowson, who first prescribed policy in 1925 (El-Eini, 2006, 192). 
 
 In 1933, the Director of Agriculture and Forests, M. T. Dawe, proposed a plantation scheme, 
which became the blueprint for the spatial planning of forestry (see map 3.8, and table 3.1) (El-
Eini, 2006).  In this scheme he endorsed Tear’s 1931 note for an expanded program of 
afforestation in Palestine, and the 1933 “Memorandum on the Palestine Forest Service.”  In 
1935, Wauchope “approved in principle” Dawe’s policy (ibid), thus setting a pattern of British 
forestry policy in Palestine.  He defined three main aims of the British forestry policy that 
henceforth were repeated in all policy statements.  One was re-afforestation of hills and 
wastelands, conserving water, preventing soil erosion, and sheltering agricultural land.  Two was 
lessening sand dune encroachment.  Three was using land unsuited to cultivation for the 
production of fuel and other forest output (El-Eini, 2006, p. 196).  Most importantly, and only for 
the sake of economic reasons, Wauchope recommended training local staff rather than hiring 
“more expensive colonial foresters.”  
Thus, analyzing Wauchope’s forestry policy, I argue, reveals an important method used by 
the British that enhanced the Zionist goal in Palestine, which is the use of ignorance of local 
Palestinian people and their interests. Palestinian people were not only excluded from the British 
system, but also in most cases their interests and needs were deliberately harmed (such as the 
limitations of cultivation and development discussed above).  And noticeably, in the few cases in 
which the British authorities did include the local people in their policy, it was by and large to 
benefit the British interests, such as Wauchope’s recommendations of  the training of local 
indigenous people in forestry because the Palestinian villagers were cheaper than using European 
professionals.  Most importantly, this was a kind of “inclusion” of the local people within the 
British policies in order to prevent any more conflict—governing by inclusion.  This was 
noticeable in the decentralization attempts of forestry planning by giving specific power and 
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 responsibilities to District Administrations.  The idea of including the indigenous people for the 
benefit of the British persisted, though decentralization, as we have seen above, was not fully 
applied (and was contested by the Forest Department represented by its head (Sale).  
In spite of all the previous attempts at establishing forestry policy in British Palestine, no 
forestry working plans had been made until 1936.  This year (particularly on April 1st) witnessed 
the establishment of the Department of Forests and the appointment of Gilbert N. Sale as 
Palestine’s first Conservator of Forests and the Head of the Department of Forests (El-Eini, 
2006, p. 196).  The British afforestation achievements up until 1936, as summarized by J. Evans 
(1948), included the following: the completion of demarcation and survey; the beginning of land 
settlement operations in hilly rural areas; saving land for the government by the declaration of 
reserves; and the increase of funding for the plantation and closure of natural forests to grazing 
during the period of WWII, when the Mandatory government realized the importance of any 
timber19 in a virtually treeless region.  As a result, during this period over 100,000 tons of timber 
and fuel-wood were provided from Palestine for war purposes (Evans, 1948, p. 224).  
Sale and his Assistant Conservator Amihud Grasovsky, who had a Ph.D. in forestry, were 
officially well qualified to prepare working plans.  On September 16, 1936, Sale presented his 
“Preliminary Note on Forest Policy” (El-Eini, 2006, p. 196).  It is considered possibly the single 
most important document on forestry policy during the British Mandate in Palestine for it 
consolidated past policy recommendations, analyzed problems, made new proposals, and created 
working plans for policy implementation to be followed to the end of the Mandate (see appendix 
B) (ibid).  
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19 Early in the War, an area of natural forest near the Allenby Bridge over the Jordan River was cut for fuel and 
replanted with Eucalyptus Rostrata Schlecht (Evans, 1948, p. 222). 
 
 Since landownership was one of the major issues that faced Mandatory forestry planning, 
Sale in 1936, in his attempts to control this complex issue, categorized eight forestry land 
categories (see Table 3.3) (El-Eini, 2006).  Through what was called the “Land Policy,” Sale 
called for the “rapid settlement of titles” in order to safeguard reserves.  Additionally, under the 
amendment of the 1926 Forests Ordinance in 1947, in order to make it more difficult for 
claimants to make a case for ownership, the burden of proof for ownership of land within a forest 
reserve lay over the private claimant.  This amendment, which facilitated the declaration of forest 
reserves or Closed Forest Areas, was supported by Sale and the Director of Land Settlement, 
Maurice C. Bennett (El-Eini, 2006, p. 201). 
Moreover, land ownership in Mandatory Palestine was greatly affected by the declaration of 
Land Transfer Ordinance of 1940. This ordinance, I argue, had an important role in facilitating 
land transfer to the Jews. Ironically, instead of preventing transfer of the land of Palestine, the 
flexibility of this Ordinance gave the Jews a great opportunity for possessing the land.  Depth 
analysis of the locations of the three zones (A, B, and C) of the regulations of land transfer (as 
discussed  in section 3.2.2 above), reveals that this Ordinance helped in establishing the state of 
Israel by providing the land; the free zone is located in the areas which became later in 1948 part 
of the Israeli state (see map 3.9).  Additionally, further analysis of the restrictions of this 
Ordinance in zones A, B, and C, leads to the conclusion that the Jews under this Ordinance could 
possess land in all of Palestine; in area C the free zone, in area A since they are not Palestinian 
Arabs, and in area B by getting the consent of the High Commissioner. 
The Arab Revolt.  On the outbreak of the Arab Revolt on April 18, 1936, afforestation 
became a very difficult task (El-Eini, 2006 & 1999).  As a result, Wauchope started reducing the 
country’s budget expenses, and preparing for the de-centralization of his administration by the 
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 delegation of certain departmental responsibilities to planned Village Councils and the District 
Administration.  Indeed, the Department of Forestry was scheduled for closure if decentralization 
was fully realized. 
Despite the various difficulties and the amount of destruction that followed the outbreak of 
the Arab Revolt, the Department of Forests survived the Arab Rebellion.  Schemes during this 
period were adopted singly, concentrating on soil erosion, Special Areas, sand dune fixation and 
grazing control (Cohen, 1993).  Instead of expensive plantings, the Department focused on 
vegetation and encouraged the regeneration of village forests.  As a result of the new conditions, 
these were fundamental changes in the work of forestry that included (1) the division of the 
Department of Forests into two Forestry divisions, the Northern and the Southern Divisions; (2) 
the introduction of four kinds of Closed Forest Areas to enable cheap management and grazing 
control: experimental, special, productive and general (see table 3.2); and (3) the stopping of the 
demarcation work due to the dangers the staff faced in the countryside (El-Eini, 2006).  During 
the period of 1936-1939, although Forestry Policy was accepted only in principle, it was the 
guideline that shaped all decisions.  
World War Two (WWII).  The second important event, in addition to the Arab Revolt, in the 
Mandate period that had great effects on forestry planning was WWII.  During the period of 
WWII, the British Forest Department faced serious challenges related to the increase of wartime 
demands of wood, in addition to forming a policy that could address the problems of soil erosion, 
grazing control and dune fixation.   
During the War, Palestine suffered from persistent serious wood shortages, due to various 
reasons.  These included the exploitation of existing forests to face the demands for food with the 
increased prices (El-Eini, 2006).  The large consumption of timber at a time of limited natural 
90 
 
 sources was a serious problem.  The British army, stationed in the country, was the biggest 
timber consumer, and its members cut trees illegally, for example “at Bab al Wad for the 
officers’ mess” (p. 205). In order to control and protect forest exploitation, in January 1941 a 
Utilization (U), section was set up warning about the possible consumption and finishing of 
Palestine’s forests within 18 months because of the demands of the War (El-Eini, 2006, p. 205).  
The Forests Department could do little to control woodcutting, and yet there was partial success 
for the Department in encouraging the replacement of firewood by oil in lime kilns, and the use 
of oil burners for bread ovens, replacing the 35,000 tons of brushwood consumed annually.  The 
number of oil kilns increased from one in 1943 to 40 in 1944 (ibid).   
In the period towards the end of the War, specifically in 1944, forestry received more interest 
from Palestine’s High Commissioner (El-Eini, 2006).  From 1944 onwards, more attention was 
given to training forest staff, and a two-year course teaching basic forestry principles to selected 
Arab villagers had been established (El-Eini, 2006, p. 207).   
A significant wartime scheme was the planting of 4,380 dunams on the western approaches 
to Jerusalem as a Special Area (El-Eini, 2006), which will later, as we will see in Chapter Four, 
form part of the Jerusalem Corridor or the Green Belt.  This plan affected the villages of 
Qoluniya, Beit Iksa, Deir Yasin and Lifta, and planting started in 1945.   
In February 1947, the British Mandatory government in Palestine was finally forced to 
approve its Forests Department’s policy, which had been formulated over a period of 27 years.  
This official forestry policy included soil erosion prevention, sand dune fixation, bringing into 
economic use land not suited to agriculture, and increasing forest production.  In 1947 also, a 
five-year plan of forestry was prepared to complement “an Ideal Forest Policy” (El-Eini, 2006).  
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 This plan concentrated on sand dunes and hill afforestation.  Three new nurseries were to be 
built, increasing plant production by 1,500, 000 (El-Eini, 2006, p. 210).  
The publication of the Draft Forests Ordinance in 1948 was the great post-war development 
for the future of forestry in Palestine (El-Eini, 2006).  This law was mainly prepared to 
consolidate the 1926 Forest Ordinance.  For the first time Waste Land could be afforested and 
private forest land was more tightly controlled by imposing stiffer fines.  In addition, squatters 
could be evacuated.  It was planned for the legislation to be “hurriedly rushed” by the Executive 
Council in the last period of the Mandate in Palestine to ensure a legal structure for the two 
states: the Jewish and the Arab.   
Important themes in the Mandatory afforestation policies. The British afforestation policies 
during the Mandatory period in Palestine, and specifically during WWII and its aftermath, 
focused on three main problems: soil erosion, grazing control and dune stabilization.  Notably, 
this focus formed central tools that facilitated land transfer to the Jews and, hence, helped in 
achieving their project in Palestine of settling and acquiring the land.     
The prevention of soil erosion was the top priority of the forestry policy throughout the 
Mandate (see map 3.10).  The argument was that hill afforestation in Palestine was important to 
soften and break up rock, to reduce evaporation and permit soil formation.  However, there were 
few data to support this.  In 1932, Tear began collecting information about soil erosion from 
across the country while at the same time commencing a complementary scheme of experiments 
on erosion (El-Eini, 2006).  Joseph Weitz, a member of the Jewish National Fund, was one of the 
observers for the issue of soil erosion.   
Sale’s plans of 1936 focused on soil and water conservation.  Indeed, the issue of soil erosion 
was the reason for the continued existence of the Department of Forests when forestry activities 
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 were reduced during the Arab Revolt.  During the Arab Revolt, most of the effort went into 
guarding protected forests (Special Areas).  In August 1939, priority was given to soil 
conservation through a circular sent by Colonial Secretary Malcolm J. McDonald.  In December 
1939, Sale formulated a Soil Conservation Policy, and the following the Soil Conservation 
Board, chaired by Sale, was set up in order to coordinate departmental and inter-departmental 
activities (El-Eini, 2006, p. 214).  The Board increased its activities in soil conservation and 
helped enforce the Flooding and Soil Erosion (Prevention) Ordinance, encouraging the collection 
of much-needed basic data (p. 204).  The Board was responsible for reviewing all soil erosion-
related problems, flooding, silting, and other causes of damage; recommending remedial and 
preventive measures; and incorporating legislation, publicity and education.  It also conducted 
amelioration work, including terracing and planting windbreaks.  
The Board used propaganda as well as formal and informal education to make farmers aware 
of the issues related to soil erosion.  For this purpose, the Board in 1944 published a booklet by 
Taylor (in both Arabic and English) named Save our Soil or SOS (El-Eini, 2006).  It included 
information about English rural areas with their tremendous green landscape, and about 
Palestine, showing its eroded areas.  For example, the first photograph in this booklet, according 
to El-Eini (2006), is of “a typical English countryside with gently rolling hills” (p. 216), and then 
shows a map of Palestine with its eroded areas that should be planted with trees.  It seems that, I 
argue, this comparative information was meant to urge people to have their own “green” in 
Palestine; “it was also England’s green and pleasant land that should be built in Jerusalem” 
(ibid).    
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In 1941, the Flooding and Soil Erosion (Prevention) Ordinance was drafted, after a series of 
floods caused huge damage in Tiberias (El-Eini, 2006).  Within this ordinance, land could be 
 
 inspected and proclaimed as a Special Area.  In Special Areas, grazing was prohibited; 
cultivation was only permitted after terracing or other safeguarding work; and building was 
possible if it did not cause soil erosion.  Moreover, to prevent soil erosion any land parcel could 
be placed under restrictions for improvement.   
Most importantly, the British plantation to prevent soil erosion on the hills facilitated the 
Jewish settlement in these areas, which indeed formed strategic locations for most of the Israeli 
settlements in Palestine.  This clearly appears when we compare between the British proposed 
map of planting soil erosion areas in Palestine (map 3.10 above) with the topographical map that 
shows the sites of the existing Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Territories, this leads to map 
3.11.   
During the British Mandate period large areas of land were denuded to bare rock due to 
uncontrolled and over grazing (El-Eini, 2006); this formed the second concern of the Mandatory 
forestry in Palestine.  For the British, control of grazing practices was important in order to 
succeed in forestry.  The first person who focused on grazing issues was Sale.  His argument was 
that vegetation could be used either to build up forests and improve soil, or to nourish animals—
but not both.  Well-managed grazing grounds, he argued, could double the product of fodder.  
Sale’s idea of the “separation plan” for fodder production was aimed at protecting existing 
vegetation and increasing production per dunam (ibid). 
To prevent erosion, more importantly, the department of agriculture attempted to have 
mountain goats replaced by “well-bred” ones.  Forestry officers could issue licenses and fine 
illegal grazers in forest reserves.  There were no specific laws dealing with grazing and also the 
old Ottoman Land Laws were used to interpret grazing rights. 
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 Grazing rights were vague with “the most contentious being over un-owned land” (El-Eini, 
2006, p. 223).  These un-owned lands were seen as unassigned State Domain, and described as 
“a misnomer for an alleged unhampered, unlimited right to feed animals on natural vegetation 
growing on any land, especially unassigned waste lands, swamps, forests and so on” (p. 223).  
Usually claimants alleged that these lands were Matruka, which means for public use such as 
communal pastures, and this often won the support of the Civil Court.  However, Sale extremely 
opposed the assignment of grazing rights for Matruka or Mawat land, claiming that they were 
State domain.   
In fact, despite the existing legislation, it was very difficult to control the actual grazing of 
animals because of the continuous movement of Bedouins across internal and international 
boundaries, such as to and from Syria.  As an attempt to control grazing, in October 1937, an 
agreement was signed with the government of Syria to control livestock movement, but this had 
little effect since the borders were too difficult to control (El-Eini, 2006, p. 223).  The Bedouin 
Control Ordinance no. 18 in 1942 helped with additional restrictions of their movement and their 
livestock.  The first stipulation of this Ordinance gave the District Commissioner the power for 
this restriction of movement. It stated: 
Exercise general control and supervision over all or any nomadic tribes or tribesmen, 
superintend their movements, and wherever he considers it necessary direct them to go, or 
not to go, or to remain in, any special area for any specified period (El-Eini, 2006, p. 224). 
 
Most importantly, the 1942 Ordinance was one of the effective tools that limited and 
interrupted Palestinians’ life, mainly the Bedouins.  Control grazing and Bedouins’ movements 
under this ordinance affected their “migratory habits” (El-Eini, 2006) and resulted in their 
sedentarization.  The disruption of the Bedouins’ way of life occurred through different 
activities.  First, tribal boundaries, which had been oral agreements for centuries, were made 
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 specific by the British Administration’s Cadastral Survey, within which tribal boundaries were 
demarcated.  This was because the British land laws in Palestine recognized ownership after title 
settlement.  Second, Bedouin land ownership and use was disturbed by the Forest Ordinances 
and the Forest Reserves.  For example, new settlements of some Bedouin groups were set up on 
the edges of Closed Forest Areas from which they had been forced out, because of the increased 
conflict between forestry and grazing.  The restricted movement of Bedouin groups limited their 
flocks to smaller grazing areas.  Third, extensive internal boundaries within Bedouin grazing 
pastures had been created by the yearly declarations of forest reserves.  Fourth, the Bedouin 
Control Ordinance that was applied to contain Bedouin movement led to sedentarization of the 
Palestinian Bedouins.  This was favored and encouraged by the government represented by the 
District Commissioners.   
An extensive scholarship concerning the colonial dominance has clearly documented the 
ways in which the colonial state rules by making people “legible” and through practices of 
licensing, measuring and registering (Scott, 1998; Mitchell, 1998).  Scott (1998) argues that the 
state seeks “getting a handle” on its subjects through standardization of weights and measures; 
the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registers; the design of cities; and the 
organization of transportation.  An example is the organization of the natural world through 
agriculture and plantation.  The design of scientific forestry and agriculture and the layout of 
plantation are “calculated” by the state to make the landscape more legible and manipulable 
“from above and from the center.”  Mitchell (1998), studying colonial Egypt, shows that the 
colonial state is characterized by a “disciplinary order” that makes things and people organized 
and readable.  The essence of this order is an abstract structure that is imposed on society from 
above.  This structure of order was attempted by the colonial French in Egypt in the nineteenth 
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 century through a process of standardization between houses, families and villages, as well as 
schools, taxes, trains, and timetables.  It included a “uniformity” which would be a hallmark of 
the new order.   
In the context of Palestine, a similar colonial urge is observed in the continuous efforts of the 
British to control grazing and implement a licensing system that worked through the shepherds.  
The Shepherds (Licensing) Ordinance 1946 permitted only “fit and proper” persons of the age of 
ten and above to graze goats and sheep (El-Eini, 2006).  The system also limited the number of 
animals herded by one shepherd at any one time, the fees, and the validity date of the license.  At 
the beginning, specifically on Sept 27, 1946, this system was applied to at least one area in each 
district, and the goats had to be tagged.  On January 1, 1948, the licensing system was applied to 
the whole Galilee District and to one selected area in each of the other five districts, and the 
shepherds had to wear their licenses in the Controlled Areas.  
However, there were resistance practices by the local population to this system.  Foremost 
among them was hiding the animals to avoid enumeration.  For example, around Bethlehem 
3,354 goats in seven villages were tagged, but only 1, 260 enumerated—a difference of 37.5 per 
cent (El-Eini, 2006, p. 227).  Moreover, since the tags were made of weak metal it was easy for 
shepherds to remove the tags or claim that they were lost.  
 Despite the different attempts to control grazing, the British could not get a handle on 
“illegal” grazing.  This was, for instance, because it was difficult for the government to provide 
the needed large number of guards and officers to enforce the licensing system.  In 1947, 
according to the British restrictions, “illegal” grazing was still widely reported, even in special 
areas such as Tiberias.   
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 The third problem addressed by British afforestation policies was sand dune stabilization. At 
the time of the British Mandate in Palestine, the dunes covered over 350,000 dunams from the 
bay of Aka in the north to Rafah in the south (El-Eini, 2006, p. 228) (see map 3.12).  Almost all 
the area from Jaffa to Sinai had wandering dunes of formidable mass, producing undulating 
sand-hills.  Sand dune fixation is crucial for forestry to succeed since wandering dunes 
threatened fertile soils, villages, roads, rail and telegraph lines, and “blocked up estuaries 
producing marshes” (ibid).  Recognizing the importance of dealing with this problem, the 
Ottomans had made their own attempts at control before the British.  The British subsequently 
incorporated sand dune fixation within their forestry policy and its implementation.  Dune 
fixation was mainly designated as State Work since it was more costly than normal afforestation.  
In 1922, a policy was developed to stop dune encroachments through the formation of the Sand 
Drift Ordinance of 1922 (ibid).   
This ordinance was aimed at dune reclamation for cultivation.  It gave power to the Chief 
Forest Officer to stop dune drift or reclaim land, and could operate in any area in which he 
considered agriculture to be threatened by sand.  Under this law, land reclaimed in any village 
was deemed matrouka.  In this way, the government could undertake any works it saw as 
necessary regardless of the village’s or individual’s willingness. Although this sand Ordinance 
was invoked in limited cases, only twice with little success, and due to the large dune areas that 
existed in Palestine, the policy was continued until 1941 when it was superseded by the Flooding 
and Soil Erosion (Prevention) Ordinance.   
During the 1920s, the work of sand dune fixation notably was focused on the north (El-Eini, 
2006, p. 239).  In the 1930s the work shifted to the south—as land in the Haifa-Aka escalated in 
value while Haifa Port was being built and completed in 1933.  Specifically in 1935, forestry 
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 work stopped in the north, and land had to be handed over to private ownership in the following 
year.  Most of the private organizations that took over the land in that time were Jewish, in part 
because the British regarded them as better funded (ibid).  A typical example was the 30,000 
dunams of Casarea dunes, ownership of which was transferred to a Jewish company in 1922.  
Another example was “a 99-year lease agreement, made on July 4th, 1932 with the Jewish-owned 
company of Hanotaiah, Ltd.” (ibid), with regard to three small plots totaling 1, 051.82 dunams 
near the village of Umm Khalid in the Tulkarm Sub-District (ibid). 
Apparently, the British sand dune fixation work was an important factor that facilitated land 
settlement by the Jews.  This work, I argue, was an effective tool preparing these areas for the 
settlement of Jewish immigrants and thus became the locations for Israeli towns and cities when 
the Israeli state was established in 1948 (see map 3.13). 
An additional important factor in the British afforestation system that served the Zionist goal 
in Palestine, I argue, was the inclusion of the Jews in this system. Handing over sand dune 
fixation work to Jewish private organizations discussed above is a clear example of this 
inclusion.  Additionally, most of the employees in the Planning Advisor’s Office and in the 
District Commissions were Jewish. For example, in 1938 there was one Arab of all the 
employees in the Town planning advisor’s Office, and he worked as emissary, and there was just 
one Arab engineer among all of the districts commission engineers (Khamaisi, 1997, p. 339).   
Moreover, during the British Mandate period the Jews, I argue, were involved officially at 
high levels of afforestation decision-making.  In 1946 Amihud Goor (Amihud Grasovsky) took 
over from Sale as the head of the British Forest Department in Palestine.  This was a great and 
opportunistic change for the Jews because of Goor’s connections with the Haganah, the 
underground organization for Jewish self-defense.  Goor facilitated the removal to Jewish 
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 settlements of Acre Station’s much-valued irrigation pipes (El-Eini, 2006).  During the last 
period of the British in Palestine, he was key in establishing “facts on the ground” that 
contributed to the establishment of the new state of Israel. 
In general the work of the British Mandatory afforestation was not significant in terms of the 
total area of forest reserves, or the number of trees planted compared with the amount of land 
within Mandatory hands.  Rather, it was significant in terms of the aggressive attitudes of the 
government towards forestry standardization, and the widespread application of forestry 
legislations for a variety of broad-ranging goals.  The relationship between afforestation 
authorities and the villagers was characterized as “competition and antagonism” (Cohen, 1993). 
It is worth mentioning that motivations of the British afforestation activities in Palestine did 
not lack utopian interest.  Similar to other parts of the British Empire during the period, such as 
India, the British wanted to produce their imagined landscape, shaped by their memories of their 
homeland, Britain.  They wanted to produce the “green English” in the “eroded Palestine.”  This 
was clear for example in their forestry work in Jerusalem, where they were informed by the 
forestry work in London despite the big difference in the two sites (Cohen, 1994).  This also 
could be conceived from their early application of the Woods and Forest Ordinance in Palestine 
that was rooted in the old British laws.  The British also, I argue, were motivated in their 
afforestation policy in Palestine to produce “order” in a place of “mess,” according to the British 
point of view.  That is, to produce a healthy, ordered, beautiful, modern landscape. 
The Jewish communities’ afforestation activities. During the British Mandate period, the 
British government was not the only actor in afforestation.  The Jewish communities represented 
by the JNF were involved in this endeavor. The British were the legislative body, while the JNF 
was the implementing body.  The JNF’s main goal was to achieve land settlement for the Jewish 
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 people.  It used the legislative body of the British afforestation as a reference for Jewish projects 
and sites of settlements.  
As the primary agency for Jewish afforestation in Palestine, the JNF continued the shift from 
planting olive trees to planting forest trees, selecting mainly pine and cypress.  Easy to work 
with, cheaper and quick growing, these trees were ideal for the primary purpose of the JNF 
afforestation policies of enhancing Jewish settlement in order to establish presence and claim 
rights to the land.   
The JNF took on forest projects that were intended to benefit the whole community, such as 
the tree nurseries that were created in the early 1920s.  Several of these were in Al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) where the number of seedlings in these nurseries reached 75,000 by 1921 (Cohen, 
1993, p. 57).  For the most part, the major afforestation projects of the JNF during the Mandatory 
period were in the Galilee, along with some in the foothills and on the coastal plain.  There were 
two sites within the region of Al-Quds.  Planting within the city of Al-Quds itself was carried out 
by the JNF and the government at historical and religiously significant locations and near 
important public institutions.  
There had been an annual increase in the afforested area, until a peak in 1936 when nearly 
44,000 dunams were planted (Cohen, 1993, p. 58).  After this, planting dropped down due to the 
outbreak of the Arab Revolt in Palestine in the same year.  During this period, the destabilization 
and lack of security in the countryside prohibited the JNF’s activities.  There was also a clear 
increase in the occurrence of arson.  However, the attack on the forests stimulated donations 
from the Jewish communities and as a result “during this period the JNF had a larger disposable 
income than in any previous year” (ibid). 
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 Most of the forests planted by the JNF were within the area that came under Israeli control 
after the 1948 war.20  This was because the JNF allocated these forests in conjunction with the 
areas of Jewish settlement activity.  In the West Bank—the area that later came under Jordanian 
rule—there were two sites: a nursery established in Al-Khaleel (Hebron) in the 1920s, which was 
abandoned when the Jewish population of the city fled in 1929, and the plantation in the area of  
the Etzion settlement block in Al-Khaleel Hills. 
Most importantly, the JNF itself as an organized representative body was, I argue, beneficial 
for, and empowered, the Jewish communities in their afforestation activities.  And also the JNF 
being a non-governmental organization provided more flexibility for financial support through 
donations from Jews all over the world.  So, once they acquisitioned the lands, had the money, 
and were supported by the legislations, they had their settlements.  
  Additionally, afforestation activities undertaken by the Jewish communities considerably 
advanced after the appointment of Amihud Goor as the head of the Forest Department in 1946.  
Goor, as the Conservator of Palestine made great progress in the field of nurseries and 
plantations, and 4,000,000 plants were raised in 1947 (Evans, 1948, p. 224).  Free distribution of 
plants had become a departmental policy that resulted from the use of locally-manufactured 
overhead irrigation systems in four nurseries.  Existing reserves had been consolidated.  Most 
importantly, a revised Forest Ordinance in 1948 was passed.  This ordinance gave more control 
over private land, and was more effective for forest prevention (ibid).  The organization of 
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 Jewish farmers known as “The Public Committee for Soil Conservation,” headed by Goor, 
converted almost all Jewish agriculture to soil conserving practices.   
The significance of Jewish afforestation in the Mandate period was related to its role in the 
Jewish land acquisition and settlement policies.  It contributed to the creation of continuous areas 
of Jewish control, population distribution and overall economic development.  This was a 
fundamental strategy in creating the broadest possible areas of Jewish control on the way to 
establishing a viable Jewish state.  More importantly, the experience gained by the JNF during 
the Mandate period prepared them for a major role within that state.  As stated by Cohen (1993, 
p. 59), 
In terms of both its professional expertise and the coordination between it and governmental 
agencies, the JNF matured into a powerful and pragmatic body, completely devoted to the 
realization of Zionist goals in Palestine/Israel. The mandate years were a time of 
experimentation and lessons learned were applied with vigor once the authorities and 
resources of the new state were directed toward the afforestation efforts of the JNF. 
 
The Palestinians’ afforestation/anti-afforestation practices.  The Palestinians during the 
early years of the British Mandate did not have an afforestation plan as systematic and organized 
as that of the British or the Jews.  Their plantation stemmed from their traditions of agriculture 
and cultivation.  Moreover, their difficult living conditions such as poverty and a high rate of 
unemployment as a result of the war, put agriculture and food acquisition as their highest 
priority. 
In 1931, recognizing the threats of the JNF upon the land, the Palestinian Arabs tried to 
protect their land from the JNF possession by establishing their own National Fund, Sunduq Al-
Ummah (El-Eini, 2006, p. 268). However, in 1930s, the Arab fund had little effects, and soon 
transformed from a charitable organization to a joint stock company (the Arab Company for the 
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Rescue of the Lands in Palestine). In 1940s it was revived.  In 1945 a Central Committee for the 
Arab Fund to Save Arab Lands from the Jews was also formed (El-Eini, 2006).  However, the 
Fund encountered various difficulties in preventing the land especially with the existence of the 
Land Transfer Ordinance. 
In 1944, after a talk of a Palestinian Arab representative to the Arab League arguing that the 
small land holders’ debts caused the fellaheen to sell their lands to the Jews, the Arab League 
helped finance the formation of the Arab development society in 1945 to assist Palestinian Arab 
peasants repay their debts to money lenders.  However, the Arab National Fund was paralyzed 
by the British bureaucratic regulations within which “no land in Zone A to be transferred to any 
companies regardless of their share holder’s national composition” (p. 270). 
The role of the local Palestinian people in the spatial struggle with the British and the Jews 
had been changed with the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936.  Although started as a civil 
strike and then militarized gradually, The Arab Revolt included the policy of anti-afforestation 
towards the British and the Jewish plantation as a tool in the Palestinians’ resistance as a form of 
forest attacks (damaging and cutting) and forest arson (Cohen, 1993; El-Eini, 2006).  Literature 
points out that, although the British and the Jewish afforestation policies did not totally stop, the 
Arab Revolt had considerable effects. For example, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, 
changes in the British afforestation policies had taken place as a result of the Arab Revolt such as 
the call for decentralization (though it was not implemented), and shifting afforestation policies 
towards small scale projects. This was in addition to the British and the Jewish loss of many 
nurseries and forests, including four nurseries—including the large one at Aka (Acre)—were 
destroyed, many hill forest reserves were lost such as those near Kidna in Hebron Sub-District, 
and the British foresters lost access to many reserves.  
 To summarize, during the Mandate period, three main actors were involved in the spatial 
struggle: the British government, the Jewish communities represented by the JNF, and the local 
indigenous Palestinians.  The British government in this struggle was representing the 
professional actors.  The other two actors (the Jewish communities and the indigenous 
Palestinians) were the non-professionals in the struggle over space.  The non-professional actors 
were in an antagonistic relationship toward each other: one (the Jewish communities) sought 
control, and the other (the Palestinians) sought resistance to that control.  Control was the goal of 
the colonial power (both professional and non-professional): the professional planning body (the 
British government), and the non-professional actors (the Jewish communities).  The British 
government and the Jewish communities, with their different positions of power, used their 
afforestation policies to achieve spatial control for different purposes.  The cooperation between 
the British system and the Jewish communities in afforestation policies and practices led to 
achieving their goals of spatial control.  In the late Ottoman period, the ignorance of the spatial 
practices of Jewish communities by the Ottoman system gave them considerable power.  Hence, 
the cooperation between the British government and the Jewish communities helped develop, 
inherited from the Ottoman era, the three elements of a state: land, people and power.  The 
British policy, by legislating and maintaining State Land helped in the land transfer to the Jewish 
people.  It helped in settling the Jewish immigrants.  And, by including the Jewish organizations 
in afforestation decision-making, it empowered the Jewish people to form a strong body as the 
basis for the Israeli nation building in Palestine.  Indeed, this “covert planning” between the 
professional afforestation planning system of the British government and the non-professional 
afforestation planning practices of the Jewish communities helped build the state of Israel in 
Palestine.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AFFORESTATION PLANNING UNDER ISRAELI DOMINATION, 1948-
PRESENT, AND CONTEMPORARY CONTROL OF MOVEMENT 
 
Conflict between the Jewish immigrants and the local Palestinians had increased during the 
Mandate period in the 1940s, and as a result, Britain became anxious to get rid of the problem.  
However, it did not wish sole responsibility for the problem and thus, in April 1947, Britain 
formally requested the United Nations’ intervention.  The UN General Assembly set up the 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which then recommended the end of the British 
Mandate over Palestine, and the partition of Palestine into two states: a Jewish state and an Arab 
Palestinian state (see map 4.1).   The UN partition decision of Palestine, which was officially 
passed in November 29, 1947 by the UN General Assembly as resolution 181 did not resolve the 
conflict.  Instead, it redistributed the land of Palestine in favor of the Zionists, who held at the 
time less than 7% of Palestine, but now received about 55% of the country (Khalidi, 1988, p. 12). 
The Arabs refused the UN partition plan, and, in response to the Arab League Council, 
moved their troops to the Palestine border, launching the An-Naqba war of 1948.  The war 
officially started after the declaration of Israeli independence on May 15, 1948.  The Arab 
regular armies and Israeli forces engaged in fighting throughout the country and ended with the 
declaration of the Israeli state (see map 4.2) and the Armistice Line21 (which is now known as 
the Green Line) between the Jewish state and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and from then 
Palestine came under the rule of the Israeli domination. The Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian rule, 
 
21The border between the Jewish state and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is now the Green Line between Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
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and the West bank under Jordanian rule.  In 1967, both the West Bank (5858 Km2) and Gaza 
Strip (369 Km2) came under the rule of the Israeli occupation (see map 4.2).   
Despite the fact that the Israeli forces were only recently officially formed, they were well 
organized and armed.  The Israeli forces, such as the Haganah, had gained military experience 
and power during the British Mandate period, and through their participation in WWII on the 
side of the British.   
The above discussion raises an important question regarding the existence and the role of the 
British Mandate administration at the time: where were the British forces that were then still the 
official authorities in Palestine?  The presence of the British administration in Palestine at the 
time was not a problem for the Zionists since the British had declared their intention of leaving 
Palestine by May 15, 1948.  Indeed, their actual timetable of withdrawal facilitated the Zionists’ 
control over the country (Khalidi, 1988).    In fact, the Zionists were concerned about the 
possibility of the Arab armies entering Palestine after the British withdrawal because there would 
be a juridical vacuum in the country.  Therefore, the British planned to withdraw gradually, 
while maintaining legitimate authority over the whole country, surrendering power over 
successive areas of it (p. 15).  The British overall authority worked as a “shield” protecting the 
Zionists from the regular Arab armies.  The British withdrawal from Palestine transferred the 
colonial institutions to the newly establishing Israeli state, which at the time (May 1948), 
occupied 20,700 Km2; some 80% of the land area of Mandate Palestine (Home, 2003, p. 296). 
A Palestinian self rule was declared in 1995 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. From then the 
Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) came under the rule of the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) under several conditions within Oslo Records. In 2000, however, 
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Israel re-captured the OPT, and since then there have been various efforts to revive peace 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.          
This chapter focuses on afforestation and closure policies in the Israeli period.  It examines 
afforestation policies and practices of different actors from the beginning of the Israeli 
domination in 1948 to present, including the Jordanian period in the West Bank until 1967.   
Two main groups of actors have been involved in afforestation: the Israelis and the Palestinians.  
The Israelis are composed of the professionals (the Israeli planners who represent the planning 
system of the Israeli state) and the non-professionals (the Israeli settlers and the Jewish 
communities represented by the JNF).  The Palestinian actors are composed of the professionals 
(the Palestinian planners who represent the established Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 
1995) and the non-professionals (the Palestinian local indigenous people).  As another example 
of the role of planning open spaces in the Israeli/Palestinian spatial struggle, this chapter also 
highlights the contemporary Israeli closure policy and the Palestinian spatial practices to resist it.  
 
4.1 Land and Planning Laws 
The Israeli authorities inherited land and planning legislations of preceding authorities in 
Palestine: the Ottomans, the British and the Jordanians.  The Ottoman and British land 
regulations remained unaffected.  To some extent, Jordanian law was applied to the West Bank.  
In order for the Israeli authorities to fulfill their goals in Palestine, they have used the precedents’ 
legal legacy selectively.  Thus, in their continuous attempts at making the existing legal legacies 
in Palestine match their goals and desires of complete control over the area, the Israeli authorities 
created new regulations in the form of Military Orders (MOs).    
 
  
4.1.1 The Israeli land laws 
Israel considers itself the guardian of all property belonging to previous governments.     
Thus, State Land has become a key concept in Israeli land laws.  Interpreting the Ottoman and 
the British land systems, it does give Israel control over nearly all the land in the West Bank.  
Thus, one main source of land for the state of Israel has been State Land, estimated by the British 
as 1700 Km2 (Home, 2003, p. 296).  Shortly after the establishment of Israel, the state claimed 
ownership of two-thirds of the land it occupied (excluding the Negev) (ibid).  This area rose to 
93% of the land in the succeeding two decades (ibid).  In recent times, two-thirds of Jewish 
households live on nationally owned land.  The state protects property rights through leases for 
renewable jubilee periods of 49 or 98 years (ibid).  The Israeli authorities use different 
significant tools for the declaration of an area as State Land.    
One important tool for the declaration of State Land has been the elimination of the land 
registration process through Military Order no. 291 of December 1968 (Coon, 1992, p. 114).  
Lands that were registered during the Jordanian period in the West Bank were very few.  Thus, 
ending land registration under this MO put nearly two-thirds of the West Bank land in a status of 
“limbo”, not registered in the landholding books.  Although some of these lands were registered 
in the British tax registers, or in the Ottoman tax books, these documents suffered from the 
problems of “location and inexactitude.” 
The effectiveness of the declaration of State Land by the occupation authorities was due to 
the difficulties of proving land ownership by the indigenous Palestinians—discussed in detail 
later in this section.  This was due to a variety of reasons, one of which was absent landowners.    
Two large waves of Palestinian refugees were dispossessed of their lands in 1948 and 1967.  
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 This land forms an important source of territory for the state of Israel, and the Israeli Ministry of 
Agriculture estimated the extent of this land in 1950 at 4200 Km2 (60% of the cultivated land 
area) (Home, 2003, p. 296).  This land of the Palestinian refugees was put under the supervision 
of the “Custodian of Absentee Property,” which was created by the Israeli state (Cohen, 1993; 
Home, 2003).  Palestinians’ absenteeism under the Israeli occupation is discussed in greater 
depth later in this section.  
Proving landownership became very difficult because many Palestinian refugees, when they 
were dispossessed, had taken documents of their landholdings with them, and could not give 
them back to their children to proof their ownership because there was no connection between 
them.  This was exploited by the Israeli authorities in their increasing efforts at identifying as 
much land as possible as State Land.  To this end, they conducted a survey of land registration in 
the West Bank.  The results indicated that the majority of the land in the West Bank was not 
registered and fell into the categories of miri, matrouka and mawat lands.  Then in the 1980s, 
Israel interpreted miri, matrouka and mawat land categories as State Land (Shehadeh, 1993; 
Cohen, 1993). Under the Real Estate Law of 1969, matrouka land was registered with the State 
Land or local authority, and mawat land with the state (Home, 2003, p. 297).  As discussed 
earlier (section 3.2.2), the above land categories were not State Land under Ottoman law. Thus, 
the Israeli misinterpretation of the Ottoman land categories as State Land contributes to the 
internationally widespread idea that Israel does not expropriate land in private ownership.   
The issue of landownership became further complicated in 1977 after the inauguration of the 
Likud Government chaired by Begin, when the Israeli government declared all land as State 
Land unless proven otherwise (ibid).  Thus the burden of proof, which wholly lay on the 
claimants, became very difficult and demanding.  
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 In addition to declaring land as State Land, the Israeli authorities imposed different 
restrictions and Military Orders in order to control the Palestinian land.  Israeli land restrictions 
and orders are summarized below.     
1. The requirement of obtaining Israeli consent for land transfer: the Israeli occupation 
authorities passed a Military Order making it imperative for the Palestinians to obtain the 
consent of the officer of the Israeli army in charge of the judiciary before any transfer of land 
(Shehadeh, 1993).  This limitation on land transfer between Palestinian citizens would result 
in constraining the Palestinian development process in various ways (Coon, 1992) including 
destroying commercial confidence, obstructing the land market, and discouraging the 
expansion and relocation of activities.  These problems are widespread in the WB (ibid).   
2. Control of the subdivision of land: by passing MO no. 291 in 1968, which stopped land 
registration, dividing land between Palestinian citizens became very difficult and often 
impossible (Coon, 1992; Shehadeh, 1993).  According to this MO, land which was registered 
in the name of a single owner may be re-registered under another single name.  However, a 
parcel of land was not allowed to be divided up and registered separately in the names of 
more than one new Palestinian owner (Coon, 1992).  This indeed threatened the Arab 
Palestinian tradition of dividing an estate between surviving children, since the land so 
inherited does not have the security of a title deed (ibid).  Because of large families, most 
inheritances are divided.  The result is that half the land which was registered in 1967 is not 
registered in the name of its present owner (ibid).   Hence, this is the case for only one-sixth 
of the land of the West bank (ibid).  Most importantly, proof of ownership is required to 
obtain consent for subdivision of the land and permission to subdivide is rarely given.  With 
only a few owners having clear title to their land, subdivision is difficult or impossible.  This 
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 control over subdivision of land in return impedes the buying and selling of land and it is an 
obstacle for development, because subdivision is a precondition to obtaining a building 
permit.  The Israeli authorities insist that applicants for building permits should be the 
registered owners of the land in question, but since this condition is seldom verified, it is very 
difficult to obtain building permits.    
3. Military Orders that facilitate purchase of land by the Israelis: an example of these MOs is 
the MO no. 811, the main aim of which is “validating land purchases made by virtue of 
irrevocable powers of attorney” (Shehadeh, 1993, p. 19).  This order legitimized the ‘illegal’ 
land purchases by nongovernmental parties.  This was because the right to lease or purchase 
land was limited to the government and the JNF until 1973 (Cohen, 1993, p. 100).  Private or 
nongovernmental parties’ purchases were considered illegal. To gain as much land as 
possible, this order facilitated land purchase also within the private sector.  
4. Compulsory Purchase Order: the Israeli occupation authorities assimilated the British legacy 
of Compulsory Purchase Ordinances by passing the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts 
and Compensation) Law in 1953 (Home, 2003, 304).  This Ordinance was followed by 
massive confiscation of land for Jewish settlement and defense.  However, compulsory 
purchase is now rarely needed since the Israeli state owns most of the land (ibid). 
5. Security Issues: restrictions related to security issues have facilitated Israeli control of the 
land without changing its ownership.  Under these security restrictions, construction in or 
entrance to specific areas is prohibited.  These restrictions give the military commander the 
right to “prohibit any new construction within a two-hundred-meter strip bracketing main 
roads, with lesser restrictions along the margins of smaller roads” (Cohen, 1993, p. 98).  This 
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 indeed rigorously affects Palestinians’ land use since the Palestinians usually tend to build 
along roadways.   
6. The declaration of military training zones or the closing of specific areas for security reasons: 
according to this restriction, in the military zone the army is not responsible for damaging 
property.  Entrance to and exit from the closed area is granted only by written permission 
from the military command.  This often serves as the first step towards the establishment of 
Israeli settlement (Cohen, 1993).    
7. The declaration of nature reserves: this does not affect ownership, but declaring nature 
reserves limits to a further degree land use and construction within the reserve.  The 
declaration of nature reserves is part of a program of land seizure by the Ministerial 
Committee for Settlement (Cohen, 1993).   
8. The “outright expropriation” regulation and its amendment: this is applied in accordance, 
theoretically, with the Jordanian laws related to expropriation procedures (Cohen, 1993; 
Shehadeh, 1993).  In theory, these expropriations are to be carried out for the benefit of the 
public.  The occupation authorities amended and interpreted this regulation according to their 
own goals.  Ironically, the authorities interpret the ‘public’ as the Jewish settlements only 
denying the Palestinians.  The result is that the significant expropriations carried out by the 
Israelis have been for the extension of infrastructure supporting the Jewish settlements, while 
prohibiting the Palestinians from such benefits.    
Absenteeism under Israeli domination.  The state of Israel, inheriting from the Ottomans 
and the British, benefited from the concept of “absenteeism” to achieve its goals.  The Israeli 
military government considered all individuals who were not present in Palestine at the date of 
the occupation as “absentees.”  Similar to the 1939 British regulations regarding “Custodian of 
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 Enemy Property” that were devised for wartime, the Israeli government created the “Custodian 
of Absentee Properties” (Home, 2003, p. 300).  Within this, all lands of the absentees came into 
the hands of the “Custodian of Absentee Properties.”24  Contrary to its precedents, the Israeli 
custodianship does not mean holding the land in trust against a possible future return.  Rather, 
the land was forfeited to the state.  In 1950, the Israeli government passed further legislation 
including the creation of a “Development Authority” with powers to dispose of absentees’ land 
(ibid).   
In 1967, the Military Order no. 58 extended the power of the “Custodian of Absentee 
Properties” to the newly Occupied Territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip).  Palestinian 
refugees from the 1948 War who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip still could not reclaim 
their former land.  Ironically, these “present absentees”—as they are called by Home (2003)—
who were displaced from their lands in Israel, were deprived of getting back their land.  This was 
in stark contrast to the 1950 Law of Return to the Jewish people (ibid).  Under this law, every 
Jew has the right to settle in Israel.  This led to successive waves of immigration to Israel that 
resulted in an increased Jewish population.    
Proving landownership.  In order for the Palestinians to maintain their land in the face of the 
Israeli policies that tend to control as much land as possible, they have to confirm 
landownership.  The persistent problem is that the burden of landownership proof is very 
difficult and demanding, and the Israeli authorities do not recognize most of the Palestinian 
ownership rights (Coon, 1992; Cohen, 1993; Khmaisi, 1997).  During the Jordanian period, only 
38% of the West Bank was formally registered (Coon, 1992, p. 14; Khamaisi, 1997, p. 331).  The 
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 rest was registered according to the Ottoman Land Code.  However, the Israeli authorities did not 
accept the Ottoman’s land titles because of the vagueness of boundaries in the Ottoman system, 
and the difference between the name of the applicant and the name on the title.  Even if the 
applicant was the successor of the title holder, he had to supply the whole genealogy and produce 
official verification.  Additionally, the MO no. 291 of 1968 stopped all registration (ibid), which 
effectively stopped land registration by the Jordanian land law.  This indeed led to a dilemma 
because landowners could not provide confirmation of ownership.     
Moreover, appealing land claims for the Palestinians required an endlessly expensive 
process.  For example, the person must use a lawyer, provide maps and documents, and secure 
cooperation of neighbors and the Mukhtar (Cohen, 1993), all of which is too expensive for the 
average person.  The survey maps alone demanded by the Israeli authorities could cost more than 
the annual income of any Palestinian farmer (ibid).  Additionally, if the documentation that 
supported the claim of ownership was not sufficient, or not in the form of a “Tabu25,” the Israeli 
government imposed further conditions.  This included demanding verification of the continuous 
cultivation of the land for ten years prior to the filing of the claim.  This condition, however, is 
very difficult to achieve due to the prevailing conditions of agriculture that depends on rainfall 
and periodic basis.  It is likely that in a period of ten years there would be years, in which the 
land was not worked.  Most importantly, the condition of obtaining the cooperation of neighbors 
and the Mukhtar is extremely problematic and subject to the effect of personal relationships.  The 
signature of a neighbor, for example, is possible only if there is an agreement on the boundaries, 
and if the neighbor actually exists.  With the vagueness of boundaries, and the possibility of the 
neighbor’s absence, getting signatures is frequently very difficult or impossible.  Most 
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importantly, getting the signatures and the cooperation of the Mukhtar does not mean the 
problem is solved.  However, “accusations of forgery and counterfeit are commonly exchanged
by both the authorities and the villagers, depending on which way the case is going” (Cohen, 
1993, p. 98).  
Proving landownership by the Palestinians is not only important for their plantation and use 
of land, it also affects development and construction in the Palestinian areas.  Proof of ownership 
is a precondition for approving detailed plans and land parcel schemes, which are in turn 
preconditions for obtaining building and development permits.  Thus, proving ownership and 
getting building permits for the Palestinians is a continuous burden with endless processing that 
limits Palestinian development.  
Israeli land policies towards the Palestinian Territories could be generally considered, as 
stated by Rishmawi (1986), as aiming at the Judiazation of these territories.  Rishmawi argues 
that Israel cannot afford to annex formally the Palestinian Territories in the West Bank and Gaza 
because of the one-and-a-half million Palestinians living in the area (p. 2).  Thus, Israel’s only 
option is to annex the land without the native population (ibid).    
4.1.2: The Israeli Statutory Planning 
The Israeli occupation authorities used the British and Jordanian legislation as the basis for 
their statutory planning in Occupied Palestine (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992; Shihadeh, 1993; 
Khamaisi, 1997; Home, 2003). The Israelis have used two bodies of law in the Palestinian 
Territories: the Jordanian Planning Law no. 79 of 1966 and “security enactments” in the form of 
Military Orders (MOs) issued, the first one in 1971, by the Israeli Army Commander or the Head 
of the Civil Administration.    
 After the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the Israeli authorities established a Military 
Government (MG) to rule the West Bank.  The West Bank remained under the rule of this MG 
until 1981, when Israel established the Civil Administration to replace it (Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 
1997).  This change in administration caused changes in the planning field.  The Israeli MG 
continued applying the Jordanian Planning Law no. 79 of 1966 until 1971.  During this period, 
the Israeli authorities focused on security issues and on developing a control process using the 
army (Khamaisi, 1997).  In 1971, the Israeli authorities passed the MO no. 418 which, together 
with its amendments, established the basis of the Israeli planning system, building upon both the 
Mandate and the Jordanian planning legacy.  
The Jordanian Planning Law no. 79 of 1966.   This Law was a complex mixture of 
Ottoman, British and Jordanian law (Coon, 1992, p. 40).  It was indeed an amendment of the 
Jordanian Law of Planning for Cities, Villages and Building no. 31 of 1955 (Khamiasi, 1997, 
329), which was based on the British TPO of 1936 with some additions.  The Jordanian Planning 
Law was applied in the West Bank as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after annexation 
in 1950 (ibid).  Despite the changes in planning law and structure of the planning system carried 
out by the Jordanians, the Mandate plans continued to form the basis for development control in 
the capacity of issuing building permits.     
This law established three planning tiers:  
1. High Planning Council (HPC): with the Minister of Interior as its Chairperson, who was also 
the Head of the planning system.  He was responsible for coordinating the use of the land 
under his authority according to the public interest, and assuring that the planning schemes 
conformed with the overall development plans and economic and social objectives of the 
government (Rishmawi, 1986);  
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 2. District Commissions: there were three district commissions in the West Bank: Nablus, Al-
Quds (Jerusalem), and Al-Khalil (Hebron);  
3. Local Commissions: municipal or village councils, which were elected.    
A Central Planning Department was established to carry out all survey work and to provide 
technical advice to the HPC in relation to the production and approval of plans, and the granting 
and appealing of building permits (Coon, 1992).  This department, according to the law, was 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior (Rishmawi, 1986).   
The law provided a hierarchy of three development plans dealing with land use: regional, 
outline, and detailed, as well as parcelization schemes dealing with landownership (Coon, 1992).   
The law, however, did not clarify when and where plans were required to be prepared.  All three 
plans were required to include regulations and roads.  Preservation of landscape, buildings, and 
infrastructure were to be covered in regional and outline plans.  Designation of areas for 
development might be done in outline or detailed plans.  Areas to be compulsorily purchased or 
reparcelled were to be designated in detailed plans.  Compulsory reparcellation allowed up to 
30% of the land to be retained for public use without compensation (Coon, 1992, p. 43).  Areas 
for reparcellation should be designated for this purpose in detailed plans.  There was great 
potential for repetition and conflict between the different types of plans, especially in the plan 
regulations, and between outline and detailed plans.  The law lacked any specifications regarding 
the need for conformity between plans, except the need for parcellation schemes to conform to 
detailed plans.     
In an assessment of this law, Coon (1992) states that there is a great deal of ambiguity about 
responsibilities for the planning process, and about how it should work in practice.  This law 
calls for good practice, but in the absence of good will, this cannot be ensured.  For example, the 
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 system can work only if the required plans are prepared and kept up to date.  Most importantly, it 
is a centralized law that gives considerable powers to the central authority, including powers to 
regulate the activity of local authorities by approving plans and considering appeals.  Thus, under 
this law the planning system could be used to constrain or prevent development by a liberal or 
authoritarian regime or, using Coon’s (1992) term, a “conscienceless authority.”  This might be 
achieved, for example, by exploiting ambiguities in the law; by reducing the powers and 
resources of the local planning authorities; by not preparing or approving plans; by obscuring the 
procedure for issuing permits; or by not adapting the law and the boundaries of planning 
authorities to meet new social needs or geographic conditions (p. 55).  These measures, indeed, 
have been used by the Israeli military authorities in the WB.  The occupation authorities 
implement these measures through Military Orders, which amended the Jordanian planning law.   
Israeli Military Orders.  The Israeli MOs in general total 1,300 MOs since 1967 (Coon, 
1992, p. 40).  Specifically, Israeli authorities passed a number of MOs amending the Jordanian 
Planning Law no. 79 of 1966 (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992; Shehadeh, 1993).  The occupation 
authorities passed ten MOs referring to the Jordanian Law (Coon, 1992, p. 55).  In 1971, Israel 
passed the MO no. 418 that was an amendment to the Jordanian Law no. 79 (Rishmawi, 1986; 
Coon, 1992; Shehadeh, 1993; Khamaisi, 1997).  Subsequent orders have been amendments to the 
MO no. 418 (Coon, 1992), but these have never been consolidated.  Most importantly, there is 
very little relationship between the orders and the provisions of the Jordanian Law (ibid).  The 
orders referred to few articles of the law, few articles have either been amended or added to the 
law, and no article in the law has been cancelled.  At the same time, very few of the provisions of 
the original Military Order no. 418 have been amended or cancelled.  What has happened is that 
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 articles have been added to the original order, and then sometimes renumbered, using a very 
“tiresome” numbering system (Coon, 1992, p. 55). 
The MO no. 418 which came to be known as, according to Khamaisi (1997), the “Decree 
Concerning the Organization of Towns, Villages, and Building in the West Bank,” caused big 
changes in the planning system (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992; Shehadeh, 1993; Khamaisi, 
1997).   These changes are summarized in the following five points.   
First, it transferred powers of the planning authorities designated in the Jordanian Law to 
nominees of the Israeli government—specifically article 2 of the MO 418 declared this transfer 
(Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 1997).  The powers of the Jordanian Minister and his role designated in 
the Jordanian Law, transferred into the hands of the “person in charge” (the Responsible) who 
was appointed by the Military Commander of the West Bank (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992; 
Shehadeh, 1993; Khamaisi, 1997).  This appointee was the Israeli Officer in Charge of Interior 
Affairs, until the establishment of the Civil Administration (discussed later in this section) 
(Rishmawi, 1986).  After the establishment of the Civil Administration, this appointee came 
from the “infrastructure branch” of the Civil Administration in the West Bank (ibid).  By virtue 
of this MO, the Military Commander was granted the power to appoint members of the HPC and 
the Regional Rural Planning Committees (RRPC) (Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 1997).  The 
“Responsible” was given absolute authority.  He could amend, cancel, or suspend for a given 
period any design or permit; take over any of the privileges of any rural committee or 
municipality; amend or cancel any permit; and exempt any person from the need to obtain a 
permit in accordance with the law (Khamaisi, 1997).   
Second, The MO 418 further centralized the planning system by cancelling the middle level 
in the planning process: the District Commission (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 
120 
 
 1997).  It also cancelled the Local Planning Commission in Village Councils and established 
instead Regional Rural Planning Committees (RRPC) (ibid).  Although municipalities continued 
to be local commissions, this MO also affected their role in planning by reducing their freedom 
of action and territorial coverage.  Most importantly, most of the municipal councils were 
dismissed and replacements appointed by the Israelis (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992). 
Additionally, the MO 418 gave additional power to the HPC to override any planning decision 
(Coon, 1992).  The HPC under this MO could at any time, and for any or no reason amend, 
cancel, or disregard any plan or permit.  It could assume the powers of any other planning 
authority, or issue or dispense any permit (Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 1997).  In other words, the 
HPC could disregard all planning provisions of the planning law.  The MO 418 authorized the 
HPC to set up “subsidiary” or “ad hoc” committees as it deemed necessary (Khamaisi, 1997), 
such as the “mysterious,” according to Coon (1997), special committees.    
Third, by virtue of this MO, the local indigenous Palestinians became totally excluded from 
the planning process (Rishmawi, 1986; Coon, 1992; Khamaisi, 1997).  Using Khamaisi’s words, 
the Palestinians “were robbed of all authority and responsibility in planning institutions” (p. 
330).  Their presence in the province and RRPC or in the sub-commission of the HPC was only 
formal (Khamaisi, 1997).  The Responsible in charge formed the HPC and appointed Jewish 
members with no Palestinian representation.  However, all Israeli planning authorities, including 
regional and local councils of the settlements in the West Bank, were represented and consulted 
in the planning process (Rishmawi, 1986, p. 6).  
Fourth, as a result of the MO 418 (and its amendments), fees for permits were imposed and 
increased.  Penalties for unpermitted development were also increased, with the possibility of 
immediately stopping development without a permit.  According to the Order, any planner who 
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 recommended, or committee member who granted, a permit or approved a plan “not in 
conformity with a plan having a greater force” was subject to imprisonment for a year or a fine 
of 100,000 shekels26 (Coon, 1992, p. 60).  However, such a penalty was not imposed for 
unreasonably refusing a permit (ibid). 
Finally, the Military Order 418 and other orders that amended it generally exploited the 
vagueness of the Jordanian Law.  Many issues in these orders were left vague in order to give the 
Israeli authorities the needed flexibility to adjust the law in accordance to their goals and desires 
of complete control (Rishmawi, 1986).  The Military Orders, as described by Coon, do not 
explain their purpose, they are brief and ambiguous, and often appear to be drafted hastily.  
Some of the provisions of the Military Orders appear to be little used and without apparent 
purpose (p. 60).   
The Israeli Civil Administration.  Another big change that occurred in the Israeli planning 
system in occupied Palestine was the establishment of the Civil Administration in the West Bank 
in 1981.  This caused noticeable change in the planning administration and structure in the 
Occupied Territories.  This Civil Administration was not operated by civilians but dealt with the 
affairs of civilians.  Its head was appointed by the Israeli army commander and the 
administration consisted of four divisions: administration, interior, infrastructure and health.  
Each division was headed by a military officer.  Below these divisions were a large number of 
departments, one of which was The Central Planning Department.  All department heads were 
Israelis, and most of them were soldiers.  These departments usually had close links with (and 
often had staff from) corresponding Israeli ministries.  The Civil Administration was responsible 
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for all public services in the West Bank—with the exception of some services within the 
municipalities.   
Under the Civil Administration, Israel divided the West Bank into 7 districts, 25 
municipalities, and 87 village councils (Coon, 1992, p. 38).  Boundaries of municipalities were 
established and changed by law.  Boundaries of villages were defined informally in accordance 
mainly with land ownership.  Many villages had larger populations than some of the 
municipalities.   
The Civil Administration contributed to the centrality of the planning system. It paralyzed 
any role that could be taken by the local committees. For example, Local (municipality and 
village) council elections were cancelled in 1976 (Coon, 1992, p. 37).  In 1982, the mayors of 
most of the large towns were dismissed, and some of them deported (ibid).  Israeli Jewish 
mayors were installed in Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and El-Bireh until 1985-87 (ibid).  In the 
1990s, nine of the 25 municipalities had mayors who were elected in 1976, 14 had mayors 
appointed and protected by the Israelis and two including Nablus had no mayor or council 
(Coon, 1992, p. 38).  
This Civil Administration delineated and added to the central concept of the Israeli planning 
system in Occupied Palestine, which is the exclusion of the local Palestinians.  All employees of 
the administration were either appointed by or ultimately responsible to the Israeli Military 
Commander and to the Israeli Ministry of Defense.  Town planning in the West Bank under this 
administration was ultimately not responsive to nor conducted with the awareness of the 
Palestinians.  The Country Report on Human Rights in the West Bank of 1987 to the 
 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US State Department assured this exclusion of the 
Palestinians.  It states, “Palestinians are not permitted to participate in significant public policy 
decisions concerning land and resource use and planning” (as cited in Coon, 1992, p. 39). 
Most importantly, the above structure of the local administration system in the West Bank 
was one of two systems.  The Israeli division of the West Bank into seven districts was just for 
the Palestinians.  Israel established another parallel local administration system within which it 
divided the West Bank into “regions” and “local councils,” and with a separate system of 
boundaries for the administration of the Jewish population in the Israeli settlements.  The control 
and limitation of the local governments discussed above, the lack of elected bodies and 
opportunity for participation and consultation, and the absence of civil rights, characterized the 
administration of Palestinians but not the system used to administer the Jewish population of the 
West Bank.   
The Israeli use of the Mandate plans.  The main aim of Israeli planning system as it appears 
from the discussion above has been to restrict Palestinian development to achieve more spatial 
control.  In addition to changing the planning structure to exclude the local Palestinians from the 
planning administration and process, Israel used the Mandate plans to restrict Palestinian 
development in the West Bank.  Israel also deepened the control of Palestinian development by 
exploiting legislation pertaining to the Jordanian Law requiring the preparation of development 
plans.  These required plans, however, do not exist in the West Bank, or the opportunities within 
existing plans (the Mandate plans) have been exhausted.  Thus, development plans in the West 
Bank have offered no opportunities toward development.   
Two Mandate plans of fundamental significance in the West Bank have been the Samaria 
Regional Plan (S15), which covers the northern part of the WB; and the Jerusalem Regional Plan 
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 (RJ5), which covers most of the remainder of the WB (see map 4.3).  These plans are significant 
to the present time because the occupation authorities have referred to and used them since the 
1980s as a pretext to restrict and prohibit Palestinian development, in particular outside existing 
towns and villages.  The occupation authorities have shown much respect for these plans though 
they did not re-discover them until the 1980s: RJ5 shortly before 1980 and S15 in 1985 (Coon, 
1992, p. 72).  Since that date, they have become the reference of the occupation for refusing 
permits to and demolishing Palestinian development.   
These plans are significant also because they have never been replaced by updated plans, 
and, although they have been amended, no amendment has been approved (Coon, 1992).  For 
example, outline plans were expected to provide the necessary framework for the development of 
the towns and villages identified in the regional plan, but these plans have never been finally 
approved (ibid).     
The respect shown by the Israeli authorities for these plans has been selective.  For example, 
the program of Jewish settlements is contrary to the regional plans both in land use and in racial 
terms (Coon, 1992, p. 65).  In terms of land use, no new settlements are shown in the plans, and 
regarding racial terms, the plans lacked any reference to provision for particular racial or 
religious groups (ibid).    
Most importantly, the Israeli authorities exploited these Mandate plans for their benefit.  The 
lack of opportunity provided by these plans for development in the late twentieth century 
provided the Israeli authorities a pretext to justify their policies of restricting Palestinian 
development (Coon, 1992).  These plans were just statements identifying the locations of 
existing development rather than any kind of guideline for future development.  They were 
restrictive documents rather than offering guidance on where and how development should meet 
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 the conditions of the 1940s (Coon, 1992, p. 79).  None of these plans is relevant to the needs of 
the present time.  The Israelis continued applying the British plans without updating population 
estimates or any revision to boundaries (Home, 2003).  The Israeli government used the list of 
Arab Palestinian settlements in the Mandate plans.  This of course limited recognition of new 
Palestinian villages, which grew from 264 in 1947 to 400 by 1967 (Home, 2003, p. 304). 
In particular, the Israeli authorities exploited two restrictive measures in the Mandate plans to 
refuse development permits to the Palestinians almost everywhere in the West Bank, outside of 
the towns and villages.  These two measures were: the designation of most of the land as 
agricultural zone, even though (according to these plans) development was not in fact prohibited 
in agricultural areas; and the prohibition of more than one “house on a plot.”  The Israeli 
occupation has used the latter measure as a means of refusing building permits simply by not 
authorizing parceling of the land (ibid).  
Moreover, another important goal of the Israeli planning system in the Palestinian Territories, 
in addition to controlling Palestinian development, has been to provide opportunities for Jewish 
settlement.  However, the Mandate plans do not offer such opportunities or pretexts for Jewish 
settlement.  On the contrary, the Israelis discovered that the Mandate plans formed obstacles to 
Jewish development and so they amended the plans in a way that helped achieve the goal of 
Israeli settlement in the Palestinian Territories (Khamaisi, 1997, p. 332).  The Mandate plans 
allowed Palestinian owners to obtain development permits in the agricultural land zone, which 
for the occupation authorities was an obstacle to acquiring the land necessary for building the 
needed Jewish settlements.  Thus, the Israeli authorities amended the Mandate plans at both 
regional and local levels.  
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 To change the Mandate plans at the regional level, the HPC in the early 1980s prepared two 
plans.  The first was the 1982 “Partial Regional Plan no. 1/82”, amendment to the British 
regional plan RJ5.  The second was the 1984 “the Regional Partial Outline Plan for Roads, Order 
no. 50” (Coon, 1992, p. 80; Shehadeh, 1993, p. 81; Khamaisi, 1997, p. 333). 
The first Israeli Regional Plan no. 1/82 reserved more areas of land for Jewish settlement 
(Coon, 1992).  This plan covered an area of about 45 km2 around the three sides of Jerusalem, 
forming a belt around the city in the area of the WB (Khamaisi, 1997, p. 333).  It identified five 
main land-use zones: agriculture, nature reserve, future development, reserved area, and built-up 
village areas.  This plan was aimed at preventing the Palestinians’ right to building permits in 
agricultural zones according to the Mandate plans.  It also limited Palestinian development in 
villages and in congested built-up areas.  Notably, the areas designated for future development 
by this plan were selected for the creation or expansion of Jewish settlements.  This plan was 
submitted by the HPC according to the Jordanian Planning Law no. 79, but has not yet received 
final approval (ibid).   
Road Plan No. 50 provided the necessary roads to connect the Israeli settlements to each 
other and to Israel through corridors that escape any Palestinian presence (Coon, 1992).  This 
plan created a dual road system in the WB: the main users of the one are the Palestinians, and of 
the other are the Jews.  It identified a four-level classification system of roads in all areas of the 
WB: highway, main, regional and local.  The plan determined the setback dimensions of the 
roads to limit Palestinian development:  a large setback of 200-300m, and a development setback 
from the axis of existing and proposed roads.  This plan is actually part of the Israeli national 
road plan, T-M-A-3, which was approved by the Israeli government in 1973, and the by-pass 
Road Plan no. 50 that connected Jewish settlements in the WB with Israel, avoiding Palestinian 
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 localities (Khamaisi, 1997, p. 333).  This plan, similar to Plan no. 1/82, has not yet received 
approval.  Despite this, the Israeli occupation has prepared detailed plans for parts of the road 
and approved them according to the Jordanian Planning Law (ibid).   
In analyses by Rishmawi (1986) and Shehadeh (1993), the two Israeli plans—Plan 1/82 and 
the Road Plan no. 50—are described as designed to serve the objectives of the Master Plan of the 
World Zionist Organization (WZO), that is to disperse a maximally large Jewish population in 
areas of high settlement priority: using “small national inputs” in a relatively short period by 
using the settlement potential of the West Bank, and achieving the incorporation of the West 
Bank into the Israeli national system (Rishmawi, 1986, p. 4; Shehadeh, 1993, p. 79).  According 
to Shehadeh (1993), the Israeli authorities in their preparation of these two plans considered the 
Palestinian population and Palestinian land use as constraints.  Thus, Palestinian areas were first 
“encircled and then penetrated and fragmented” (p. 81).   
Israeli attempts at changing the Mandate plans at local levels occurred through the 
preparation of local outline plans for the Palestinian villages.  This process was started in 1979 
by a private Israeli planner who was asked to prepare these plans by the central planning 
committee (Khamaisi, 1997, p. 334).  In 1981, the HPC approved 183 plans (ibid), but these 
were strongly rejected by the Palestinians because they limited Palestinian village development.   
Later, at the end of the 1980s, the HPC established boundaries for the building areas of villages 
(ibid).  The staff of the Central Planning Department prepared outline plans for these villages,   
and the HPC approved and imposed them without Palestinian participation.  Until the end of 
1993, all Palestinian villages had fixed boundaries and half of them had approved outline plans 
(ibid).  These local plans amended the Mandate district plans and later cancelled them within the 
fixed boundary area.  Outside the boundary areas, the Mandate plan is officially still valid (ibid). 
128 
 
 129 
 
For the Palestinians the Israeli planning system is of vital concern because it has impact on 
the quality of their lives; it affects not only their future prosperity, but their nationhood and 
identity.  Decisions of the Israeli planning system affect all aspects of Palestinian life: social, 
economic development, transport, and quality of the environment. Most importantly, the Israeli 
planning system is of notable importance for the great changes it causes to the landscape of 
Palestine.  This notable change is the result of building the Israeli settlements and the road 
system that connects them.    
Regarding afforestation planning, the above restrictive features of the Israeli planning system 
are crucial and of great influence.  Indeed, restricting Palestinian development and the exclusion 
of the local Palestinians from the planning system have been important features of the Israeli 
planning system that have helped the Israelis implement their afforestation policies in their 
spatial struggle with the Palestinians.  While planning has been described as a process of 
mediating conflict, the Israeli planning system in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), as 
stated by Coon (1992), “is not so much a means of mediating conflict. It is an instrument for 
conducting the conflict” (p. 4). 
4.1.3 Planning Laws After the Establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 
The valid planning law in the OPT under the rule of the PNA is the Jordanian Law.  The 
Palestinian planning system applies the Jordanian Law in areas within zones A and B (according 
to divisions of Oslo II agreement).  In areas within zone C (60% of the OPT), which are 
completely under the Israeli responsibility, the Israeli authorities apply the British plans in
addition to the Military Orders (discussed earlier).  As a result of this, new construction is 
prohibited in almost 70% of zone C, with very tight regulations and restrictions applied through 
the rest of the zone (Ma’an, 2009).  And because of security reasons in areas in zone B, the 
 Israeli restrictions can be applied effectively in areas within this zone.  Thus, areas under full 
Palestinian planning responsibilities form only 20% of the OPT.    
Because of the vagueness and in most cases the inappropriateness of the Jordanian Law, the 
Palestinian planning system (namely the legal department of the MoLG) has attempted in the last 
five years to amend it. Since the Palestinian system does not have the power to change the Law, 
because of the inactivity of the Palestinian Parliament due to the current political situation, the 
Palestinian legal planners worked with specific articles and paragraphs of the Law to decrease its 
vagueness and increase its efficiency as much as possible. This work includes explanations and 
clarifications of specific points of the Law.  However, this work is very limited and at the 
beginning stages.  
From the discussion above, although the ‘ostensible’ declaration of Palestinian self-
autonomy in OPT, effects of  Israeli statutory planning on the Palestinian areas have not stopped 
and continue in the current period with the existence of the PNA.   
 
4.2 Afforestation Planning and Its Use in the Israeli/Palestinian Spatial Struggle 
Afforestation policies in Palestine during the Israeli domination period have changed in 
response to changes in political conditions and the consequent changes of actors’ goals.  The 
development and the use of afforestation planning in Israeli/Palestinian struggle are discussed in 
three main periods.  The first includes the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 up to the 
1970s.  The second covers the Israeli state stabilization period, from the 1970s to the 1990s.  The 
third period started with the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip in 1995 to the present time, which coincides with Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories.   
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4.2.1 During the First Decades of the Israeli State, 1948-1970s 
With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the responsibilities of the Mandatory 
Forestry Service were transferred to the Afforestation Department of the Ministry of Agriculture 
of the state of Israel and to the JNF (Home, 2003; Amir and Rechtman, 2006).  The Israeli 
government (Israeli professional planning system), and the JNF (representing the Israeli people) 
remained explicitly responsible for afforestation tasks until 1960.  Due to overlaps in these tasks 
between the Israeli state (represented by the Forestry Division in the Ministry of Agriculture) and 
the JNF, two agreements were signed in 1959 and 1960 that consolidated afforestation tasks in 
the hands of the JNF (Cohen, 1993).  This does not mean that the Israeli planning system has no 
role in afforestation policies.  While the JNF became the agent explicitly responsible for all the 
work related to afforestation, the Israeli planning system still implicitly combined some work 
with the JNF in order to achieve the general Israeli goals in Palestine.   
The Israeli state’s and the JNF’s afforestation.  After the 1948 war, the Israeli system 
emphasized the importance of integrating forests into national goals.  This was clear in the 
speech by David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, in the second Knesset.  He stated, 
We [the people of Israel] must plant hundreds of thousands of trees over an area of 5 million 
dunams… we must wrap every mountain and slope in trees, all the hills and stony lands that 
cannot be used for agriculture… we must plant for defense purposes, along the roads and 
borders… (Amir & Rechtman, 2006, p. 43). 
 
Ben Gurion declared that afforestation was one of the activities necessary for protecting the 
newborn state of Israel and developing it into a powerful state.  To this end, the Israeli planning 
system (representing the Israeli government) and the JNF (representing the Israeli people) as the 
agent responsible for afforestation directed projects towards important purposes that included: 
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 protecting state frontiers; security issues; settling the country; protecting the land and limiting the 
Arab Palestinian growth and use.  The main aim was planting the entire area that was appropriate 
for forestry, which was 3.5 million dunams (Cohen, 1993, p. 62).  With the 427,000 dunams that 
had been planted during the pre-state period, Yosef Wietz, the Director of the JNF and the chief 
architect of the use of trees in the state building effort, stated that there was a need for planting 
3,073,000 dunams (ibid). The ways in which the Israelis use afforestation policies to enhance the 
national goal are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Afforestation was used to protect state frontiers. During and immediately after the 1948 War, 
afforestation was mainly along border areas (Amir & Rechtman, 2006; Cohen, 1993).  Here 
planting was not used to prohibit land use, but rather to promote it.  Israel throughout its history, 
has hoped to nourish growth on its “sparsely settled periphery” by its continuous attempts at 
dispersing population (Cohen, 1993).  This was achieved by the construction of agricultural 
settlements or by the provision of employment for the residents.  An example that served this 
function was the plantation of security groves and boulevards in towns and temporary labor 
camps, constructed by the government for the immigrant waves in the 1950s.  Planting and 
settlement usually came on borderland that had been closed for security reasons, which was 
generally under the possession of the Arab Palestinians (ibid).   
The Israelis used forests for “security groves.”  These were the trees that sheltered roads from 
the view of observers and soldiers in the “hostile neighbor state,” or provided “a marshaling 
point” for Israeli military forces.      
Israeli afforestation was aimed at assisting Israeli land settlement.  Thus, the location of 
afforestation projects, I argue, was determined according to the sites of Israeli settlements.  
Settlement was directed toward interested strategic sites, and afforestation was used to provide 
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 employment for the settlers of these sites.  It was used as a tool of stimulation for the Jews to 
settle these strategic areas.  For example, afforestation played a great role in absorbing the 
massive wave of immigrants that came in the early 1950s through the creation of new jobs and 
by providing training in agricultural skills that would serve the basic state economy (Cohen, 
1993).  A good example of using forests to enhance the Israeli settlement in the early period of 
the Israeli state was that which had been done in Al-Quds area which was known as the 
Jerusalem Corridor and later the Jerusalem Green Belt.  
The Jerusalem Corridor (see map 4.4)—that part of the route between Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem which ran from Bab El-Wad to the city’s western entrance—was considered one of the 
most contested areas of the 1948 War (Cohen, 1993, p. 64).  The Israeli state considered the 
existence of the Arab Palestinian villages in the area above the road to Jerusalem as a constant 
source of pressure on Jewish attempts to maintain connection with the city.  Thus, the Israeli 
authorities decided to clear the Corridor of its Palestinian inhabitants; and they were 
dispossessed.  One of these cities was Deir Yaseen, which had been the site of a massacre of 
Palestinians in 194827. 
Trees had been planted specifically on the village’s southern-facing slope, had begun in 
1950-1951 in order to remove the village and to encourage the settlement of the Jews on the 
same site.  This afforestation was indeed part of the efforts to provide employment and to settle 
new Jewish immigrants in the Jerusalem neighborhood named Givat Shaul, which was being 
created on the site.  The work on the site continued for four years, but at the end of this period, a 
fire destroyed nearly all of the 400 dunams that had been planted.   
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 In the Corridor some fourteen Israeli communities were established, most of them were 
Kibbutzim or Moshavim working mainly in agriculture.  Afforestation in the Corridor carried out 
during the Mandate period covered 18,000 dunams.  The area of the entire Corridor reached 
230,000 dunams, of which 150,000 were fit for afforestation.  Since almost 20,000 dunams were 
already covered, the goal was set to plant the remaining 130,000 dunams (Cohen, 1993, p. 65). 
The forest on Deir Yaseen/Givat Shaul was the beginning of serious planting efforts in Al-
Quds.  After the destruction of the forest on the site of Deir Yaseen in 1956, an afforestation plan 
on a larger scale was drawn up.  The details and implementation of this plan was the 
responsibility of Yosef Weitz of the JNF.  The plan called for the planting of a green belt of 
forest along those parts of the municipal border that were adjacent to open areas, which lay on 
the western edge of the city.    
There were different reasons behind the Green Belt around Al-Quds, including for the most, 
the ideological reason relating to the biblical status of the city as “the city that sits alone.”  It was 
meant that the city of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) should be physically distinguished from its 
surroundings in order to preserve its uniqueness.  It was thought that the green belt “would make 
the city stand out from the western approach” (Cohen, 1993, p. 68).  It was also believed that the 
green belt would prevent future expansion of built-up areas.     
The idea of setting the city of Al-Quds apart, I argue, was not only the Israeli planners’ idea.  
The British plans for Al-Quds had always strongly called for the creation and preservation of 
open spaces in and around the city (see map 4.5).  In 1944, a British plan called for the creation 
of a belt around the city that would consist of agricultural land on the eastern side of the city, and 
afforested land on the west (Efrat & Noble, 1988).   
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 After the reunification of Al-Quds in 1967, the primary element in the Israeli national policy 
had been to consolidate an enlarged and permanent capital for Israel.  Thus, great effort began to 
renew and expand the Jewish presence throughout and beyond the portions of the city that since 
1948 had been under Jordanian control.  As a way to expand the Israeli presence, there was a 
plan to afforest open areas within the municipality and on the periphery of the city.  Thus, the 
green belt28 (see map 4.4) that had been planted in areas under control prior to 1967 would be 
extended to encompass the new municipal boundaries.  The efforts to encompass Al-Quds in an 
afforested belt affected (and continues to affect) a number of Palestinian neighborhoods within 
the city and some sixteen villages bordering it—among these are the villages of Sur Baher, Beit 
Iksa, Beit Surik, and Abu Dis.  Indeed, this effort caused and continues to generate significant 
conflict.   
Most importantly, we can see results of the role that the forests of the Green Belt had played 
in enhancing Israeli settlement in the early period of the Israeli state, in the present time. The 
sites of most current Israeli settlement fringe that surround Al-Quds city (see map 4.6) are in the 
locations of the forests of the Green Belt as appears in map 4.7.  In fact, this role started during 
the British Mandate period.  This is seen by comparing the locations of the British forests (map 
4.5) with those of the Israeli settlements (map 4.6 above), which leads to map 4.8 that shows that 
most of the Mandate forests in Al-Quds area formed locations of the sites of the Israeli 
settlements.     
Additionally, plantation was intended to secure these settlements and military locations, as 
well as preventing Palestinian growth by consuming State or public Land.  In theory, the Israeli 
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 afforestation was to be focused on State Land, benefiting from the wide range of State Land 
inherited from the Mandate legislations, but as we have seen in practice, all land in the OPT is 
considered state land by the Israeli authorities.  The point was to plant abandoned and State Land 
in order to prevent land use by the Palestinians who had lost their lands in the 1948 War or its 
aftermath, as well as to limit their growth, and hence, to achieve a Jewish majority.  As discussed 
earlier, the uncertainty and vagueness of land ownership after the War of 1948, a situation 
persisting since the Mandate period, helped with the transfer of land to the JNF by granting the 
title of State or Public Land.  According to Cohen (1993), the status of State (public) Land 
ownership applied to more than 90% of the land in Israel (p. 67).  Thus, afforestation was used to 
guard this public or State Land from any other use.  As noted by the JNF, trees “were the best 
guards of land.  There is no better.  Walls and fences can be cut down.  A tree says ‘we are here’, 
if you plant a tree, that’s your land” (ibid).   
In addition to guarding the land, forests prevent others from using the land, so they can serve 
as a barrier to expansion.  For example, in many places in the Galilee and the Muthallath the 
“Arab [Palestinian] villages end where the forest begins, and the forest serves as a clear sign to 
the villagers, whether the forest borders on residences or on agricultural land, the sign is that 
there is no room for expansion, as the adjacent land is off-limits” (ibid).  The Israelis used 
afforestation to remove any confusion regarding the status of a particular piece of land and to 
protect its status in the future.   
Moreover, Israeli authorities used not only State Land in their afforestation policies to 
facilitate land settlement, but also privately owned land.  Possessing land privately owned by 
Palestinians was through a process within which the Israeli government and the JNF cooperated. 
Basically, the JNF was responsible for requesting or initiating the process of the declaration of 
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 State Land.  More frequently, the other associated agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture 
or the Municipalities, requested the JNF to plant a given area in order to assert the right of 
possession.  On some occasions, planting occurred before the registration of the area as State 
Land, especially if there was a possibility that Palestinians could establish a counterclaim. In 
some cases, the area was planted with no particular intention simply to preserve it as unused 
land.  One of the agencies that sponsored such planting was the Custodian for Absentee Property, 
under the sponsorship of the Defense Ministry in the West Bank.  Since, as we have seen earlier 
in this chapter, proof of ownership by the Palestinians is complex but impossible, an area slated 
for future Israeli use is found, planned and planted to confirm the status of State Land.  
Possessing private land was, I argue, among the reasons behind the tendency of the JNF to plant 
quick-growing trees such as pine, cypress, and eucalyptus, because these kinds of trees helped to 
establish a visible presence very soon.   
This management between the Israeli government and the JNF in this early period of the 
Israeli state resulted in increasing afforestation during this period.  At the end of the first two 
decades of statehood, a total of 90,033,000 trees—over 70,000,000 of them quick-growing 
evergreens—had been planted throughout the country (Cohen, 1993, p. 72).  This management 
also contributed to expanding areas of settlement and making them pleasant places for habitation.     
The role of the local Palestinians in this early period of Israeli domination in afforestation 
was limited.  They, I argue, were exhausted due to the wars and did not have enough power to 
pursue any afforestation strategies as a means of resistance to the Israeli domination.  However, 
some incidents of Palestinian attacks on Israeli forests did occur, such as the 1951-52 fire that 
destroyed the Israeli forests on the Deir Yaseen site.  Thus, this early period of Israeli domination 
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did not lack Palestinians’ practices of anti-afforestation towards the Israeli as a tool in their 
resistance. 
4.2.2 During the Period of the Israeli State Stabilization, 1970s-1990s 
This period had witnessed the achievement of the Israeli national goal of establishing a 
homeland in Palestine.  As a result, this caused changes in Israeli afforestation policies. The 
massive wave of immigrants had been settled in cities, development towns, and agricultural 
communities.  There also had been a decrease in the number of immigrants, with an 
improvement in the country’s economic conditions.  The old needs for afforestation decreased as 
settlement and the development of the nation’s infrastructure stabilized.  Thus, the role of 
afforestation in settling immigrants and creating job opportunities for new residents ended.  And 
this resulted, in turn, in an increase in the value of forests as a “resource of outdoor recreation” 
and a natural resource. 
Additionally, political changes that had happened at the end of the previous period resulted in 
further changes in afforestation polices of this period.  After Israel occupied the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip in 1967, all of Palestine came under Israeli rule. The country, in the period of 
1970s-1990s, composed of the state of Israel (the 1948 areas), and the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; areas occupied in 1967 (see map 4.2). As a result, 
purposes of Israeli afforestation polices directed towards the Israeli areas were different from 
those directed toward the OPT.   
Thus, afforestation in this period became the task of the Israelis composed of the Israeli 
government, the JNF and the Israeli settlers of the OPT, and the Palestinian people.  For each 
group of these actors, afforestation had different purposes and played different roles.  The role of 
each group is discussed in the following paragraphs.       
 The role of the Israeli government. The Israeli system during the period of the state 
stabilization employed ruralcide or anti-afforestation policy towards Palestinian plantation, 
which was composed of bureaucratic and legal tools including official attacks on trees and 
farmlands and the application of a number of restrictions.  These official attacks included 
uprooting or cutting down Palestinian trees for the purposes of land expropriation (whether 
private or public land), and for security reasons.  
Trees can be uprooted when land of Palestinian private ownership has been expropriated for 
the use of the Israeli state.  In such cases, landowners are entitled to transplant the trees on their 
property.  Rejecting the legitimacy of the expropriation, Palestinians usually refused to move 
their trees.  In such cases, trees were cut down or removed forcibly.  Additionally, trees also may 
be removed from land that is declared State Land, whether it is in the West Bank or within the 
Green Line.  Two particular examples of these actions are what happened in the villages of Al-
Midiya and Katannah.    
Al-Midiya village is to the southwest of Al-Quds.  The land of this village was claimed by 
the Israeli Land Authority (ILA) as State Land.  In 1986, the ILA started uprooting trees that, 
according to the ILA’s point of view, “were illegally planted on State Land” (Cohen, 1993, p. 
128).  To complete the uprooting work, a curfew was imposed on the village, and some 3,300 
trees were uprooted.  Then forest trees were planted (by the Israelis) on the land to prevent 
renewed agricultural use by the villagers.  Al-Midiya is mainly an agricultural village.  The loss 
of these trees extremely affected the economic conditions of the villagers.  Additionally, the 
villagers accused the JNF of taking the mature trees that had been uprooted from their lands to 
Israel—to the area within the Green Line—for replanting.  To prove their claims, they indicated 
the new locations of the trees captured by photographs.  Moreover, the villagers held protests at 
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 the prime minister’s residence, appealed to the Ministry of Agriculture, and raised the issue to 
the Knesset.  However, nothing was done to solve or even ameliorate the problem, and the matter 
quickly faded from the public view (Cohen, 1993, p. 128).   
The Katannah case is the most widely known case of uprooting trees.  Katannah village lies 
to the northeast of Al-Quds.  In the wake of the War of 1948, much of its land was on the Israeli 
side of the Green Line, and thus was taken by the government.  The land in question was planted 
with olive trees.  For a number of years after the 1967 War, the villagers made no attempt to 
approach the trees, but gradually they resumed harvesting the olive trees under the cover of 
darkness.  When a Kibbutz near the site learned that the villagers were renewing their use of the 
land, the government took immediate preventative action; according to a JNF official, “the 
government decided to take… ‘drastic action’ after it realized that under Ottoman law, failure to 
use the land could let the trees slip back into the villagers’ hands” (Cohen, 1993, p.  129).  Then 
the ILA uprooted some three thousand trees from the site, and many of them were replanted at 
different sites in Israel.  Since that time, campaigns have been established to gain compensation 
for the people of Katannah village: one by the villagers and their representatives, the other by 
Israelis who opposed the uprooting.  To date, nothing of significance has happened.  
Subsequently, some trees have been replanted by villagers and sympathizers—both Palestinians 
and Jews.  However, the disruption of the village agriculture remains, and Katannah has become 
“the byword for Israeli destruction of Palestinian trees” (p. 129).  Although the above two 
examples discuss the ruralcide policies of the Israeli government towards the Palestinian 
plantation, they show also the high cooperation between the Israeli official system and the Israeli 
non-official body, the JNF, in the application of these policies for achieving spatial control.   
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 Another official Israeli uprooting of Palestinian trees is for security reasons.  These actions, 
which are the greatest in number, are carried out by the Israeli army.  Tree uprooting occurs 
along roadways, with the pretext that the trees and the orchards along the roads provide a hiding 
place for attacks on road traffic.  A famous example of this kind of uprooting is what happened 
in Battir village near Bethlehem city south the West Bank (see map 1.4).  The location of the 
village just above the railroad tracks that connected Tel Aviv with Al-Quds caused the uprooting 
of the trees along this railroad.    
During the first Intifada (started in 1987), the number of trees uprooted along roads rose, 
because road attacks had increased.  While Israeli sources insist that just 1,000-2,000 trees were 
uprooted in the first year of the first Intifada (Cohen, 1993, p. 129), Palestinian sources, the LRC 
(1993), indicate that during this period about 25,000 trees were uprooted, and by the fifth year of 
the first Intifada the uprooted trees reached more than 60,000, most of which were olive trees 
(see Fig. 4.1 and table 4.1).  
The officially sanctioned tool used by the Israeli state included restrictions on Palestinians’ 
planting and uprooting of trees.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the planting of new trees was 
regulated by the Israeli government by requiring a special permit from the authorities. As Cohen 
points out, “The Civil Administration prevents the planting of fruit trees and vegetables in the 
West Bank without a special permit from the authorities” (Cohen, 1993, p.  127).  This was 
based on the Military Order “no one may plant, transplant or sow fruit trees in an orchard, except 
after receiving a written permit from the certified authority, and [only] in accordance with the 
conditions determined by it” (ibid).  Planting without permission would result in a penalty of one 
year in jail, a fine, or both.  Moreover, this order has the stipulation that “anyone who controls, 
hold, or owns an orchard, must notify the certified authority of this in a manner that it 
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 determines” (ibid).  However, the order and its stipulation were rarely invoked.  The reports were 
not made, and planting continued in the West Bank without application for granting permits.  
Stricter enforcement of the order was applied to the operation of commercial nurseries.  In 
general, the functioning of Palestinian agriculture is heavily regulated, interfered with, and 
limited.    
 
 
Figure (4.1) 
The Percentage of Uprooted Trees during the Five Years of the First Intifada According to 
Tree Type 
 
 
 
Source: Arab Studies Society & Land Research Committee, 1993, p. 18 
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The role of the JNF.  The JNF in this period, while cooperating with the Israeli government 
in its ruralcide policy imposed on the OPT, started to focus on afforestation in the Israeli areas. 
The JNF’s planners started to conceive of forests as a means of visual management of the 
landscape, a place for recreation, and a tool for preserving open space.  As a result, the 
afforestation policies were changed from policies as tools for realizing national goals, to those 
for developing and protecting a national wealth of natural resources that satisfy people’s needs 
for open space for environmental and recreational reasons (Amir & Rechtman, 2006).  
However, existing planted forests of mature trees needed proper management to adapt them 
as outdoor recreation sites.  That is, planted coniferous forests were of high density that made 
them unsuitable as a place of recreation, and did not support rich diversity.  Planted forests, or 
“pine deserts” as they were called by Amir & Rechtman (2006), were noticeably different from 
Mediterranean scrubland open spaces.  There had been much criticism of the ecological impact 
of new forests on native vegetation, the animal world and the landscape, and the misuse of 
forests for timber production (ibid).     
An example of these forests for recreational needs was that in the Al-Quds area, where the 
JNF began to implement what was conceived of as planting for the creation of an urban park 
(Cohen, 1993).  Additionally, in 1973, the JNF drew up a conceptual plan that redefined the 
functions, development and administration of the forest resources in Israel.  The main goals of 
this plan were to develop outdoor recreation at the national and regional levels; use the existing 
planted and natural forests to improve environmental and landscape qualities; create an economic 
infrastructure for timber production; and protect State Lands (Amir & Rechtman, 2006, p. 44). In 
1974, a 10-year plan was prepared with the new purposes of forests.  And in 1976, the National 
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 Planning and Building Board decided to prepare a National Outline Scheme for Forests and 
Afforestation in Israel, which was completed in the mid-1990s (ibid).   
In the 1990s, Israeli afforestation became an activity integrated in regional planning with 
three main goals: the protection of open areas from urban and rural development pressures; the 
development of tourism and leisure infrastructure in forests; and the renewal of the Aleppo pine 
forests that had been damaged (Amir & Rechtman, 2006).  Foresters of this period intended to 
create a high-quality forest, suitable to multiple activities, and in which the variety of species 
would be compatible with existing natural habitat conditions (ibid).  The uniform dense forests 
typical of earlier decades were substituted for different forest types, which are for multiple uses 
like recreation and grazing and contribute to nurturing and preserving a stable, sustainable 
environment (p. 45).  This was passed through an outline scheme in 1995.  This scheme granted 
the forests statutory protection and a conceptual framework for planning, administration and 
development of the forest resource (ibid).  Most importantly, parallel with the intention of 
creating recreational forests of multiple uses, old ecological factors of afforestation remained 
important in this period.  One area of serious ecological challenge was the Negev Desert.  The 
JNF initiated, and continues to carry out, pioneering work in arid-zone afforestation (Cohen, 
1993, p. 73).   
The role of the Israeli settlers. The Israeli settlers who live in the Israeli settlements in the 
OPT, supporting the official ruralcide (anti-afforestation) policy by the Israeli government 
towards the occupied areas, conducted ‘unofficial’ attacks of uprooting, damaging, or burning 
Palestinian trees.  Although settlers’ attacks during this period of the Israeli state stabilization 
were sporadic, they created serious anxiety among Palestinian farmers.  Such acts were the 1988 
fires—three in a week— in the fields and orchards of Anabta in the West Bank.  The more 
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 frightening attacks to the Palestinians during this period were the spraying of herbicide on 
vineyards adjacent to Jewish settlements in the Hebron region (Cohen, 1993).    
The role of the Palestinians. The Palestinian people, while observing the spread of the JNF 
forests, and the continuous Israeli attack and uprooting of the Palestinian trees, employed their 
own policy to prevent land alienation.  During the period of the 1970s-90s, the Palestinian people 
in their resistance to the Israeli policies conducted two forms of actions.  First were actions that 
happened before the Israeli plantation, and hence endangered Israeli control of the land.  Second 
were those actions that happened after plantation—attacks on the trees and the status they 
represent.    
Actions before the Israeli plantation included the extension or the continuation of Palestinian 
land use of new areas or areas that had been declared as state or closed land.  Thus, the express 
purpose of the planting by the JNF was to “sever the connection” to the land of those whose use 
was considered unauthorized.  This is what happened in areas adjacent to the Green Line29, 
which were inaccessible to the West Bank villagers as a result of the armistice agreement with 
Jordan in 1949.  In the wake of the 1967 War, villagers began to use the land within the Green 
Line.  However, in order to prevent Palestinian use of these areas, the ILA planted them.     
The most popular actions by the Palestinians to resist Israeli control through afforestation 
were acts of arson.  For the Palestinians, acts of arson in the Israeli forests were characterized as 
“nationalistically motivated” and, with the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, these were 
called for by the various Palestinian National Forces of the Intifada.  Although these kinds of 
acts occurred also before this period, the dimensions of the damage and the frequency of the 
attacks grew dramatically during the Intifada.  In the first year (1987), a rough count of 1,207 
145 
                                                            
29 The border between the Israeli state and the OPT. 
 
 acts of arson consumed some 1.2 million trees.  The area affected included approximately 10,000 
dunams of planted forest, while the scope of the open areas burned approached 140,000 dunams, 
some ten times the area burned in the previous year (Cohen, 1993, p. 124).    
Additionally, most of the arson of trees planted by the JNF occurred in areas within the 
Green Line.  The bulk of arson occurred beyond the Green Line within the area of the Green Belt 
(Cohen, 1993).  Because of the heavy concentration of forests in the Jerusalem Corridor, and its 
proximity to the West Bank on several sides, this area was the site of the most arson.  Up to 80 
percent of the arson attacks occurred in the Corridor Forests, some of which happened repeatedly 
(p. 125).  One forest that was subject to arson several times in a month was that near Battir 
village in the West Bank, which is The Ramot Forest.  None of the forests in the Green Belt was 
completely destroyed.  However, the accumulated damage was upward of 4,000 dunams (ibid). 
The discussion above reveals two important lessons that are crucial in the analysis of the use 
of forestry planning in spatial struggle in the period of the Israeli state stabilization.  First, is the 
strong cooperation between the Israeli professionals and non-professionals in the practices for 
enhancing Israeli spatial control. Second, afforestation practices of control and resistance were 
clearly entangled.  Actors used afforestation/anti-afforestation in the practices of 
control/resistance within the same space (forests).  For the Israelis, although their goal of settling 
the land had been achieved, there continued to be a need to protect and maintain their 
accomplishment.  Thus, they applied their policies of cutting and uprooting Palestinian trees to 
protect the land from Palestinian use and development.  As for the Palestinians, who still did not 
have the power to initiate their own afforestation polices to resist the Israeli policies and protect 
their claims to land, they applied their anti-afforestation policies towards the Israelis by engaging 
in arson.  This pattern included both the initial action and the response action in the struggle over 
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 space representing a highly dyadic relationship.  For example, more Israeli afforestation practices 
to achieve control over land lead to more anti-afforestation practices by the Palestinian 
resistance, which in turn caused stricter and larger Israeli afforestation efforts to control the 
space, and so on.  A good example of this entanglement of forestry practices of control and 
resistance is the Palestinian arson in the Israeli forests, and the response of the Israelis to these 
acts. 
For the Israelis the arson attacks were a serious problem that struck “a particularly sensitive 
nerve in Israel” (Cohen, 1993, p. 123).  Thus, in response to the acts of arson, there was a 
deliberate organized and cooperative reaction coordinated by the JNF and the government.  The 
campaign began after the first summer of the first Intifada arson in 1988.  The main goal was 
“broadening the scope of new planting beyond that which had been planned for, for the coming 
planting season” (p. 124).  The campaign also included a widespread drive to collect money 
through donations both in Israel and abroad.  This campaign was supervised by an inter-
ministerial committee including Defense, Police, Interior, and Agriculture (ibid).  Based on the 
biblical injunction “an eye for an eye,” the campaign took the name of “a tree for a tree.”  And in 
order to achieve the goal, the intention was to plant ten trees for every one burned by an arson 
attack.  Interestingly, this response was similar to that which happened in the wake of the 
destruction in 1913 of the tree planted outside Al-Quds (Jerusalem) by Theodore Herzl, when 
some two hundred trees were planted in place of Herzel’s tree.  It is also similar to what 
happened following the forest burning during the Arab Revolt in 1936-39, when donations for 
the JNF increased dramatically when the scope of the damage was publicized.  In all of the cases 
above, tree planting subsequent to the acts was significantly greater than which was prior to 
them.    
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4.2.3 After the Establishment of the PNA, 1990s-Present 
In the previous periods, Palestinian people lacked an official planning body representing their 
needs and desires.  This body was established by the declaration of Palestinian self rule (the 
Palestinian National Authority, PNA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1995.  Since then the 
Palestinian governmental institutions (such as the MoP and the MoLG as mentioned earlier in 
this dissertation) have become responsible for planning issues in the OPT—in light of the 
conditions under Oslo Agreement, as mentioned earlier in this dissertation, see Chapter 1.   
As a result, in the current period afforestation in the OPT has become the task of 
professionals and non-professionals on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides.  The Israeli and 
the Palestinian afforestation policies are the results of the work of their respective planning 
systems and people.  These different individuals and groups involved in afforestation have 
different purposes and motivations.    
The current Israeli anti-afforestation policies.  For the Israelis the main goals are to protect 
their state by limiting or hindering Palestinian growth, and, hence, to gain more power to control.  
Therefore, the Israelis (professionals and non-professionals) continue to apply their policy of 
ruralcide towards Palestinian plantation and agriculture within the areas of the PNA.  The early 
afforestation motivations for the settlement and holding of land do not have much importance in 
this period since land confiscation for settlement is now done by the support of Military Orders.  
In other words, there is less of a need for afforestation to claim land rights by the Israelis since 
these rights are established by the use of Military Orders (as discussed earlier) that declare the 
need of the land for security issues, military zones, or even development of existing settlement.   
However, plantation (and fencing) still is the first step in confiscating land by the Israeli 
authorities.   
 Israeli ruralcide or anti-afforestation policies in the current period applied in the OPT, 
similar to previous periods but more intensified, consist of two types and the results of two 
groups of actors.  The first consists of constraints and regulations imposed on the Palestinian 
farmers by the Israeli authorities.  The second takes the form of official and unofficial attacks 
including damage, cutting, or uprooting of the trees and the agricultural land by both the Israeli 
government and the Israeli settlers of the OPT, respectively.  
Policies of the Israeli authorities. The Israeli occupation authorities impose various forms of 
constraints over the Palestinian agricultural sector.  These include the declaration of specific 
farms as closed zones for the security needs of the Israeli army or because they are adjacent to 
Israeli settlements, which results in the Palestinian loss of accessibility to these farms.  An 
important example of this problem arises with respect to the Palestinian farmlands near the 
Israeli Separation Wall.30  Many Palestinian farmers with farmlands near the Israeli Wall lost 
their farms or the accessibility to their farms because of the Wall.  According to the Palestinian 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Wall consumes the fertilized agricultural lands of 50 
Palestinian villages (MoA, 2003).  Additionally, the Israeli occupation in many cases tries to 
push Palestinian farmers to obtain authorization for some agricultural activities like land 
reclamation.  Although this regulation is not uniformly applied, it especially affects development 
in the Palestinian areas that are under total Israeli control, which is to say areas in zone C, since 
most international donors focus on zones A and B for their projects, to avoid facing this 
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 regulation.  Moreover, one of the Israeli effective policies that constraint Palestinian plantation is 
the internal closure policy.  Through this, Palestinian farmers are prohibited from reaching their 
farms by the closure of the roads leading to them by the Israelis through the use of checkpoints 
or roadblocks.  Because of the closure of the roads, agricultural material and equipment cannot 
be delivered to the farmers, a policy that hinders their ability to plant (Israeli internal closure 
policy is discussed later in this chapter).  
The Israeli official attacks on the Palestinian trees occur in the following ways.   
1. As a kind of punishment, the Israeli occupation authorities used to cut or uproot the 
Palestinian trees.  Olive trees specifically were subject to these attacks due to their economic 
and symbolic meanings to the Palestinians, and also because replanted new olive trees would 
take a long time to bear fruit (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3).     
2. The Palestinian trees are also uprooted, cut or damaged by the Israeli military forces for what 
are called “security groves”; these are explained earlier in this chapter.  Additionally, large 
areas of Palestinian agricultural land were confiscated for the building of the Separation Wall 
(see Table 4.4).  Until June 2003, the number of trees that had been cut or uprooted for 
building the Israeli Wall reached 803,978, of which 234,830 were olive trees (MoA, 2003).     
3. The greatest impact on Palestinian agricultural resources is from cutting or uprooting trees on 
lands confiscated by the Israeli occupation for Israeli settlements.  Every month, thousands of 
dunams of Palestinian agricultural land are confiscated by the Israelis.  For example, the 
West Bank losses from September 2000 to April 2005 included 13,000 dunams of fruit trees, 
270 dunams of greenhouses, and 15,000 dunams of fruits and vegetables in open fields 
(UNDP/PAPP, 2005).   
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 Policies of the Israeli settlers. The Israeli unofficial attacks on Palestinian trees consist of 
uprooting, cutting, damaging, or burning by the Israeli settlers who live in Israeli settlements 
within the Palestinian localities.  In addition, they attack and threaten Palestinian people during 
harvest and planting times, damaging fruit or tree saplings.  Great numbers of trees have been the 
victims of the Israeli settlers’ practices all over the OPT.  On June 20, 2009, the Israeli settlers 
burned about 350 dunams of the agricultural land of the village of Beit Leed near the city of 
Tulkarm (BBC News, 2009).  After four days of this, on June 24, 2009, they burned the 
agricultural lands of the village of Deir Nitham near Ramallah, including 120 olive trees (ibid).  
Another attack took place after almost one month. On July 20, the settlers from Yitsahar 
settlement in the north of the West Bank near the city of Nablus burned agricultural lands related 
to Jet, the Palestinian village near Nablus, and cut down olive trees from the village of Burin, see 
picture no. (3) (Al-Quds Newspaper, 2009). 
 
 
Picture no.  (3): Farmers from Burin Village on their farmlands after 
being damaged and trees cut by the settlers of Yitsahar settlement 
Source: Al-Quds Newspaper, July 22, 2009.  http://www.alquds.com/ 
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 The current Palestinian Afforestation-Agricultural policies.  As Palestinians for the first 
time obtained an organized representative body, they gained the needed power to initiate their 
own policies of afforestation to resist the Israelis.  Thus, in this period we see the Palestinians 
(government, individuals and groups) organize afforestation-agricultural policy, afforestation for 
agricultural products, as a tool for their resistance.  These Palestinian initiatives are now 
organized by the PNA, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and by a number of 
non-governmental organizations.   
Palestinains’ use of agriculture as a means of their resistance is, indeed, due to its importance 
for both the Palestinians and the Israelis as well.  Despite the numerous difficulties and problems 
facing Palestinian agricultural sector, it forms an important factor in the Palestinian national 
economy and social life.  The Palestinian agricultural system depends mainly upon family work, 
using agricultural crops for the needs of the family.  It is a mixed-plantation system in which the 
Palestinian family plants different kinds of crops such as grains, vegetables, and fruits.  It 
depends on simple methods that need intensive labor, and suits the local environmental 
conditions.  The prevailing agriculture in the OPT depends on rainfall.  Rain-fed agricultural 
areas form 92.7-95.8% of the total agricultural lands (UNDP/PAPP, 2005).  Olives are the main 
and most important crop, with olive groves forming 70% of the total area planted with fruit trees 
(ibid).  
Most importantly, agriculture has great importance as the main source of income and food 
for most Palestinians.  It produces 90% of their needs of vegetables, meat, egg, and fruits; 61% 
of milk; and there is a surplus in olive and citrus which can be exported (MoA, 2005).  
Additionally, it plays a significant role in providing job opportunities for Palestinian people, 
especially during the difficult times of the Israeli sieges and closures, mainly during the Intifada.  
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 A report by UNESCO in 2002 points out agricultural projects—such as the projects of land 
reclamation—played the main role in providing employment for Palestinian laborers at the time 
the unemployment rate was increasing due to difficulties imposed by the Israelis during the Al-
Aqsa Intifada.   
Therefore, because of the importance of agriculture to the Palestinians, it also forms a 
strategic tool for the Israelis in their tactics for controlling the Palestinian land and people.  Thus, 
it has been subject to Israeli attack by a wide range of restrictions, regulations and damage 
through their ruralcide (or anti-afforestation) policy.  
Nevertheless, dominance is entangled with resistance using the same space of the OPT.  
Thus, the Palestinians (individuals, groups and government) also use agriculture as a tool in their 
resistance.  To this end, different agricultural-cooperative projects have been conducted through 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), such as land reclamation projects in all regions of 
the territories.  In these land reclamation projects the PNA, represented by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA) cooperated with Palestinian31 and international32 organizations (see appendix 
D).  This cooperation resulted from the recognition that individual Palestinian farmers could not 
survive alone, protect the land, and develop Palestinian agriculture in the face of the Israeli-
imposed difficulties. 
153 
                                                            
31 Such Palestinian organizations are: Land Research Center (LRC), Juhoud, Al-Khader Cooperation, Jenin 
Cooperation, Ma’an Development Center, Payesan Union (PU), Economic & Social Development Center (ESDC), 
Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committee (PARC), Arab Center for Agricultural development (ACAD), and Union 
of Agriculture Working Committee (UAWC). 
32 Such as International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Program of Assistance to the  Palestinian 
People (PAPP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and other foreign organizations from Japan and 
from Europe such as Spain and Italy. 
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Various land reclamation projects have been carried out in different villages in the West 
Bank.  Through these projects, various sites are worked by their owners with the assistance of the 
MoA and other organizations in providing the needed materials such as agricultural equipment, 
seeds and tree saplings.  In many cases—such as in the project “Participatory Natural Resource 
Management Program” (PNRMP)—the MoA helps in conducting fund agreements with the 
donors, in organizing the work among the NGOs and the farmers, and in providing the needed 
staff for preparing the required documents.  Tree saplings in most cases are subsidized for the 
farmers.  Lands are mostly planted with olive trees in addition to other kinds of fruit trees, and 
with vegetables according to the farmers’ needs and desires.  Work in these projects includes 
supplying irrigation systems, digging rainwater catchment wells, and maintaining existing and 
new rural agricultural roads to facilitate access to different sites.
These projects of land reclamation are worked with the main declared objective of 
developing the economic situation and livelihood of the farmers, their families, and thus the 
national Palestinian agricultural economy.  It is declared by the MoA that these projects are to 
supply Palestinian families with food, and to provide employment for the large number of 
Palestinians who lost their jobs as a result of the Israeli closures and sieges.  Additionally, 
although it is not declared officially, these projects are aimed at protecting the land from Israeli 
encroachment.  The main idea is that since the Palestinian national economy—and even the daily 
livelihood of the Palestinian citizens—is always the target of the Israeli attacks, resistance 
includes the support and the growth of the national economy and individuals’ livelihoods.  Since 
agriculture forms a significant element in the Palestinian economy, with its important physical 
results on the ground of protecting the land and of indicating Palestinian existence, it is an 
important tool in the Palestinian practices of resistance.  The idea of this kind of “covert 
 planning,” I argue, is to gain funds from international donors, and to focus on the economic and 
socially beneficial projects through which political achievements in the struggle with the Israelis 
over space could be accomplished.  The historical analysis of forestry planning in the Israeli 
domination period, discussed in this chapter, shows how this approach of planning has been used 
significantly by the Israeli professionals and non-professionals, which helped the Israelis achieve 
their desires of control.  
This ‘undeclared’ objective of protecting land against Israeli encroachment is achieved by the 
selection of the sites of the projects.  Priority is given to sites with specific qualifications, in 
addition to geographic, economic and social parameters.  These qualifications include being 
subject to Israeli confiscation, such as areas adjacent to Israeli settlements or the Separation 
Wall, and abandonment and remoteness, i.e., lands of remote areas are chosen to indicate its use, 
to show that they are not “unused,” that the land is being worked and crops are being produced 
on it (see picture no. 4).  This is because unused abandoned lands are mostly subject to Israeli 
confiscation, benefiting from the Ottoman and British legacy of land laws. 
According to the MoA (2009), sites that are protected from the Israeli encroachment by the 
projects of land reclamation include the sites of Wadi El-Qif, Beit Ommar and Halhool in Al-
Khaleel (Hebron) district (see pictures no. 5, 6, and 7); and the sites of Doma, Aqraba, Asira Al-
Shamalia, Eraq-Burin in the Nablus district; in addition to other sites in the Qalqilia, Salfit and 
Ramallah districts.  Most importantly, land reclamation projects in the areas of Biddo village and 
Jerusalem changed the path of the Separating Wall.  The farmers appealed with maps and photos, 
which pushed the court to announce the change of the wall’s track (ibid).   
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Palestinian plantation 
Israeli Settlement
Picture no. (4): this picture shows, as indicated by the green circle, the protection of 
the land adjacent to the Israeli settlement by land reclamation work in Al-Khaleel 
district. Source: LRC, 2009 
 
 
Picture no. (5): the site of the Beit Ommar reclamation project before the work 
Source: MoA, 2009 
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Picture no. (6): the site of the Beit Ommar reclamation project after the work 
Source: MoA, 2009 
 
 
Picture no. (7): the site of Beit Ommar with the newly opened rural agricultural roads 
Source: MoA, 2009 
 
 
 
4.3 Internal Closure Policy: The Theft of Space and Time 
Closure policy which applies movement restrictions is yet another spatial practice used for 
social control.  In some contexts it is used to control crime and social purposes.  In the UK, for 
example, roadblocks were used to control urban disorder and labor disputes (Brown, 2004).  In 
Belfast, where physical barriers referred to as “peace lines” closure policy was used to reduce 
localized conflict.  Similarly during the WWII movement restrictions were used in the US to 
restrict the movement of most Canadians and Japanese (ibid). 
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In the context of the OPT, closure policy has been one of the most effective policies imposed 
by the Israeli authorities using open space for controlling Palestinian people and space.  Within 
this policy, the Israeli authorities have deprived Palestinian people of their rights to free 
movement using both physical obstacles and permit regime. The Israeli authorities have imposed 
two forms of closures in the OPT: external and internal closures.  
4.3.1 External Closure Policy 
Israeli policy in the Palestinian Territories from the beginning of the occupation in 1967 until 
the early 1990s was to integrate the two economies.  During this period, the Palestinians were 
able to cross the border to Israel.  This free movement of the Palestinians was not in the interest 
of equality between the two populations, but it was to integrate both economies, to minimize 
Palestinian ambition, and to make Palestinian people mostly dependent on Israel.  The Israeli 
policy at the time was allowing and encouraging the Jews to settle in the 1967 territories; 
however, the Palestinians had no such rights in Israel.  This early policy of integrating Israel with 
the 1967 Palestinian Territories was, according to Hass (2002), one of Moshe Dayan’s (the 
Israeli Foreign Minister in 1977 to 1979) measures for “economic integration of the OPT into 
Israel with the aim of toning down Palestinian national aspirations and undermining the 
feasibility of an independent Palestinian State” (p. 7).  But whatever the reasons were, this free 
movement had great advantages for Palestinians both economically and socially, and also it 
benefited the three separated Palestinian communities in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel.  It 
helped them to establish direct contacts and consolidate the national and cultural common 
ground despite the differences that had been developed through the occupation. 
However, during the first Gulf War in 1991, Israel cancelled the permission of Palestinians’ 
movement to Israel, which meant the beginning of the external closure.  Under this external 
 closure, Palestinians who live in the 1967 territories wanting to enter Israel (or to travel abroad) 
needed a personal exit permit.  Consequently, to enforce its new closure policy, Israel set up 
checkpoints at the crossing points between the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel (these 
checkpoints have remained in one form or another until the present day). 
This general closure harmed Palestinians’ economy especially of those who lost their jobs in 
Israel.  Most importantly, it split the OPT into three separate areas: the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip and East Jerusalem.  The Israeli external closure imposed on the OPT can be considered as 
administrative restrictions represented by the limited work permissions given to certain 
Palestinians, which allowed them to enter Israel.  During the period of 1991-1993, Israeli police 
began to capture and arrest “infiltrators,” and military courts began imposing heavy fines on 
those caught without the proper pass.  In 1999, a “safe passage” was opened to link the West 
Bank with the Gaza Strip.  To move through this passage still required permission from Israel. 
Moreover, to maximize enforcement of the general closure, from time to time, Israel used 
“comprehensive or hermetic closure”.  This referred to situations where Israel would stop issuing 
permits or it would revoke permits previously issued for the purposes of work, medical 
treatment, family visits, and the like.  At the present time, external closure policy is intensified, 
and issuing permits to enter Israel is very rare. 
4.3.2 Internal Closure Policy 
Palestinians’ internal movement among Palestinian cities, villages and camps in the OPT has 
been firstly controlled by the Israeli authorities in March 1996.  At the time, according to Usher 
(1996), more than 1.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank were put under wholesale curfew 
with prohibition of all mobility between villages and towns for 11 days.  The NGOs in the OPT 
estimated that for the duration of this internal closure, about 200,000 Palestinians were prevented 
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 from reaching their workplaces.  Daily loses to the Palestinian economy were approximately $6 
million (Usher, 1996, p.35).     
Since the outbreak of Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, this internal closure policy has become more 
stringent and more intensive.  Palestinian cities and villages have been gradually and 
systematically sealed off.  Palestinian people have been prohibited from using what once had 
been their primary roads by a system of checkpoints and roadblocks (see map 4.9).  Under this 
policy, Palestinian traffic is forbidden from all main and secondary roads.  As a result, 
Palestinians not only do not control their movement within their space, but also do not control 
their time.  Their time is stolen or consumed by the Israeli military at the checkpoint while they 
are waiting for a long time (up to a full day) to pass, or most likely to be denied the right to pass.   
A personal observation might be revealing here.  One day in Spring of 2005, while I was 
trying to go to my work in Nablus City from my town near Tulkarm City, I successfully passed 
the main checkpoint at the entrance of my town (Ennab checkpoint), the flying (movable) 
checkpoint, which was less than two Kilometers away from Ennab checkpoint, and Deir-Sharaf 
checkpoint, about thirteen kilometers from the flying checkpoint.  After a period of nearly two 
hours, I finally reached the main checkpoint at the entrance of Nablus City (Beit-Eiba 
checkpoint), which was at a distance of only three kilometers from Deir-Sharaf checkpoint (see 
map 4.13).  The Israeli soldiers at Beit-Eiba checkpoint prohibited me from passing, simply for 
the reason “no one can pass.”  When I insisted I needed to pass, they detained me at the detention 
area at Beit-Eiba checkpoint for more than four hours, and then did not allow me to pass to 
Nablus. They ordered me to go back home, meaning going through another journey of 
checkpoints.  I left my home around seven in the morning, and returned back home at three in the 
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 afternoon.  What happened to me was typical for several Palestinians at different checkpoints in 
the West Bank and at different ages.   
For Palestinians to get to work, school, clinics, universities, relatives’ houses or markets, they 
have to circumvent the barrier or the checkpoint, climbing up and down sand embankments, 
walking through dust or mud in farmlands under the risk of being shot by the Israeli soldiers.  
Palestinian taxis are usually gathered at each barrier, roadblock or checkpoint.  Palestinians have 
to change transportation several times to get to the cluster of waiting cars at the other side and 
some of them do this on a daily basis.  A journey that would normally take twenty-five minutes 
has turned into an ordeal of three to four hours or a full day.  Thus, through this policy of road 
closure and movement restrictions, the Israelis steal the Palestinians’ open space.  It is, indeed, 
not only the theft of the Palestinians’ space, but also the theft of the Palestinians’ time.  
4.3.3 Effects of Internal Closure Policy 
Israeli closure policy imposed on the Palestinian movement has bad effects on both the 
physical structure of the OPT, and different aspects of Palestinian life including economy, health, 
education and social life.  At the physical level, the closure policy resulted in, in addition to the 
segregation between the Israeli areas and the Palestinian areas, the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian Territories. The Palestinian Territories are transferred into several disconnected 
enclaves (see map 4.10). 
More importantly, Israeli internal closure policy harshens all aspects of Palestinian life.  It 
affects all Palestinians’ rights as human beings: the right to work, to make a living, to proper 
medical treatment, to education, and to maintain family life.   
Economy.  The Israeli siege and closure resulted in gross losses to the Palestinian economy 
because it mostly depends on the Israeli economy.  According to Lein (2001), about 80% of the 
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 Palestinian foreign trade (which comprises 80.4% of the Palestinian GDP) is with Israel (p. 16).  
Most importantly, a notable decrease in Palestinian economy resulted from the fact that different 
local industries and workshops were closed because either their sites were adjacent to Israeli 
checkpoints, or because workers were not able to reach these industries because of the closure of 
the main roads that leading to them.  As a result, several Palestinians lost their jobs, in addition 
to those in Israel, in the Palestinian local market, which led to a sharp increase in unemployment 
and poverty rates.  For example, the Palestinian unemployment rate reached in 2002, 65% and 
poverty rate 70% (Palestinian National Information Center, n.d., p. 1). 
Health.  Israeli’s restrictions on Palestinians’ freedom of movement have been also harmful 
to Palestinians’ health leading to a deterioration of health conditions.  This led to gross violations 
of the right of Palestinians to proper medical treatment.  These violations resulted from the many 
difficulties placed by the Israeli authorities on the sick, on medical teams trying to reach 
treatment centers, and from obstacles to supplying hospitals and clinics with medicines, medical 
equipment and food. 
Israeli closure policy has delayed ambulances from reaching sick or wounded people or 
reaching medical centers for treatment.  Delays of patients or medical ambulances at checkpoints 
caused in several cases the deaths of the patients.  For example, the delay of the ambulance 
carrying an eleven-year old girl at Hawara checkpoint in 2001 caused her death (Dudai, 2001). 
Additionally, in testimony to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, B’tselem, a Palestinian taxi driver from Tell, a village near Nablus, described how 
the delay of his taxi carrying an unconscious Palestinian man (Isma’il) at a flying checkpoint 
north to Nablus, caused the death of Isma’il a few minutes after he reached the hospital from a 
heart attack, the driver said: 
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 I walked over to the first jeep, which was only some five meters from where I was. In 
Hebrew, I told the soldier who was sitting in the front passenger seat that a very ill man was 
in a car and had to get to the hospital urgently. He said that he would take a look... [the 
soldier] said that it was forbidden to cross, sick or not… I continued to wait… [I was told] 
Isma’il had died... (B’Tselem, Dec. 12, 2006) 
 
Moreover, many times ambulance crews have been subject to verbal and physical violence at 
the hands of Israeli forces stationed at the checkpoints.  According to Swisa (2003), during the 
year of 2003, ambulance crews have reported to Palestinian Red Crescent and human rights 
organizations at least 28 cases in which soldiers and border police officers humiliated and beat 
medical personnel.  In some cases, soldiers damaged ambulances or medical equipment.  For 
example, from 2000-2003, soldiers damaged 118 ambulances, 28 of which had to be taken out of 
service (Swisa, 2003, p. 14).  Additionally, Palestinian medical teams are subject to a critical 
phenomenon which harms and impedes their work: the use of ambulances by Israeli soldiers for 
non-medical purposes, actually to serve military objectives.  Although these incidents are rare, 
they are worth special attention because they endanger not only the medical teams but also 
Palestinian civilians who require ambulances to assist them.   
Education.   Similar to other aspects of Palestinians’ life, Israeli siege and travel restrictions 
on free movement of the Palestinians impair the proper functioning of all levels of educational 
system.  Many schooling hours, either of university or school education, have been lost due to 
absence of teachers because of delays at, or being denied passage, Israeli checkpoints and 
barriers. Additionally, due to many problems facing them to get to their schools, many university 
students quit their education, yet increasing the rate of unemployment, and the danger of having 
this large group of youths with nothing to do.  For Palestinian students to complete their high 
education they have to struggle to reach their classes on time every day.  However, there is no 
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 guarantee that these young people will pass the series of checkpoints; if one has passed the first, 
there is no expectation to pass the second, the third or the fifth.  Additionally, there is no 
guarantee that they will pass safely due to the danger of being humiliated, beaten, arrested or 
shot by the Israeli military forces stationed at stable checkpoints, or the military jeeps, which are 
in a continuous surveillance of the roads.  
Another way for Palestinian university students to complete their studies is by living in the 
main cities where universities are located, the very option that is full of danger and bad living 
conditions.  Parallel to the internal closure policy, the Israeli authorities, since the last decade, 
have been applying an intensive policy of, as called by Graham (2003), “urbicide”: attacks upon 
Palestinian main cities including military operations, sieges, and long curfews.  Thus, Palestinian 
cities have become an unsafe place for the students to live in and economically hard for them to 
find suitable rent in a bad economic situation.  According to Bocco, et al., (2003), 68% of 
Palestinian students were living in difficulties or found it impossible to attend classes. 
Social life and everyday needs.  Israeli’s restrictions on Palestinians’ movements have 
noticeable effects on all Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories of different groups, ages 
or residency.  Israeli movement restrictions have dispersed family members.  Because of the 
many difficulties facing the Palestinians on their way to work, to school, or even to visit 
relatives, most of them have preferred to live in the same community, where their work or school 
is located.  As a result, family members are scattered in different places according to work or 
school.  For example, in 2002 my family was composed of only three, and we were separated 
into three different places because of the closure: I was in Nablus city for my work, my husband 
in Tulkarm for his work, and because it was hard for me alone and not safe for our three-year-old 
son to stay with me, he stayed with my mother in a small town seven kilometers from Nablus.   
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 For Palestinian family members who already live in poverty to live in different places, it is 
economically hard, since having housing for each member of the family means an additional 
financial burden.  Most importantly, this housing is usually unsafe with no security because of 
the crowdedness in the cities due to the siege and being subject to Israeli attack at any time.   
Moreover, Palestinian society is famous for strong relationships between families and family 
members; however, dispersion of family members has minimized these relations or divided them 
because family members, relatives, or sometimes neighbors are not able to meet even for 
important feasts and occasions.  As a result, during the last decade, different social problems 
have appeared in Palestinian society, which was not a noticeable phenomenon in the past, such 
as the increase of divorce cases.  In addition to the increase of social problems, internal closure 
policy affected badly the everyday needs of Palestinian people.  Basic important materials for 
people’s daily living have been cut or have disappeared from the Palestinian society such as 
flour, baby formula and food, and gas.  In turn the shortage of these materials produced further 
problems, such as the shortage of gas causing cut offs of electricity in various communities in the 
OPT since it is needed for electric generators, not to mention health and nutrition problems 
resulted from shortages in baby formula.  
4.3.4 Palestinian Spatial Practices 
In the face of the Israeli closure policy of controlling Palestinian space, time and life, the 
Palestinians have their own spatial practices to maintain their rights to movement within the 
Palestinian Territories.  To reach their destinations, the Palestinians have invented alternative 
spaces using various mechanisms.  
Palestinian households have changed the roles of their family members according to closure 
policy.  In the early 2000s, some Israeli checkpoints allow women and all old people (over forty 
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 to fifty years old) to pass on specific days.  Accordingly, women and elderly people in 
Palestinian families have become responsible for doing any work that required travelling through 
these checkpoints.  In areas where the Israeli barriers are in the form of physical obstacles 
without Israeli guards such as roadblocks, trenches or earth-mounds, which are physically hard 
for elderly people to jump over, to walk up and down, or turn around them, young women of 
Palestinian households are responsible for the work that requires passing the obstacles.  The 
importance of continuing claiming their rights to movements among their cities and towns is in a 
degree that caused the Palestinians to change mechanisms of travelling.  For example, when 
vehicles are forbidden from travelling on specific roads, they walk, and when both walking and 
using vehicles are forbidden, they walk parallel to the main road in the adjacent lands.  For 
example, in 2002 I used to walk every day more than ten kilometers taking me an average of two 
hours.  An empty paved road with many Palestinians walking beside is not unusual in the 
Palestinian everyday life scenes.       
When the Israelis intensified their closure policy, the Palestinians have invented alternative 
spaces with alternative means of transportation.  The Palestinian people have used a local 
indigenous network of “bypass roads” to get around the Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks, 
which is known by the Palestinians as the alternative road-networks (see picture no. 8 and maps 
4.11, 4.12, 4.13). Instead of the local primary roads from which they are prohibited, they depend 
on ancient rural roads through farmlands in order to move from one place to another in the OPT.  
In respect to the status of these alternative networks, the Palestinians use substitutive means of 
transportation; for example, they use animals, horse-carts, agricultural tractors, tractor-carts, or 
even walk.  One might use all these means of transportation in one journey according to the 
status of the segments of the alternative road.     
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Picture no. (8): a Palestinian Taxi using an alternative road crossing the 
Ramin plain near Tulkarem. 
Source: Sari Michaeli, B’Tselem, October 22, 2006.  
 
Most importantly, Palestinian official system (the PNA institutions) cooperated with 
Palestinian people in facilitating their movement and, thus, defying the Israelis.  In many cases in 
different localities in the West Bank, different Palestinian institutions including the Ministry of 
Local Government, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
helped in repairing or opening alternative roads by their crews and equipment such as the 2004 
repair of the alternative road in Ramallah area that connected the city with Birzeit University 
(meeting with the General Manager of the office of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 
Ramallah, May, 2009).  Palestinian civil organizations such as Land Research Center, the 
Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, and the Welfare Association, also were involved in the 
work of repairing or opening alternative roads.  Interestingly, individual Palestinians shared 
according to their different abilities in this work: farmers by their simple farming equipment or 
agricultural tractors during night time or early morning, people living near these alternative roads 
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 by putting hand-written traffic signs to organize and direct movement of vehicles, and 
households in the areas by putting water coolers at the side of the road especially during hot, 
summer days. 
Since Israeli closure policy has affected all aspects of Palestinian life, the Palestinians defy 
this policy by using new ways of living. Because of the bad economic situations and the 
increasing of unemployment in a society composed mostly of young people,33 Palestinians have 
found new ways of livelihood such as selling goods near the checkpoints and at different points 
along the alternative roads.  At specific points of the alternative roads within the Palestinian 
localities, and in areas adjacent to the Israeli checkpoints where Palestinian crowds usually 
gathered to pass the barrier, the Palestinians started selling food, cold drinks, and hot drinks.  At 
the beginning they put their goods in boxes at the side of the street, then included various 
goods—such as newspapers, books, household items, fruits and vegetables—and built light 
structures for them.  Over time, these areas became important trade places where small business 
took place and formed a source of income for many Palestinian families.  For example, 
Palestinian villagers who could not pass the checkpoint to the city to sell their fruits, vegetables, 
cheese or oil, sell them in these areas, and any person, organization or small company that failed 
to pass the checkpoint might find their needs at these places.  Although it is the Palestinians’ 
economic necessity that motivates them, over time, working in these areas and their existence 
there, is seen by the Palestinians’ as a kind of resistance to the Israeli imposed policies of 
closure.  This is true, since, although the Palestinians working there are usually subject to 
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33 Palestinian people at the age of 18 and below form 64.6% of the total population of the OPT in June, 2009 
(UNICIF, OPT, Overview), http://www.unicef.org/oPt/overview.html 
 
 
 humiliation, bother, attacks, or even arrest by the Israeli forces at the checkpoint, they do 
continue their work at these critical places. 
Additionally, another new aspect of life that was adopted by the Palestinians in their 
practices of resistance to the Israeli closure policy is related to education.  To decrease the 
probability of cancelling schooling hours, Palestinian teachers who could not reach the schools in 
which they were hired because of the closure, served in the schools near their residence in their 
communities and neighborhoods.  More importantly, The Palestinian Ministry of Education not 
only accepted these teachers’ actions, but also encouraged it.  Additionally, facilitating and 
maintaining the normal study program, the Ministry of Education changed schools for teachers 
according to their residency.  It assigned each teacher to a school closer to his/her house.   
For education at university level, to facilitate and encourage university teachers to reach and 
stay in communities closer to their universities, some universities such as An-Najah University in 
Nablus allowed university teachers and staff free accommodation in residential buildings of its 
property.  Additionally, for some basic university classes that usually have a large number of 
students in different sections, university teachers who live in other cities (such as Tulkarm or 
Jenin), and had enough students from the city of their residency, held their classes in one of the 
public buildings in the city where they live, and it was not required for them to go to the 
university in Nablus every day.  For example, one of my colleagues at the Department of Civil 
Engineering who live in Tulkarm taught one of his classes in 2001-2002 in one building of Al-
Khadori College in Tulkarm. Additionally, the university registration office directed and 
encouraged student from Tulkarm to register in the section that would be held in their city.   
The discussion above highlights further dimensions of the ongoing spatial struggle in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. It points to the fact that space is not the only locus of power in 
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the struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians.  Time is also a significant dimension of 
this struggle.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLANNING IN THE FACE OF OCCUPATION 
5.1 Analytical Review  
Spatial planning is at the core of the struggle over space in the context of occupation.  In the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), spatial struggle is complex, and spatial planning has 
been used in this complexity for the exercise of power relations: the top-down and the bottom-up 
power.  There have been different groups of actors: some seeking control and others seeking 
resistance, each of which has employed their own spatial practices.  Power relations are highly 
entangled, and not only space, but also time are important arena for this entanglement.  This is 
learned from the historic analysis of afforestation planning during the British Mandate and the 
Israeli domination periods, and the contemporary closure policy during the current era. 
This study shows that the symbolic meaning of trees and plantation for various actors 
involved has given afforestation in Palestine a great role not only in representing the vegetation 
of the landscape, but also in reflecting people’s presence, identity and national ideology.  Thus, 
afforestation planning has been changed and developed during the long colonial history of 
Palestine in respect to changes in ideology and the will of the people.  Most importantly, as a 
result of differences in ideologies of people who live or contend to live in Palestine through its 
modern history, afforestation has been a core tool in the struggle over space across this history. 
Afforestation planning has been a key tool in the exercise of, what Foucault (1977a) called 
the “disciplinary power” and, Mitchell (1988) referred to as the “disciplinary order” of the 
colonizer or the occupier.  In the British period, planting trees was used to control the land and 
achieve economic and strategic goals by transferring afforestation planning into a discipline of 
law.  This was reflected in the Mandatory government’s large numbers of acts and laws imposed 
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on the local Palestinians concerning planting and cutting trees, grazing, zoning, and 
development.  By doing this, the British controlled the Palestinian land and people by Foucault’s 
(1977a) instrument of “normalizing judgment” of the disciplinary power by referring the local 
Palestinians to a set of rules and laws to be followed.  In other words, the Mandatory government 
judged Palestinian land and people according to its legal system (which was in itself built on the 
Ottoman legacy of disciplinary power), without any attention to the concerns and needs of the 
local populations or the local conditions of the land.  This clearly appears from their application 
of the British-born afforestation and planning laws in Palestine. Therefore, Palestinian people 
were excluded from the British planning process.  When included, the Mandatory government, 
addressing one important feature of the disciplinary power as described by Foucault, regarded 
the local Palestinians as the Mandatory instruments for economic benefits. 
While the British considered the local Palestinians as their instruments, they regarded the 
Jewish as their objects in the exercise of power, Foucault’s second feature of disciplinary work.  
This study has shown how the Jewish immigrants in Palestine were included in the British 
planning process, but at a high level of decision-making.  Additionally, afforestation practices of 
the Jewish immigrants were directed by their ideology and will in Palestine. So, they exploited 
the prevailing legal system to facilitate their goal of settling the land: the Ottoman legal system 
during the late Ottoman period and the British legal system in the Mandate period.  The common 
interest of both the Jewish immigrants and the British Mandatory government in Palestine ended 
in cooperation between the British colonial professionals and their non-professional objects: the 
Jewish immigrants. This cooperation resulted in afforestation order.  Plantation has been used to 
reflect Jewish identity in Palestinian space through the selection of the types of trees by using 
coniferous instead of olive trees.  Palestinians’ spontaneous plantation and agriculture, and the 
173 
 
indigenous life of the Palestinian Bedouins of grazing, for example, were considered as a kind of 
chaos that threatened the “order” and had to be controlled by the discipline.  Most importantly, 
the cooperation between the professional British and the non-professional Jews in establishing 
this order of afforestation provided the land and the power that Jews needed to build their state in 
Palestine. 
In the Israeli domination period, afforestation discipline continued to be sustained by the 
Israeli legal system, which depended on, and according to self-interpretation of, the British 
legacy, introducing a large set of Military Orders.  Most importantly, analysis of Israeli forestry 
has shown that the Israeli occupying power has been exercised not only within urban areas, but 
also within rural areas. That is, the Israeli occupying power is exercised not only within cities, as 
described by Graham (2003), the historic medium of colonial or warfare power, by applying the 
policy of “urbicide,” but also, I argue, within the countryside by applying the policy of ruralcide.  
Thus, Israeli disciplinary power is exercised within the entire space of Palestine.  
Israeli ruralcide (or anti-afforestation policy) imposed on the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories expressed Foucault’s punishment instrument of the power.  This dissertation has 
revealed the ways in which cutting and uprooting trees have been used by the Israeli system to 
sanction the Palestinians, at the same time to hinder their source of living.  The Israeli forestry 
planning, indeed, contradicts with itself within the same space.  This system is seen conserving 
and protecting forests and open spaces as natural and recreation sources in Israeli areas including 
Israeli settlements in the OPT.  At the same time, that it damages and destroys forests and 
farmlands in the adjacent Palestinian territories. This contradictory system of protecting and 
damaging forests, farmlands and open spaces is, I argue, a spatial expression of what Cresswell 
(1996) called “out of place” by the colonial power including the distinction between the same as 
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“ours” and the other as “theirs.”  Creswell (1996) argues that the notion of “out of place” is that 
power interprets what is appropriate and acceptable in space (or place) with “intensively political 
implications.”  That is, power creates in one’s mind a familiar space which is “ours” and 
unfamiliar space beyond “ours” which is “theirs.”  This notion includes installing a gap or 
partitions between “us” or “ours” and “them” or “theirs.”   
Like their precedents, the Israeli professionals cooperated with their objects of the non-
professionals in their afforestation or ruralcide policies. This cooperation or “covert planning” in 
the early period of the Israeli domination helped in the establishment and development of the 
Israeli state, and in the most recent period, in maintaining Israel’s existence.    
However, unlike their precedents, the Israelis have practiced their “disciplinary power” not 
only through space, but also time.  Analysis of the Israeli closure policies in this dissertation has 
shown that the bureaucratic imposition of restrictions on Palestinians’ movement expands or 
compresses space and time according to the occupation goals in respect to whom is affected: 
“us” or “them.”  Particularly, imposing the closure policy in the OPT compresses space and time 
for the Israeli settlers who live in these territories, at the same time expands them for the 
Palestinians.  The Israeli occupation through the use of closure policy has transferred Palestinian 
places (cities and towns) into an extended space that needs a long time to move within it.  This is 
while the Israeli occupation compresses space for the Israelis and transfers it into connected 
places that need a short time to move between them.   
More importantly, by applying the closure policies, the Israeli authorities put the Palestinians 
under continuous “order” of “surveillance” and “examination”, Foucault (1977a) and Mitchell 
(1996) key instruments of the discipline.  The whole society is monitored and must be kept 
readable.  Thus, every person has to be examined according to the occupational standards.  This 
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order views every Palestinian as a projection of a criminal, and thus, puts the whole society 
under the system of punishment in a way that not only their space should be controlled, but also 
their time.     
Additionally, this exercise within space and time for the Israeli occupational power affects all 
Palestinians’ aspects of life including education, health, and psychology, introducing them as 
main loci of spatial struggle. The policy of targeting the daily living requirements of people by 
using famines, which Kearns (2007) called the “bio-politics,” is a key element in the practices of 
colonial power.  Additionally, in the OPT, I argue, it is not only the “bio-politics,” but also edu-
politics, psycho-politics, health-politics, or wholesale-politics.        
Because of the dyadic relationship between control and resistance, the Palestinian people 
practice their resistance within the same targeted space, time and other aspects of life.  Their use 
of open spaces, whether by agriculture and plantation, anti-afforestation practices towards the 
Israelis, or by claiming their rights to movement by inventing alternative roads, is crucial to 
express their presence, their sumud on the land.  This is a tool of their resistance to the occupier’s 
control, and a means to maintain their rights to the land.  Palestinian continuous use of the land, 
the Palestinian sumud, is itself a form of resistance since resistance includes not only collective, 
but also non-collective actions and activities. For example, Bayat (1994) shows that individual, 
discrete and silent direct actions by slum dwellers near Tehran were the reasons these slums 
continued to exist.  Their continuous use of their captured places forced the government to 
recognize them by either formalizing and integrating these communities, or by tolerating their 
informal existence.  In this sense, Palestinian anti-afforestation practices towards the colonial and 
occupational plantations also have been a form of their resistance because they interrupt the 
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occupational order.  Additionally, they have threatened colonial and occupational existence by 
cutting or burning the colonial or occupational symbols of presence.  
Most importantly, in the early periods of Israeli domination in Palestine, ordinary Palestinian 
people, the non-professionals, were involved in spatial practices of sumud, such as the resistance-
anti-afforestation policies. After the establishment of the PNA and in the present time, and as we 
have seen in this dissertation, the Palestinian professionals and the Palestinian society: both 
groups and individuals are involved in spatial practices of resistance.  Moreover, since all aspects 
of Palestinians’ life are targeted by the Israelis, their resistance includes spatial inventions to 
claiming their rights to educate, to good health, to have income, to have family relations and 
even to live.          
The above historic analysis of afforestation planning and the contemporary closure policies 
in Palestine reveals three lessons.  First, the contemporary struggle over space in the OPT is 
historically constructed, and spatial planning played a great role in this spatial struggle as it has 
been a critical tool for control and for resistance. This has been through spatial policies and 
practices not only by professional planning processes and mandates but also by non-professional 
practices.  This spatial struggle has been through a combination of official policies and non-
official everyday spatial practices.   
Second, the occupying power has used spatial planning covertly to achieve desires of 
control.  There has been “covert planning” between the occupying system and its people that 
helped achieve their desires and goals of imposing control.  This is far from the ideal concept of 
“covert planning” as identified first by Beard (2003).  For Beard, covert planning is a radical 
planning concept that aims at transformation of the authoritarian regime.  In her case study on 
Indonesia, Beard called the process of building a library an example of covert planning by the 
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insurgents because to do so they had to resist the oppressing state.   The overt reason for building 
the library, which was known by the state, was for reading, but the library in reality was also 
used covertly as a place for resistance movements’ activities since the state prohibited them 
apparently in any public space.  Thus, in this sense “covert planning” is ideally a concept for 
empowering the oppressed and for the goodness of people not for oppressing them.  In occupied 
areas, however, “covert planning” is used by the occupier to impose control upon people. This 
knowledge is crucial for radical planning scholarship since it points out the “dark side” of covert 
planning.  That is, “covert planning” could be used accordingly in different contexts: in one 
context it can be used for the wellness of people, while in another such as in the occupied areas, 
can be used as a tool or a weapon against them.  
The third is the combined importance of the ‘state’ and the ‘people’ for planning.  Planning, 
I argue, cannot be the monopoly of the state, nor can it be sustained wholly by the people; both 
state and people are needed for valid planning.  
Critiques of state-directed developmental projects do exist in planning scholarship. Scott 
(1998), for example, discusses the resulted major failures of the twentieth-century state high-
modernist planning experiences, such as the total modernist planning of Brasilia, and the 
scientific forestry planning in Europe, namely in Germany.  He argues that, although these 
projects were aimed at improving human conditions, they were built on an order that ignored 
local conditions. For example, Le Corbusier’s plans for modern Brasilia lacked any attention to 
existing traditions, history, aesthetic tastes, or existing cities; the plans were neutral and abstract 
without context.  Moreover, in German scientific forests, the attention was given to planting 
scientific kinds of trees in a very ordered way to achieve fiscal revenues without any attention to 
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natural diversity.  Both cases failed: people could not live in modern machine-like Brasilia, and 
the scientific forestry model resulted in the death of most forests in Germany. 
People-directed planning experiences also do not succeed.  This dissertation has showed how 
the Palestinian people could not materialize organized afforestation strategies to resist colonial 
and occupational afforestation policies of control during early periods of the Mandate and the 
Israeli domination, because they lacked the official representative body to support them.  The 
Palestinians have only been able to establish their afforestation-agricultural policies after the 
establishment of the PNA.  Additionally, in the present time, Palestinians’ spatial inventions 
resisting Israeli closure policies are also sustained and supported by the Palestinian system. This 
study also shows that during those early periods, the afforestation practices of colonial and 
occupational people (Jewish immigrants in the Mandate era, and the Israelis in the Israeli 
domination period) would not have succeeded without the support and power of state (the 
Mandate state, and the Israeli state).  We see in this study how Jewish immigrants’ afforestation 
practices were sustained first by the Turkish government in the late Ottoman period and then 
continued under the Mandate government through ignorance and inclusion.  And also we see 
how the Israelis’ practices have been supported by the Israeli state through management in 
afforestation work and their inclusion in the planning process. 
In this sense, people need state power: organization, law, and finance to validate their 
planning practices.  In the same vein, the state needs people for implementing planning projects; 
they are needed to transform state plans from mere utopian abstract plans into valid planning 
projects.  The state is the umbrella for people’s planning tasks, and the people are the supporting 
structure of this umbrella.   
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In this sense, this dissertation applies to planning endeavor in contexts where there is no 
sovereign state such as the OPT.  This leads to the following section in which I am answering my 
early question of this dissertation regarding the ways in which a local indigenous spatial planning 
system can operate in the face of the complex conditions of occupation.   
 
5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations: Planning in the Face of Occupation 
We have seen in this study that spatial planning in the OPT is a very complex task since it has 
been used as a main tool in the intertwined pattern of control/resistance.  Existing literature on 
the role of planning from the perspective of the oppressed in the complex context of occupation 
is limited.  Therefore, recalling my early question of this dissertation, the main query is: how can 
the local indigenous planning operate while resisting control of the occupying planning? 
In the OPT—and other similar occupied areas—both the indigenous planning system (the 
Palestinian planning system), and the indigenous citizens (the Palestinian people) are occupied, 
limited and restricted.  In the context of occupation, the occupied authority is clearly not a 
sovereign state.  Not only the occupied society (the people) is restricted and regulated, but so is 
the occupied authority restricted and limited in its function— at times even paralyzed.  
Therefore, the indigenous occupied authority alone does not have sufficient power to do planning 
work through the known systematic top-down planning concept; nor does the local occupied 
society alone have sufficient abilities to do planning work conceptualized as insurgent or radical 
planning practices.  Thus, the need is for an understanding of planning that recognizes both the 
indigenous occupied government and the local occupied people.    
This understanding recognizes the specifics of the occupied areas as a context that lacks a 
sovereign state, and has only a local authority representing the local people. Thus planning 
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endeavor has come to include both formal and informal practices.  It consists of a cooperative 
work in which the professional planning system takes into account the practices of people, at the 
same time ordinary citizens give their trust and workability to the professional planning system.  
Within this concept both the local government and the local society are empowered since both 
the professional planning system and the people change their tasks accordingly to deal with the 
problems they face.  The people take the responsibility for issues in which the professional 
system is limited, and vice versa.  With these turning roles of the indigenous professional 
planning system and the non-professional local citizens, they are engaged in a kind of “covert 
planning,” while at the same time it is an “insurgent planning.”   
It is “covert planning” in the sense that its work is hidden, not known, but not in the sense 
that its goal is changing the local authority by its citizens.  We should keep in mind that in 
occupied areas there are two authorities: the occupying and the local occupied.  Political change 
or reform, which is a key goal of covert planning as first identified by Beard (2003), is within the 
agenda of planning endeavor in occupied areas, but in terms of empowering and reforming the 
local government and changing or even ending the occupying one.  Planning in occupied areas, 
similar to that under the concept of “covert planning” includes identifying weaknesses of the 
local authority, but not like that under “covert planning,” for changing it.  Rather, the 
identification of local government’s weaknesses in occupied areas is for the remedy of the local 
authority, for local society to take over responsibilities in these weak spots to empower its 
government.  In other words, the covert part of planning endeavor in occupied areas is for 
empowering the local authority by achieving results on the ground, not for political 
transformation of it.  
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Moreover, planning in areas of occupation is “insurgent planning” but in the face of the 
occupying state.  Insurgency, in “insurgent planning” means individuals’ strive to practice their 
constitutional rights beyond those given formally to them by their hegemonic state; it is a 
counter-politics that destabilizes their dominant regime (Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 
2009; Holston, 2009).  Thus, insurgency is the characteristic of citizens’ practices.  In occupied 
areas, however, insurgency is not only the characteristic of citizens’ practices, but also of those 
of the local authority.  In the face of the occupying state (and people) both local authority and 
local citizens involve in insurgent practices.  Practices of insurgent citizenship, as identified by 
insurgent planning scholarship such as Miraftab (2009), include the emancipation from the 
“invited spaces” of citizenship that are endorsed by the authority (the citizen’s state), to 
“invented spaces,” which are new spaces or the re-appropriated old ones for the use of counter-
hegemonic interest. Planning practices in the face of occupation, similar to those of insurgent 
planning, include the invention of new spaces different from those formal invited spaces.  But 
such appropriation and invention is carried out by both the local people and the local authority.  
The cooperation between the local state and local people in planning in occupied areas is a kind 
of inventing new spaces different from those “invited” spaces provided by the occupier.  
Additionally, in the face of occupation, not only the people but also the local authority move 
across “invited” and “invented” spaces of citizenship as it is the case in insurgent planning.  We 
see local state is involved in negotiation through formal channels with the occupying state.  We 
also see local citizens use formal ways such as the law and regulations to gain their rights of 
citizenship.  However, since Palestinians’ rights of citizenship and the Palestinian government’s 
right of authority are restricted and hindered by the occupying state, the Palestinian government 
and the Palestinian people cooperate informally: for the Palestinian citizens to get their rights of 
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citizenship, and for the Palestinian authority to facilitate giving these rights to its citizens.  
Additionally, this cooperation empowers the local indigenous authority in the face of occupation 
by creating facts on the ground that could have good effects on its formal negotiations with the 
occupying state, and hence, sustains the local government’s authority.  
It is worth mentioning that the cooperation between the local state and the local people in 
planning endeavor in occupied areas is not governing through inclusion (inclusive governance), 
through which neoliberal governing dominates, and to which insurgent planning as originally 
articulated by Miraftab (2009) seeks to respond.  This cooperative inclusion in occupied areas is 
driven not only by the agenda of the state, but also by people and their everyday agenda of needs 
and demands. 
In short, planning concept that suits areas of occupation includes covert and insurgent 
planning.  However, hidden work and insurgency are the characteristics of not only the practices 
of the local citizens, but also the practices of the local authority in the face of another occupying 
state (and citizens).   
In this sense, as we have seen above, lessons from history are very important.  The combined 
work in afforestation planning by both the professional planning system and the non-
professionals during both the British Mandate and the Israeli domination periods resulted in 
establishing and supporting a state and a nation: the Israeli state with its Israeli people.  
Currently, for the Palestinians to plan, maintain and protect their rights to Palestine’s space 
and land, they need to develop and encourage the cooperation between the Palestinian planning 
system and the Palestinian people.  This empowers both the Palestinian government and the 
Palestinian people, and is needed for effective and valid Palestinian planning in the face of the 
Israeli occupation.  It is the cooperative work between the Palestinian planning system and the 
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Palestinian society (individuals and groups) that would help re-build the Palestinian state.    
Thus, this dissertation concludes with my recommendations to the Palestinian planning 
system to develop and extend the ongoing cooperation in agricultural planning with the 
Palestinian society.  I recommend expanding this to include all other aspects of planning, in order 
to make the cooperation between planning professionals and non-professionals the hallmark of 
Palestinian planning, and thus enable other similar occupied areas in the world to benefit from 
the Palestinian case.  
My recommendations of “covert planning” and “insurgent planning” concepts for areas of 
occupation is not strange to planning scholarship but is, indeed, complementary to it.  Planning 
scholars—such as Liggett (2009), Miraftab & Wills (2005), Miraftab (2006 and 2009), Perera 
(2009), Roy (2009a and 2009b), Friedmann (1987, 1988, and 2002), and Sandercock (1998a and 
1998b)—have called for an expansion in the definition of planning, to shift it from a kind of 
planning that is the purview practices of trained professionals in suits and ties, toward a more 
expanded field that includes everyday spatial practices of people. This both reflects their power 
to shape the space and its territorial control, and to enhance it.  The recommended insurgent and 
covert planning practices in occupied areas amplify planning scholarship by taking into 
consideration the complex conditions of occupation.  Existing planning scholarship does 
consider the everyday practices of people in the face of their authoritarian state.  However, in 
occupied areas, consideration should be given to both the everyday practices of the people and 
the informal practices and policies of their authority that itself has to deal with another authority 
above it (the occupying state and people).  In other words, planning in areas of occupation should 
encompass both the informal practices of people and the policies of the local state or government 
to resist domineering spatial power of the occupier. 
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Moreover, my recommendation on the importance of occupation context contributes to 
participatory approaches in planning, in particular the forms of participation in non-western 
societies mainly eastern societies.34  Planning is a contextual field: deeply dependent on socio-
spatial and political processes that shape the context within which it operates (Watson, 2002; 
Roy, 2006; Yiftachel, 1995 & 2006).  There are various cultural and social differences between 
western societies and eastern ones.  Accordingly, the western participatory approaches in 
planning such as communicative planning are mismatched with a wide range of eastern-stubborn 
realities.  
For example, in the western communicative planning model (Forester, 1989; Innes, 2004; 
Healey, 2006), public participation in planning is achieved by consensus building and the full 
participation of all stakeholders.  However, full participation and consensus building is limited in 
the OPT and other eastern societies.  Consensus building among entities with different 
viewpoints in western (industrialized developed) societies is achievable because western liberal 
democratic societies are relatively more prosperous , more stable, and in which most individuals, 
even members of minorities have reasonable personal liberties, existential security and basic 
welfare provision (Yiftachel, 2006).  However, consensus building is rarely achieved in eastern 
societies since they are characterized by deep ethnic, caste and racialized conflicts that give rise 
to divisive political perspectives.  For eastern societies, liberalism is not a stable constitutional 
order; it is mainly an economic agenda.  Public participation efforts in eastern societies are often 
perceived as “lip service” or forms of co-optation (Yiftachel, 2006).  These stubborn 
characteristics of eastern societies in general are of great significance in the OPT in particular.  
Palestinian society faces some of the most complex and troubled political issues in the world 
 
34 The non-liberal democratic societies that have a history of colonization and domination. 
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resulted from its colonial history and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.  Its institutional system is 
exposed to destruction at official and social levels.  It is a society of increasing factionalism, and 
gives much respect to family relations, kinship, communal property, and tribal networks. Under 
these conditions, achieving consensus in the OPT is very hard and probably impossible.  
Thus public participation in planning in the OPT, and other eastern societies, has to be 
reconceived: instead of consensus, it needs to consider what people are spatially doing on the 
ground.  This kind of participation forms the core of the covert and insurgent planning practices 
recommended in this dissertation for areas of occupation.  The recommended cooperation 
between official planners and non-official people in occupied areas includes taking into 
considerations people’s practices in planning.  This is the very meaning of public participation.   
The innovative aspect of the recommended planning for areas of occupation in this 
dissertation is that attention is paid to both planning process and outcomes, which is different 
from that in the western normative planning model. Communicative planning, for example, 
focuses on the planning process with the idea that a just process will result in just outcomes 
(Watson, 2002), which is not the case in the OPT and other eastern societies.  The OPT, and other 
eastern societies, are volatile environments and often informally directed.  Issues are likely to be 
changed at implementation stage according to frequent changes beyond the control of local 
authorities or local indigenous people.  This decreases the probability of achieving just outcomes.  
Therefore, by taking into consideration the spatial practices of people on the ground in occupied 
areas both just public participation in planning process and just outcomes are achieved.  This is 
the kind of public participation in planning needed in eastern societies.  
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Map 1.1 
Map of Oslo II agreement in 1995  
 
Source: Ministry of Planning (MoP), 2009 
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Map 1.2 
The Israeli Settlements and the Bypass Roads in the West Bank in 2004 
 
 
Source: The Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ), 2004 
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Map (1.3) 
The Different Regions of the West Bank, 2006  
 
Al-Aqaba 
Battir 
Source: Ministry of Planning (MoP), 2006 
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 Map (1.4) 
Damaged Buildings in the Old Section of Nablus City after the 2002 Israeli Attack 
                       Damaged Buildings                         
 
Source: Nablus Municipality, the Old City Rehabilitation Unit, 2004 
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Map (3.1) 
The Geography of the Land Transfer Regulations: Zones of 1940 
  
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 262.
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Map (3.2) 
Zoning in the Mandate District Plans (RJ5 and S15) within the West Bank, 1936   
 
Source: Khamaisi, 1997, p. 327. 
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Map (3.3) 
State Forest Reserves and Private Forests in 1927 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 202. 
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Map (3.4) 
Forest Reserves and State Domain in 1936 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 202. 
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 Map (3.5) 
Most of British State Domain Areas Located in the Then Israeli State in 1948 
 
State of Israel in 1948  
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 202. 
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Map (3.6) 
British Special Areas in 1947 Located Within the Then State of Israel in 1948 
 
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 209 
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Map (3.7) 
Locations of British Swamp Areas Projects Were Within the State of Israel in 1948 
 
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 527 
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Map (3.8) 
Dawe’s Proposed Plantation Scheme (Read with table 3.1) 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 195 
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 Map (3.9) 
The Free Zone of British Land Transfer Ordinance of 1940 Was Located in the Then State 
of Israel in 1948 
 
State of Israel in 1948  
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 262 
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Map (3.10) 
British Proposed Soil Erosion Areas That to Be Planted, 1944  
 
 
 
 
Redrawn by author from : El-Eini, 2006, p. 217 
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Map (3.11) 
British Forests on Hilly Areas Formed the Sites of Most of Existing Israeli Settlements in 
the West Bank 
 
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 217 and MoP 
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Map (3.12) 
British Proposed Sand Dune areas for Plantation, 1944 
 
 
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 217 
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Map (3.13) 
Locations of British Sand Dune Fixation Projects Were in the Then State of Israel in 1948 
 
State of Israel in 1948  
Source: Araj, based on El-Eini, 2006, p. 217 
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Map (4.1) 
The United Nation Partition Plan of Palestine in 1947  
 
Source: Abu Sitta (Dec. 22, 2006). The Atlas of Palestine 
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Articles/General/Story1933.html 
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Map (4.2) 
The state of Israel in 1948 and the OPT in 1967 
 
Source: An Atlas of Palestine, 2002, p. 20  
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Map (4.3) 
The Mandate Regional Plans: S15 and RJ5  
  
Source: Coon, 1992, p. 75 
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Map (4.4) 
Green Belt Afforestation since 1967. This map highlights projects carried out since the 
reunification of Jerusalem. 
 
 
Source: Cohen, 1993, p110. 
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Map (4.5) 
The Mandate Afforestation around Al-Quds 
 
    
 
Drawn by the Survey of Palestine, 1943 
Source: Archive, MoP 
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Map 4.6 
The Israeli Settlements in Al-Quds Area  
 
      Israeli 
settlements    
Source: MoP, 2009 
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Map (4.7) 
Most of the Current Israeli Settlements in Al-Quds Area are in the locations of the Green 
Belt Forests 
 
Source: Drawn from MoP (2009) & Cohen (1993, p. 110). 
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Map (4.8) 
The Relation Between the Locations of the Mandate forests and the Israeli Settlements in 
Al-Quds Area 
 
Source: Drawn from Survey of Palestine (1943) & MoP (2009) 
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Map (4.9) 
The Israeli Checkpoints in the West Bank, 2004 
 
Source: The Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ), 2004 
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Map (4.10) 
The Effect of the Israeli Internal Closure policy of Splitting the West Bank  
 
Source: Makdisi, 2008, p. 338 
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 Map (4.11) 
 
Palestinian Alternative Road in Al-Khalil Governorate 
  
 
Source: Land Research Center (LRC), 2009 
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 Map (4.12) 
Palestinian Alternative Road in Nablus Governorate 
 
 
Based on B’Tselem , August 2007 
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Map (4.13) 
Palestinian Alternative Road from Tulkarm to Nablus Cities 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
1 Ennab Checkpoint, 2 the Flying Checkpoint, 3 Deir-Sharaf Checkpoint, 4 Beit-Eiba Checkpoint 
Based on B’Tselem , August 2007 
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TABLES 
 
Table (1.1) 
Cases of Israeli settlers’ Attacks and Occupation of Specific Buildings in Al-Khalil City 
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Source: From a Follow-up Report, Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (HRC), 2007 
The case Description 
1. Seizure of Jamal Tahboub’s roof 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The house is located on Al-Shalalah old street in the 
Old City of Hebron. It is adjacent to the Beit Hadassa 
settlement on the Western side. Settlers invaded the 
roof of the house and installed an iron handrail. They 
created a door connecting the roof to the settlement. 
2. Seizure of Sama’an Abou 
Sakour’s land 
The building and land are located in Tal Al-Rumeida. 
Settlers installed games and an iron ladder on the 
land. 
3. Occupation of Zakaria Al 
Bakri’s house 
The house, located in Tal Al-Rumeida, near the Tal 
Al-Rumeida settlement in the Old City of Hebron 
was invaded and occupied by settlers. 
4. Teachers’ housing/sultan This issue concerns the land assigned for the 
Teachers’ housing project in Al Boueira, Hebron, 
where the Kiryat Arba’ council unjustifiably took 
possession of part of the land and set up a park. 
5. Partial demolition of Naser-
Eddin building 
Beit Hadassa settlers demolished part of Izzat and 
Dawood Nassereddin’s house, located on the Old Al 
Shalalah street near the Beit Hadassa settlement on 
the Northern side of the Old City of Hebron. 
 
6. Erection of electric poles in Wad 
Al Hassin 
Settlers erected electric poles on the land owned by 
the Jaber, Souaifan and Da’ana families located in 
Wadi Al-Nassara, on the southwestern side of 
Kiryat Arba’ settlement in Hebron. 
7. Occupation of Al Nather 
house/phase I 
The house is located in Bab Al Khan. It consists of 
three levels and is owned by Al Nather family. 
Settlers took over the house. 
8. Occupation of Fayez Al Rajabi 
building  
The building is located in Wadi Al-Nassara in 
Hebron. In April 2007 the settlers’ occupied the 
building. 
 
 
 
Table (3.1) 
Index to Map (3.5) Above 
 
No. Forest Reserve Sub-District Area of Reserve 
Dunams 
No. of Units to 
Be Planted 
(1936-37) 
No. of Years 
Planting to 
Continue in 
Each Reserve 
1 Meirun (Meiron) Safad 1,500 1 3 
2 Jebel Toran     
 Turan or Tur’an Nazareth 14,000 2 14 
3 Jebel Sacha  (Sasha) Nazareth 6,000 1 12 
4 Wadi Mughara Haifa 7,500 1 15 
5 Abu Huran Jenin 1,500 1 3 
6 Ras Zeid Nablus 2,000 1 4 
7 Jebel Saradi Hebron 3,800 2 3 
8 Mughar Ramle 1,800 1 2 
Total   37,300 10  
 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 194 
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Table (3.2) 
The Four Types of Land management for Closed Forest areas (Closed to Grazing and 
other Forms of Interference), 1936  
 
Type Management 
(a) Experimental The area of land devpted to an experiment depends on the nature of the experiment, and 
recors are kept in full deatil, both technical and financial. 
(b) Special In araes of specail importnace or difficulty, where accelerated afforestation is desired, 
intensive management is necesarry. The land is divided into compartments of 
approximately 100 dunams and full records of working [sic] are kept for each 
compartment. 
(c) Productive Where forest produce could be obtained from an area it will be divided into 
compartmnets for purposes of record, and a working plan made to determine araes and 
dates of cutting, and methods or regeneration. 
(d) General Ruined lands closed for regeneration will be divided into ‘Blocks’ of approximately 500 
dunams based on the areas which one labourer can protect and work. The cost of the 
man engaged on guarding and cultural operations will be charged against the Block, and 
a report made periodically on the condition of the growing stock. When the vegetation 
has been completely regenerated, it is hoped that one man will be able to protect several 
Blocks during the resting period. (Owing to the disturbances [the 1936-39 Arab Revolt], 
no araes have so far been worked inder (c) and (d).  
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 520. 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (3.3) 
Land Categories as Defined by Sale in 1936 
 Category Definition 
AI State Forest State Domain definitely allocated to Forestry and declared as Closed 
Forest Reserve. Allocated by Government authority, while the 
declarations bring the land legally under the provisions of the Forests 
Ordinance. 
AII Allocated State Domain Land that for some reason (usually security-related) has not yet been 
declared a Closed Forest Reserve. 
BI Closed State Domain Land not yet definitely allocated by Government but which is under 
Forests Department protection and has been declared a Forest Reserve 
and Closed Forest Area. 
BII Open State Domain  Land not definitely allocated which has been declared a Forest reserve 
but not a Closed Forest area. 
BIII State Domain: not Forest 
reserve 
Includes land which is to be declared or such land as nurseries, etc., 
where declaration is unnecessary or delayed. 
CI Closed Forest Reserve Land not registered as State Domain, which has been declared a Forest 
Reserve and a Closed Forest Area. 
CII Open Forest Reserve Land which has been declared a Forest Reserve, but not closed to 
grazing and cutting. 
CIII Undemarcated Forest 
Reserve 
Land similar to CII (Open Forest Reserve), which has been declared a 
Forest reserve with approximate boundaries, but which still awaits 
demarcation and survey. 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 521 
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Table (4.1) 
Total Numbers of Trees Uprooted in All Areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip According 
to Tree Type During the Five Years of the First Intifada 
 
 
Time, Period                                                            Types of Trees                                                                  Total 
 
 
 
     
         Olive   
 
     Almond        
 
      Citrus 
 
       Vine 
 
      Other 
 
     1st year         13967         1748        1277        1841        4607        23440 
     2nd year         22936         1944        3887        1932        5285        35984 
     3rd year         23308         1431        3753        3826        2217        34535 
     4th year         28533         4867        2406        6193        3697        45696 
     5th year         28633         2096        3414        9425        1041        64279 
      Total         117377        12086       14737        3217       26517       203934 
  
Source: Arab Studies Society & Land Research Committee, 1993, p. 16 
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Table (4.2) 
The Losses of Farmers Due to the Israeli Practices Relating to Destroying Houses, 
Wells and Agricultural Buildings from 09/28/2000-04/30/2005 
 
Losses  Unit Total 
Agricultural stores N0. 770 
Poultry Farms And Equipment N0. 756 
Sheep and Goats  N0. 14749 
Animals  N0. 12132 
Beehives  N0. 15265 
Poultry and Birds Farm Bird 1.250.059 
complete water wells and supplements N0. 403 
Pools and Water Stores  N0. 1327 
Basic Water Lines Meter 929984 
Irrigation Networks Dunam 31263 
Farms Fences Meter 609593 
Package and Storing Station N0. 2 
Experimental Station N0. 2 
Nurseries N0. 16 
Destroying Tractors N0. 16 
Number of Affected Farmers Farmer 16177 
            
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), retrieved June, 2009 from 
http://www.moa.gov.ps/index.php. 
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Table (4.3) 
The Losses Incurred the Palestinian Agricultural Sector Due to The Israel 
Aggressive Practices Relating to Destroying TREES, Greenhouses & Vegetable 
Farms from 09/28/2000-04/30/2005 
Losses Unit Total 
Olive trees Tree 445699 
Date trees Tree 34056 
Citrus trees Tree 542777 
Almond trees Tree 84191 
Grapevines Tree 88567 
Banana trees  Tree 20400 
other Fruit trees Tree 128780 
Forest trees   and fences Tree 10227 
Total Number of Uprooted 
trees 
Tree 1355290 
Total of Uprooted Trees Area  Donum 48184 
Vegetable Fields  Donum 12618 
Greenhouses Donum 2183 
  field crops Donum 13882 
  Total Uprooted Area  Donum 76867 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), retrieved June, 2009 from 
http://www.moa.gov.ps/index.php. 
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Table (4.4) 
Agricultural Lands Confiscated and Bulldozed in Hectares in the First stage of the 
Separation Wall 
 
Plantation Cover Bulldozed Lands Confiscated Lands Total 
Olive 6,262.3 974.3 7,236.6 
Citrus 800.8 200.3 1,001.1 
Fruit Trees 355.8 75.6 431.4 
Cereals 1,852.2 61.7 1,913.9 
Green Houses 191.4 61.7 253.1 
Grazing areas 980.0 6.9 986.9 
Others 155.5 6.9 162.4 
Total 10,598.0 1,387.4 11,885.4 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), retrieved June, 2009 from 
http://www.moa.gov.ps/index.php. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
SUMMARY OF TEAR’S FORESTRY POLICY IN 1933   
 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 508. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUMMARY OF SALE’S FOREST AND LAND POLICIES, 1936 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 511-512. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ARTICLE SIX OF THE BRITISH MANDATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: El-Eini, 2006, p. 461 
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APPENDIX D 
 
THE PALESTINIAN NGOs PARTICIPATE IN PNRMP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Land Reclamation Program in Economic and Agricultural Development Unit-UNDP/PAPP, 2005. 
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